A Good Inclination
I think that something else still needs to be said about moral motives. It is, at least generally, a morally acceptable reason to do something because it is right. However, if one does something because it is right, one is presumably thereby not doing it out of inclination. My moral observation compels me to believe that this girl helped this person for the right reasons. Yet at the same time, the act seems clearly to have been performed out of inclination. I would not claim that just any inclination, however, would be of moral worth. It is for this reason that it is perhaps worth exploring more deeply what consistutes a good inclination.
Suppose that one were to ask this girl why she helped this person. If she said, "Because it gave me pleasure," that is not a moral reason. But note also that if she said, "Because I felt like it" or even "Because I felt sorry for her", I do not consider those moral reasons either. But if she said "Because she was upset," that is a 100% moral reason. Note also that this reason is 100% consistent with her having performed the act out of inclination. In fact, I would argue that her inclination to help was her way of connecting with the fact that the woman was upset.
I should probably elaborate a little more on the idea of connecting with things. The idea for me comes from a lecture from a visiting professor, Graham Oddie. He was opposed to the hedonist idea that there were positive emotions and negative emotions. He thought that every emotion in your head had some circumstance in which it was good for you to feel that emotion. The example that he provided was of grief. Grief is hardly a pleasant emotion, hence it is the sort of emotion that a classical hedonist would label as "negative". But Graham thought it was perfectly good for you to feel grief at the funeral of someone whom you had loved. This is because your grief was your way of connecting with the loss.
I think something very similar applies to my moral observation. When someone is upset, it is good for someone else to have an inclination to console her. This inclination is her way of naturally connecting with the fact that someone is upset. Perhaps this is why, I have argued, it is bad in that circumstance to try to console anybody merely "because it is right". If that is your only reason for the action, you have not connected with the other person's state of affairs. If you have not connected with them, then you are helping them for the wrong reasons. Nor, if you make your lack of connection obvious, can you console them in any meaningful way. If anything, the offer of help simply becomes condescending. A good inclination must therefore at least sometimes be essential for at least certain kinds of morally appropriate action.
Suppose that one were to ask this girl why she helped this person. If she said, "Because it gave me pleasure," that is not a moral reason. But note also that if she said, "Because I felt like it" or even "Because I felt sorry for her", I do not consider those moral reasons either. But if she said "Because she was upset," that is a 100% moral reason. Note also that this reason is 100% consistent with her having performed the act out of inclination. In fact, I would argue that her inclination to help was her way of connecting with the fact that the woman was upset.
I should probably elaborate a little more on the idea of connecting with things. The idea for me comes from a lecture from a visiting professor, Graham Oddie. He was opposed to the hedonist idea that there were positive emotions and negative emotions. He thought that every emotion in your head had some circumstance in which it was good for you to feel that emotion. The example that he provided was of grief. Grief is hardly a pleasant emotion, hence it is the sort of emotion that a classical hedonist would label as "negative". But Graham thought it was perfectly good for you to feel grief at the funeral of someone whom you had loved. This is because your grief was your way of connecting with the loss.
I think something very similar applies to my moral observation. When someone is upset, it is good for someone else to have an inclination to console her. This inclination is her way of naturally connecting with the fact that someone is upset. Perhaps this is why, I have argued, it is bad in that circumstance to try to console anybody merely "because it is right". If that is your only reason for the action, you have not connected with the other person's state of affairs. If you have not connected with them, then you are helping them for the wrong reasons. Nor, if you make your lack of connection obvious, can you console them in any meaningful way. If anything, the offer of help simply becomes condescending. A good inclination must therefore at least sometimes be essential for at least certain kinds of morally appropriate action.
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