Commensurability 2.1

Writing that last entry made me realise something about level 1 commensurability. Any claims about which two speakers can be in agreement relative to a particular argument can be said to be at level 1 commensurability relative to that argument. It stands to reason that not all of those claims will be 'trivial'. For example, a political argument between two left-wing theorists will quite legimitately imply many level 1 claims with which a right-wing theorist would never in her right mind agree. I was not fully aware of this at the time that I first devised the theory of commensurability, so now I will have to:

  1. Acknowledge that level 1 (and presumably other levels as well) is relative to the speakers in the discussion; and
  2. Stop calling the name of level 1 'triviality', on the grounds that not all level 1 claims will be trivial.

Level 1 claims will, however, always be of a consensus, so my new name for level 1 commensurability will be 'consensus'.

This is a minor revision of Commensurability 2.0, so its new version number will be 2.1.

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