A stipulative definition of 'commensurability'
Note once again that 'commensurability' means 'measureable by a common standard'. I now consider that all of my four levels involve stronger or weaker ways by which things are measured by a common standard.
I think that the strongest common standard is an existing convergence of opinion. Where there is an existing convergence of opinion for or against a proposition, there is a disincentive against rational discourse about that subject. Why would one want to argue for or against a proposition when the other side already agrees with you? There is no practical point to discourse under those circumstances, and in practice it would not happen. This standard therefore rightly belongs at level 1.
Conversely, I also think that the weakest common standard is human sympathy. Sympathy serves to shield a view from rational discourse, which as any professional philosopher knows can be emotionally brutal. Rational discourse may still be possible if both sides agree to it, but sympathy renders this an optional, not an inevitable, component. This standard, therefore, rightly seems to belong at level 4.
Note, therefore, that levels 1 and 4 represent the upper and lower limits of rational discourse, respectively. At level 1, rational discourse is barred through lack of interest in the argument. At level 4, rational discourse is barred through sympathy with the person with whom one dissents. It is only the middle two levels at which rational discourse is practically possible, because it is rational discourse that is necessary to produce either agreement or intellectual respect.
Therefore, I can now provide a stipulative definition of 'commensurability' that is a proper subset of its standard definition. It is 'measurable by a common standard that is conducive to a non-coercive convergence of opinion'. Degrees of commensurability, therefore, are measured in terms of the degrees of conduciveness to that convergence. I count existing consensus as a kind of convergence on the grounds that its natural tendency is to remain convergent. I count appreciability as a form of conduciveness, because a person can be moved to adopt an view out of appreciability.
I think that the strongest common standard is an existing convergence of opinion. Where there is an existing convergence of opinion for or against a proposition, there is a disincentive against rational discourse about that subject. Why would one want to argue for or against a proposition when the other side already agrees with you? There is no practical point to discourse under those circumstances, and in practice it would not happen. This standard therefore rightly belongs at level 1.
Conversely, I also think that the weakest common standard is human sympathy. Sympathy serves to shield a view from rational discourse, which as any professional philosopher knows can be emotionally brutal. Rational discourse may still be possible if both sides agree to it, but sympathy renders this an optional, not an inevitable, component. This standard, therefore, rightly seems to belong at level 4.
Note, therefore, that levels 1 and 4 represent the upper and lower limits of rational discourse, respectively. At level 1, rational discourse is barred through lack of interest in the argument. At level 4, rational discourse is barred through sympathy with the person with whom one dissents. It is only the middle two levels at which rational discourse is practically possible, because it is rational discourse that is necessary to produce either agreement or intellectual respect.
Therefore, I can now provide a stipulative definition of 'commensurability' that is a proper subset of its standard definition. It is 'measurable by a common standard that is conducive to a non-coercive convergence of opinion'. Degrees of commensurability, therefore, are measured in terms of the degrees of conduciveness to that convergence. I count existing consensus as a kind of convergence on the grounds that its natural tendency is to remain convergent. I count appreciability as a form of conduciveness, because a person can be moved to adopt an view out of appreciability.
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