Transference
In the previous section, we asked what makes a token the same token over time. We decided that it was spatio-temporal transference that marked the passage of the same token over time. To test these intuitions, we set up a thought experiment of a special place in the room. If one moved anything onto this place, then that thing would vanish from that place. Then, ten seconds later, a thing would appear at the other end of the room. All of its observed properties would be identical to the ones of the thing that disappeared at the special place in the room. We first imagined this happening with a chair, and then with a person. We postulated that the person on the other end would talk about how much fun it was to travel across the room in that way.
In this case, the two different person-stages lack spatio-temporal contiguity. On the other hand, they do contain continuity. We can therefore conclude, as discussed previously, that the two person-stages belong to the same type of person. This is not enough evidence in itself, however, to establish that they must also be the same token of person. For this to happen, we must think that this token has undergone a transference across space and time.
How will we know whether such a transference has occurred? In previous examples, it has been enough to know that there has been spatio-temporal contiguity between the token-stages. This has constituted adequate empirical evidence that the tokens are the same. Now that this spatio-temporal contiguity has gone, is the evidence of transference still there?
In this case, it seems that the continuity itself constitutes adequate evidence of the transference. The two person-stages have the same mass, and all their other dimensions are the same. Why, then, are they not the same token as well? One person started off at the special spot, and one person ended up at the spot on the other side of the room. How, then, is the special spot not an entry point, and the spot at the other end of the room an exit point? It does not seem to be a large leap of the imagination to conclude that this is the case. Transference is therefore a separate issue from spatio-temporal contiguity. One can have evidence of transference from continuity without spatio-temporal contiguity. It seems that there has been a transference of a person from one end of the room to the other. The continuity of the person stage at the one end of the room with the person-stage at the other end constitutes evidence of this transfer.
Let us construct a conditional based on the above observations. Let proposition C equal "Token-stage B is perfectly continuous with token-stage A." Let proposition L equal "Token-stage B occurs later in time than token-stage A. " Let proposition T equal "The same token has transferred itself from stage A to stage B." Given these three propositions, we can construct the conditional "If (C and L), then T".
Our conditional entails a sufficient condition for the transference of a token. That sufficient condition is continuity over time between stages of the token. This continuity does not require spatio-temporal contiguity to exist. (Of course, in practice, continuity and spatio-temporal contiguity will probably go together hand in hand.) In addition, transference is also a sufficient condition for what makes a token the same token over time. Without transference, it is hard to see how one could say that two token-stages are the same. It seems to me that transference is therefore a necessary and sufficient condition for token identity over time. Is continuity over time between stages likewise a necessary and sufficient condition for transference? I prefer to remain agnostic about this question for now, in favor of the pursuit of other questions. My original issue concerned the digitization of consciousness as the key to immortality. I shall argue that other questions have greater relevance to the philosophical plausibility of this concept.
Let us now return to the issue of memory continuity as an account of personal identity. We have concluded that continuity over time indicates transference of the same token over time. Therefore, memory continuity over time indicates transference of memories over time. We can suppose that the memories of one person might be transferred to the body of another. Science fiction abounds with fictional examples of this. But does it follow that the person itself has transferred from one body to another?
To ask this, we must ask, what are memories? What is it exactly that gets transferred from one body to another in Deep Space Nine, Altered Carbon or Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom? I would argue that all that is being transferred is information. Memories are nothing more than information, stored in a certain way. This information will have partly a visual component, as one remembers what one saw. It will have partly an aural component, as one will remember what one has heard. There will also be olfactory, gustatory and tactile components to match our remaining three senses. Memories will also have a component that is partly pure data, as one will remember what one knows as facts. They will have an emotional component, as one will remember how one felt during a certain time in one's life. There will also be an intuitive component, as part of one's knowledge in memories is an understanding of various things. This understanding, as an intuitive component, is not necessarily reducible to a discursive set of facts. The Altered Carbon series assumes that all this information is somehow digitizable.
I hope it is clear that to digitize all this information would already be a stupendous achievement. But even assuming that this is possible, can it ever capture what a person is? Is all that a person is, information?
I'll answer this question in the next section...
In this case, the two different person-stages lack spatio-temporal contiguity. On the other hand, they do contain continuity. We can therefore conclude, as discussed previously, that the two person-stages belong to the same type of person. This is not enough evidence in itself, however, to establish that they must also be the same token of person. For this to happen, we must think that this token has undergone a transference across space and time.
How will we know whether such a transference has occurred? In previous examples, it has been enough to know that there has been spatio-temporal contiguity between the token-stages. This has constituted adequate empirical evidence that the tokens are the same. Now that this spatio-temporal contiguity has gone, is the evidence of transference still there?
In this case, it seems that the continuity itself constitutes adequate evidence of the transference. The two person-stages have the same mass, and all their other dimensions are the same. Why, then, are they not the same token as well? One person started off at the special spot, and one person ended up at the spot on the other side of the room. How, then, is the special spot not an entry point, and the spot at the other end of the room an exit point? It does not seem to be a large leap of the imagination to conclude that this is the case. Transference is therefore a separate issue from spatio-temporal contiguity. One can have evidence of transference from continuity without spatio-temporal contiguity. It seems that there has been a transference of a person from one end of the room to the other. The continuity of the person stage at the one end of the room with the person-stage at the other end constitutes evidence of this transfer.
Let us construct a conditional based on the above observations. Let proposition C equal "Token-stage B is perfectly continuous with token-stage A." Let proposition L equal "Token-stage B occurs later in time than token-stage A. " Let proposition T equal "The same token has transferred itself from stage A to stage B." Given these three propositions, we can construct the conditional "If (C and L), then T".
Our conditional entails a sufficient condition for the transference of a token. That sufficient condition is continuity over time between stages of the token. This continuity does not require spatio-temporal contiguity to exist. (Of course, in practice, continuity and spatio-temporal contiguity will probably go together hand in hand.) In addition, transference is also a sufficient condition for what makes a token the same token over time. Without transference, it is hard to see how one could say that two token-stages are the same. It seems to me that transference is therefore a necessary and sufficient condition for token identity over time. Is continuity over time between stages likewise a necessary and sufficient condition for transference? I prefer to remain agnostic about this question for now, in favor of the pursuit of other questions. My original issue concerned the digitization of consciousness as the key to immortality. I shall argue that other questions have greater relevance to the philosophical plausibility of this concept.
Let us now return to the issue of memory continuity as an account of personal identity. We have concluded that continuity over time indicates transference of the same token over time. Therefore, memory continuity over time indicates transference of memories over time. We can suppose that the memories of one person might be transferred to the body of another. Science fiction abounds with fictional examples of this. But does it follow that the person itself has transferred from one body to another?
To ask this, we must ask, what are memories? What is it exactly that gets transferred from one body to another in Deep Space Nine, Altered Carbon or Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom? I would argue that all that is being transferred is information. Memories are nothing more than information, stored in a certain way. This information will have partly a visual component, as one remembers what one saw. It will have partly an aural component, as one will remember what one has heard. There will also be olfactory, gustatory and tactile components to match our remaining three senses. Memories will also have a component that is partly pure data, as one will remember what one knows as facts. They will have an emotional component, as one will remember how one felt during a certain time in one's life. There will also be an intuitive component, as part of one's knowledge in memories is an understanding of various things. This understanding, as an intuitive component, is not necessarily reducible to a discursive set of facts. The Altered Carbon series assumes that all this information is somehow digitizable.
I hope it is clear that to digitize all this information would already be a stupendous achievement. But even assuming that this is possible, can it ever capture what a person is? Is all that a person is, information?
I'll answer this question in the next section...
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