The Identity of Types
In the previous section, we considered the metaphysics of personal identity. We asked what makes a person the same person over time. The example with which we illustrated this question was the process of restoring humans from backups. The source novels for this example were Down and Out in the Magic Kingdom, Altered Carbon and Broken Angels. We decided, based on this example, that there was type/token ambiguity in the word "same". We can definitely say that the backed-up human and the restored human are the same type of person. But they are two different tokens of the same type. The question therefore becomes: which are you, your token or your type? We can have two different hypotheses, one in which you are your token, and the other in which you are your type. I shall now consider both hypotheses separately for the sake of analysis.
We can now return to the question of what makes a person the same person over time. I argue that light is shed on this question by drawing a distinction between types and tokens. In particular, we may now split one question into two. We need not ask anymore what makes a person the same person over time, which is ambiguous to begin with. First, we can ask what makes a type the same type over time, and what makes a token the same token over time. I shall not here make a distinction between people and non-people. I prefer to concentrate, at least initially, on properties common to all types and all tokens.
In the previous section, we introduced the memory continuity view of personal identity. I shall here argue that continuity is all that is necessary to make a type the same type over time. The most popular notion of what makes a person a person in science fiction is one's memories. We see this time and time again. In the episode "Facets" from Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, Jadzia Dax undergoes the "zhian'tara" ceremony. It is the Trill rite of closure whereby she encounters each of the previous hosts to her symbiont. This is achieved by the memories of the hosts being telepathically transferred into the minds of volunteers in the ceremony. As one of the volunteers, Kira Nerys accepts the memories of Lela, Dax's first host. While Kira is under the influence of Lela's memories, Dax exclaims, "It's so strange. It's like you really are Lela." Kira/Lela replies with, "In a sense, I am. What is a person but a sum of their memories?"
In this view, memory continuity is what makes personal identity. All that you need in order to be the same person as somebody else is to have the same memories as that person. We can agree that, under the influence of Lela's memories, Kira is the same type of person as Lela. But that she is a different token of person seems hard to deny. Hence, memory continuity is enough to make two people of the same type, but not of the same token.
In fact, continuity in general would seem to make a type the same type over time. If two chairs had continuity of design and materials, for example, then they would be the same type of chair. If two cars had continuity of design and materials, then they would be the same type of car. If two mountains had continuity of features and ore, they would be the same type of mountain. Continuity makes for type-identity. But in each case, the chairs, cars and mountains might all be different tokens of that same type.
The question is therefore suggested, what makes a token the same token over time? What makes Kira a different token of person than Lela? What makes a backed-up person a different token than a restored person?
I am not an expert on issues of personal identity. I covered the topic as part of my introductory course in philosophy when I did my original Bachelor of Arts. They covered lots of different accounts of continuity as theories of personal identity. But they made no distinction between type and token. I have here argued that continuity accounts satisfactorily for what makes a type the same type over time. But it can say nothing about what makes a token the same token over time. So in asking what makes a token the same token over time, I am now moving into uncharted waters, and my work must once again become exploratory.
Because of this, I probably want to take my time to draw this issue out. I want to explore different facets of the identity of tokens. There are many different issues in this matter once it has been introduced, and I shall explore them one at a time in sections to follow.
We can now return to the question of what makes a person the same person over time. I argue that light is shed on this question by drawing a distinction between types and tokens. In particular, we may now split one question into two. We need not ask anymore what makes a person the same person over time, which is ambiguous to begin with. First, we can ask what makes a type the same type over time, and what makes a token the same token over time. I shall not here make a distinction between people and non-people. I prefer to concentrate, at least initially, on properties common to all types and all tokens.
In the previous section, we introduced the memory continuity view of personal identity. I shall here argue that continuity is all that is necessary to make a type the same type over time. The most popular notion of what makes a person a person in science fiction is one's memories. We see this time and time again. In the episode "Facets" from Star Trek: Deep Space Nine, Jadzia Dax undergoes the "zhian'tara" ceremony. It is the Trill rite of closure whereby she encounters each of the previous hosts to her symbiont. This is achieved by the memories of the hosts being telepathically transferred into the minds of volunteers in the ceremony. As one of the volunteers, Kira Nerys accepts the memories of Lela, Dax's first host. While Kira is under the influence of Lela's memories, Dax exclaims, "It's so strange. It's like you really are Lela." Kira/Lela replies with, "In a sense, I am. What is a person but a sum of their memories?"
In this view, memory continuity is what makes personal identity. All that you need in order to be the same person as somebody else is to have the same memories as that person. We can agree that, under the influence of Lela's memories, Kira is the same type of person as Lela. But that she is a different token of person seems hard to deny. Hence, memory continuity is enough to make two people of the same type, but not of the same token.
In fact, continuity in general would seem to make a type the same type over time. If two chairs had continuity of design and materials, for example, then they would be the same type of chair. If two cars had continuity of design and materials, then they would be the same type of car. If two mountains had continuity of features and ore, they would be the same type of mountain. Continuity makes for type-identity. But in each case, the chairs, cars and mountains might all be different tokens of that same type.
The question is therefore suggested, what makes a token the same token over time? What makes Kira a different token of person than Lela? What makes a backed-up person a different token than a restored person?
I am not an expert on issues of personal identity. I covered the topic as part of my introductory course in philosophy when I did my original Bachelor of Arts. They covered lots of different accounts of continuity as theories of personal identity. But they made no distinction between type and token. I have here argued that continuity accounts satisfactorily for what makes a type the same type over time. But it can say nothing about what makes a token the same token over time. So in asking what makes a token the same token over time, I am now moving into uncharted waters, and my work must once again become exploratory.
Because of this, I probably want to take my time to draw this issue out. I want to explore different facets of the identity of tokens. There are many different issues in this matter once it has been introduced, and I shall explore them one at a time in sections to follow.
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