The Right of Veto
It won't make sense for the UN to pass a resolution if a great power will not obey it. Logically, the UN must only make resolutions that it can enforce. If a great power simply chooses to disobey a resolution, then the UN cannot force that power to obey it. This obviously undermines the legitimacy of the UN as an institution. It seems reasonable that that legitimacy be preserved. It therefore seems reasonable that the UN provide a mechanism to avoid passing resolutions that great powers will not obey.
This mechanism, of course, is the right of veto. Currently, the right of veto is held by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Those members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are ten other members on the Security Council, who are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. They have no right of veto. Any resolution passed by the Security Council is enforceable by the UN. Consequently, non-permanent members (and non-members) face some kind of sanction if they disobey a Security Council resolution. Permanent members, on the other hand, face no sanction, but not because they would ever disobey a Security Council resolution. It is simply that such resolutions could not get passed by the Council to begin with. Any permanent member that did not like a resolution would simply veto that resolution.
Theoretically, the permanent members of the Security Council are all the great powers. These are the powers whose disobedience the UN could not control. It is consequently not in the UN's interests to pass resolutions that they will not obey. That is why those powers have the right of veto.
The choice of these permanent members, however, is rather antiquated. It reflects the power structure in effect when the UN was first created, in 1945. As such, the choice surely needs to be revised. Exactly how it should be revised is something I shall research later. But whoever ends up being a permanent member should only be a power so great that the UN could not enforce any resolution with which it would disobey.
This legal right of veto must therefore be distinguished from a moral right of veto. A great power can get away with disobeying a Security Council resolution. The legal right of veto merely acknowledges this fact. It does not, of course, follow that that power ought to get away with such disobedience. In that respect, it would be more moral if resolutions were passed by simple majority and binding for all parties. Hence, the right of veto cannot have any direct moral justification. But it does not make sense for a more democratic system to be in effect if it cannot be imposed upon all powers. This would only destabilise the UN system at the outset. And it is surely better that there be some UN system than no UN system, as I argued in the last section.
This mechanism, of course, is the right of veto. Currently, the right of veto is held by the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Those members are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are ten other members on the Security Council, who are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. They have no right of veto. Any resolution passed by the Security Council is enforceable by the UN. Consequently, non-permanent members (and non-members) face some kind of sanction if they disobey a Security Council resolution. Permanent members, on the other hand, face no sanction, but not because they would ever disobey a Security Council resolution. It is simply that such resolutions could not get passed by the Council to begin with. Any permanent member that did not like a resolution would simply veto that resolution.
Theoretically, the permanent members of the Security Council are all the great powers. These are the powers whose disobedience the UN could not control. It is consequently not in the UN's interests to pass resolutions that they will not obey. That is why those powers have the right of veto.
The choice of these permanent members, however, is rather antiquated. It reflects the power structure in effect when the UN was first created, in 1945. As such, the choice surely needs to be revised. Exactly how it should be revised is something I shall research later. But whoever ends up being a permanent member should only be a power so great that the UN could not enforce any resolution with which it would disobey.
This legal right of veto must therefore be distinguished from a moral right of veto. A great power can get away with disobeying a Security Council resolution. The legal right of veto merely acknowledges this fact. It does not, of course, follow that that power ought to get away with such disobedience. In that respect, it would be more moral if resolutions were passed by simple majority and binding for all parties. Hence, the right of veto cannot have any direct moral justification. But it does not make sense for a more democratic system to be in effect if it cannot be imposed upon all powers. This would only destabilise the UN system at the outset. And it is surely better that there be some UN system than no UN system, as I argued in the last section.
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