The irrationality of inductive scepticism
What evidence would it take to convince you that you were wrong? This was
a question that I Googled. This
is a good website I found in the results, and this
is a good article in it, with a good principle. “It is irrational to hold any view so tightly that you aren’t willing to admit the possibility that you might be wrong.” “The
rational response is to actually engage contrary information and truly consider whether or not your view is correct.” The principle that you must be able to answer this question is the principle of falsifiability.
This reasoning is of relevance to the problem of induction. According to the principle of falsifiability, inductive scepticism is inherently irrational. An inductive sceptic can accept nothing as evidence that she is wrong. She cannot accept a deductive argument because induction is by definition not deductively valid. She cannot accept anything that occurred in the past because it might change in the future. She cannot accept anything that is occurring in the present because it might change in the future. Nor can she even accept anything that may occur in the future precisely because it has not occurred yet. So no matter what a person might present to her as evidence that she is wrong, she cannot accept it. So, according to the principle of falsifiability, inductive scepticism must be inherently irrational.
Of course, the converse position must also be correct, that induction is inherently rational. If inductive scepticism cannot fail to be irrational, then induction cannot fail to be rational. But then what evidence could an inductivist accept that she were wrong? Presumably evidence that induction had never worked in the past. If it had never worked in the past, then inductively it should never work in the future. It might seem absurd to use induction to disprove the validity of induction. But if induction had never worked in the past, it would be inductively irrational to use induction in the future. I do not see that as inconsistent, merely that induction is capable in principle of acknowledging its own limitations. (Not that I consider that it is likely that it should ever do so in practice.)
This reasoning is of relevance to the problem of induction. According to the principle of falsifiability, inductive scepticism is inherently irrational. An inductive sceptic can accept nothing as evidence that she is wrong. She cannot accept a deductive argument because induction is by definition not deductively valid. She cannot accept anything that occurred in the past because it might change in the future. She cannot accept anything that is occurring in the present because it might change in the future. Nor can she even accept anything that may occur in the future precisely because it has not occurred yet. So no matter what a person might present to her as evidence that she is wrong, she cannot accept it. So, according to the principle of falsifiability, inductive scepticism must be inherently irrational.
Of course, the converse position must also be correct, that induction is inherently rational. If inductive scepticism cannot fail to be irrational, then induction cannot fail to be rational. But then what evidence could an inductivist accept that she were wrong? Presumably evidence that induction had never worked in the past. If it had never worked in the past, then inductively it should never work in the future. It might seem absurd to use induction to disprove the validity of induction. But if induction had never worked in the past, it would be inductively irrational to use induction in the future. I do not see that as inconsistent, merely that induction is capable in principle of acknowledging its own limitations. (Not that I consider that it is likely that it should ever do so in practice.)
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