A counterexample to the Kantian idea of moral worth

I saw a convincing counterexample to the Kantian idea of moral worth this morning. While we were still riding through the Inner West on the train, a woman in front of me burst into tears. She was talking to someone on her mobile phone. Her sobs were so great that I could make out almost none of what she was saying. But it seems that she had just found out that someone close to her had died. She was going to call work and then she was going to go straight back home. As the train was starting to empty at Central, a girl on the other side of the aisle took her by the shoulder and asked her if she was okay, and whether she would like a glass of water. The woman started to talk to her a little about what had happened. Again, I could make out very little of it, but the girl decided to sit with this person and unpack her things by her. Apparently she was going to say with her until she got onto a train back to the Mountains.

It seemed obvious that this was an act performed out of inclination. It seemed equally obvious that this was an act of moral worth. In fact, I would not have wanted someone to approach me in that circumstance if I thought she were merely doing it "because it were right". In principle that would have been insulting and demeaning. In practice it would surely have led to mutual resentment. Notice also that it seemed obvious that the girl was not doing this because it gave her pleasure. Anyone approaching someone in that emotional state is clearly not deriving pleasure out of it. And yet the fact that she is moved to help her is in and of itself a good inclination.

Modified 8 September 2009, 12:05pm GMT + 10

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