Notes

We should consider our introduction to the paper. It does not seem enough simply to say, "We are going to consider what makes a person the same person over time. But the problem with this question is that it is ambiguous." This formulation does not indicate to the lay reader why this question is interesting in the first place. Tip 4 states: Do not expect the reader to fill in gaps in your reasoning, even if you know they have read the same things you have. Write as if you were trying to explain things to one of your friends who is not taking the class. You might even test this by having a friend read the first draft. What makes this question interesting to me is that it is essentially a matter of life and death. Right now, people assume in various cyberpunk novels that people can be copied. They think that it is okay for their current bodies to die if they have backed themselves up. I need to tell them that it is not okay. I would never consent to being killed even if I

I have now written nine entries on the metaphysics of personal identity. I had a brainstorm last night that gave me enough information to write a proper paper on the subject now. When I am finished, I shall supply a link to it from this blog. I have written an outline for the paper. I wanted to get a concept of what word length people would expect from a work of this nature. I would imagine that there would be a maximum of ten thousand words for the paper, but a thousand words seems a little short. That's as much space as I would devote to a single blog entry. I did a Google search on "philosophical paper word length". The top-ranked page belonged to the University of South Carolina College of Liberal Arts Department of Philosophy. It was a list of tips for writing a short philosophy paper, and it merely said that: Length should not be a problem if you choose a good (and tractable) issue that interests you and compels you to explore what it involves. Well, this

Re-reading yesterday's section, I think you do well up to the point where you ask what is mind. I don't really think that mind is brain viewed from the inside. Little pieces of your brain can get replaced over time, but we would not say that little pieces of your mind ever get replaced. You touch on this subject in your penultimate paragraph. I therefore think that mind supervenes over the brain. No computer backup is something over which the same token of the mind could supervene. What if you slowly split the consciousness in two over the two different mediums? Half your consciousness could supervene over brain processes. Half could supervene over computer processes. We can assume that phenomenologically, you could not tell the difference between this condition of consciousness and the way it normally is. We could imagine this process continuing until your consciousness was fully supervening over the computer. I think that that would be a legitimate transference. The wa

You have had quite a philosophical journey in the last few days. I'm still not sure that it all hangs together properly, so I will recapitulate it here. You directed your attention to the question of what makes a person the same person over time. You identified what you took to be a source of confusion with this question. It is type/token ambiguity in what is considered to be the same thing. You can definitely say that a backed-up and restored person are the same type of person. But they are two different tokens of the same type. The question of what makes a person the same person over time is therefore not really one question, but two. What makes a type of person the same type of person over time, and what makes a token of person the same token over time. The former question is the easier one to answer. Continuity is what makes any type of thing the same type over time. In this case, the basic argument made in the Altered Carbon series is that continuity of consciousnes

There is a difficulty in the previous section. You said that it is a logical impossibility for two different token-stages to coexist at the same time. But what if you move one of the token-stages back in time? It's the basic science-fictional scenario where you go back in time and meet yourself. What I would argue is that in this instance, you have to conclude that both token-stages belong to the same token. After all, you already believe that you are you over the whole period of time if you don't go back in time. So how can you conclude that you cease to be you over the whole period of time just because you go back in time to meet yourself? Surely the difference of going back in time is not metaphysically relevant. And if you decide that two different token-stages can exist at the same time, then you go down a slippery slope. What is to stop the backed-up and restored token-stages from existing at the same time as well? You have already decided that the differences of content

There is a difficulty in the previous section, although it may be surmountable. You said that matter/energy was not being conserved in the back-up and restoration process. But I can see a possible way that that notion might be challenged. Let us first consider the normal situation of a person transferring himself over time. Just about every molecule in our body is replaced many times over in the course of a human lifetime. So what is it that is actually being conserved in the process of this transference? Some molecules obviously "become" officially part of the human body over time. Others officially become separate. So the matter/energy that we actually consider to be our bodies is something that is constantly changing, just as our memories are. We need an account of conservation that is sophisticated enough to withstand these changes. Yet it must still able to resist the back-up and restoration process. What is it that content replacement performed by the body has, but

There is a difficulty in the previous section. You said that continuity over time is a sufficient condition for transference, but I can think of a counterexample to this. Let us go back to the example of the backed-up and restored humans. Now suppose that the restored human's body is merely a clone of the backed-up human's body. This provides ample continuity over time between two different person-stages. But one would never conclude from this that both person-stages must belong to the same token of person. Okay, from this, I think I can infer a necessary condition for the transference of tokens. It is conservation of matter and energy. Notice that this happens to be a scientific principle of matter/energy transference in general--that the matter/energy is conserved in the process. Matter/energy is conserved in the special-place example. But it is not conserved in the backed-up and restored humans example. In the special-place example, the overall amount of matter/energy in

In the previous section, we asked what makes a token the same token over time. We decided that it was spatio-temporal transference that marked the passage of the same token over time. To test these intuitions, we set up a thought experiment of a special place in the room. If one moved anything onto this place, then that thing would vanish from that place. Then, ten seconds later, a thing would appear at the other end of the room. All of its observed properties would be identical to the ones of the thing that disappeared at the special place in the room. We first imagined this happening with a chair, and then with a person. We postulated that the person on the other end would talk about how much fun it was to travel across the room in that way. In this case, the two different person-stages lack spatio-temporal contiguity. On the other hand, they do contain continuity. We can therefore conclude, as discussed previously, that the two person-stages belong to the same type of person. Th

In the previous section, we asked what made a person the same person over time. We did not make the customary distinction, at least initially, between persons and non-persons. We preferred to make the distinction between types and tokens. In this respect, we concluded that what makes a type the same type over time is continuity. We decided that continuity theories can explain what makes a type the same type over time. They cannot, however, explain what makes a token the same token over time. This naturally enough raises the question of what does make a token the same token over time. When we answer this question we will have two different accounts of identity over time: one for types and one for tokens. This will put us in a better position to judge whether we are our type or our token. In this section, I will explore the issue of what makes a token the same token over time.   The first and most obvious question to ask seems to be, how can you tell which token you are? Again, I wil

In the previous section, we considered the metaphysics of personal identity. We asked what makes a person the same person over time. The example with which we illustrated this question was the process of restoring humans from backups. The source novels for this example were Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, Altered Carbon and Broken Angels . We decided, based on this example, that there was type/token ambiguity in the word "same". We can definitely say that the backed-up human and the restored human are the same type of person. But they are two different tokens of the same type. The question therefore becomes: which are you, your token or your type? We can have two different hypotheses, one in which you are your token, and the other in which you are your type. I shall now consider both hypotheses separately for the sake of analysis.   We can now return to the question of what makes a person the same person over time. I argue that light is shed on this question by drawi

I have recently read Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom and Altered Carbon . Both books had enormously entertaining stories. But they both relied on a metaphysics of personal identity that I found dubious to say the least.      Both books employ the idea that it will eventually be possible to digitize human consciousness. When this occurs, we can keep a full backup of ourselves on a device like a computer chip. That way, whenever our physical body dies, our consciousness will still be preserved on the chip. From there, it can be downloaded into a fresh body. Altered Carbon is named after the medium in which human consciousness is digitized. The process by which this consciousness gets downloaded into a fresh body is known as "re-sleeving". Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom preserves human lives by a similar method. People can make backups of their consciousness onto a computer as often as they like. That way, if they ever die, a clone of them can be made immediately and

I have often been a fan of science fiction at various times of my life. Most recently I have read: Jennifer Government; Pattern Recognition ; and Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom . I am currently reading Altered Carbon . I believe that I have seen enough science fiction now to make a general observation, which probably includes much fantasy: There are people who have great ideas and people who are great writers. Unfortunately, they're usually not the same person. Neuromancer might have single-handedly created the cyperpunk genre. But I can remember almost nothing about the book except how boring it was. William Gibson may be a visionary in sci-fi circles, but his books are just not very readable. I just finished reading Pattern Recognition and it was a very slow, plodding effort. He relies for descriptive atmosphere on the overuse of brand names and technical jargon. For example, our heroine doesn't suffer from jet lag, she suffers from "disrupted circadian r

I am building up a compendium of new concepts from reading science fiction that is more fresh: 1.Ad-hocracy; 2.Transhumanism; and 3.Reputation Economy are the ones I currently find most intriguing, and Down and Out has all three of them. One interesting thing that happened in today’s reading had to do with the reputation economy. The society in Down and Out is called The Bitchun Society. The basic fiscal unit of the Bitchun Society’s reputation economy is the Whuffie. The main character, Julian, lost so many Whuffies that he went to his runabout one day and found it had gone. Somebody else could simply make more popular use of his car than he could. He or she had consequently simply gotten into the car and driven away in it. Intriguingly, this seems to indicate that in the Bitchun Society, there is no private ownership. Anybody can confiscate one’s property at any time if one’s Whuffie score does not merit its use. Similarly, Julian went to enter his hotel room only to disc