Person- versus act-oriented ethical theory
Today I would like to elaborate on a passage from my entry on the use of farfetched examples:
I often find this the only way to argue against some of the more altruistic moral theories. Singer, for example, employs an example in Practical Ethics that is very similar to Nozick's cowshead example as it pertains to Third World countries. He notes that we spend our money on ourselves in many unnecessary ways while people are starving across the world. Because he is a utilitarian, he is committed to claiming that this is the moral equivalent of murder (Singer's phrase). To illustrate this, he employs an example of someone actually travelling to a Third World country and machine-gunning down a village of people.
Elsewhere in the chapter, he tries to consider various proposals for morally relevant differences between the two actions. Most of these proposed differences are fatuous, the debunking of which would only be useful as an exercise. One, however, does seem plausible, namely that we are actively harming people in the latter case and not in the former case.
In this instance, Singer argues persuasively enough for his own side. It is noteworthy, however, that not once in the discussion do the relative characters of the participants in either scenario get discussed. Indeed, as Iris Murdoch notes in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, this is arguably the central weakness in all consequentialist theories. They lack an adequate theory of virtues.
Of course, this touches on a basic dichotomy in ethical theory, between person-oriented and act-oriented theories. Do we focus on what makes a good person or what makes a good action?
Certainly, act-oriented theories seem to have great difficulty in adequately categorising good and evil actions. As Thomas Aquinas said, for any individual action, we can always tell whether it is right, wrong or indifferent. But for any class of actions, such a determination is impossible. Even cutting off a baby's feet without anaesthetic is sometimes necessary.
I think that the only way that we can adequately cover morals is if we focus on what makes a good person. Even Immanuel Kant said that the only thing that you needed to be moral was to have a good will. Correspondingly, a good action was one that was performed with good intentions. Kant goes on to enumerate what he regards as good intentions, through his various formulations of the categorical imperative, which are all arguably different imperatives. But the basic claim that he makes appears sound. With respect to Singer's examples, there is an obvious Kantian difference between the motive of someone who kills someone and someone who simply lets someone die.
Although Kant's theory is ostensibly act-oriented, therefore, person-orientation seems smuggled into it from the outset. After all, the same action may be good or evil depending upon the motives of the person who performed it. Writing a scathing critique might be right or wrong depending on whether it is well- or ill-intentioned.
Of course, some actions seem far more likely to bespeak a good or bad will than others. Hence, walking into a village and machine-gunning down everybody in it is likely to reveal ill intentions. Putting a gold coin in a beggar's hat is more likely to reveal good intentions. A negative review could go either way; an ill-intentioned negative review is a hatchet job, but a well-intentioned negative review can be constructive and helpful.
As to what constitutes a good or bad intention, this would constitute an entry (book?) in itself.
[M]ight we have simply decided on other grounds that eating meat and swinging the bat are morally different after all? If nothing else, they must surely reveal very different things about the character of the person who would do either.
I often find this the only way to argue against some of the more altruistic moral theories. Singer, for example, employs an example in Practical Ethics that is very similar to Nozick's cowshead example as it pertains to Third World countries. He notes that we spend our money on ourselves in many unnecessary ways while people are starving across the world. Because he is a utilitarian, he is committed to claiming that this is the moral equivalent of murder (Singer's phrase). To illustrate this, he employs an example of someone actually travelling to a Third World country and machine-gunning down a village of people.
Elsewhere in the chapter, he tries to consider various proposals for morally relevant differences between the two actions. Most of these proposed differences are fatuous, the debunking of which would only be useful as an exercise. One, however, does seem plausible, namely that we are actively harming people in the latter case and not in the former case.
In this instance, Singer argues persuasively enough for his own side. It is noteworthy, however, that not once in the discussion do the relative characters of the participants in either scenario get discussed. Indeed, as Iris Murdoch notes in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, this is arguably the central weakness in all consequentialist theories. They lack an adequate theory of virtues.
Of course, this touches on a basic dichotomy in ethical theory, between person-oriented and act-oriented theories. Do we focus on what makes a good person or what makes a good action?
Certainly, act-oriented theories seem to have great difficulty in adequately categorising good and evil actions. As Thomas Aquinas said, for any individual action, we can always tell whether it is right, wrong or indifferent. But for any class of actions, such a determination is impossible. Even cutting off a baby's feet without anaesthetic is sometimes necessary.
I think that the only way that we can adequately cover morals is if we focus on what makes a good person. Even Immanuel Kant said that the only thing that you needed to be moral was to have a good will. Correspondingly, a good action was one that was performed with good intentions. Kant goes on to enumerate what he regards as good intentions, through his various formulations of the categorical imperative, which are all arguably different imperatives. But the basic claim that he makes appears sound. With respect to Singer's examples, there is an obvious Kantian difference between the motive of someone who kills someone and someone who simply lets someone die.
Although Kant's theory is ostensibly act-oriented, therefore, person-orientation seems smuggled into it from the outset. After all, the same action may be good or evil depending upon the motives of the person who performed it. Writing a scathing critique might be right or wrong depending on whether it is well- or ill-intentioned.
Of course, some actions seem far more likely to bespeak a good or bad will than others. Hence, walking into a village and machine-gunning down everybody in it is likely to reveal ill intentions. Putting a gold coin in a beggar's hat is more likely to reveal good intentions. A negative review could go either way; an ill-intentioned negative review is a hatchet job, but a well-intentioned negative review can be constructive and helpful.
As to what constitutes a good or bad intention, this would constitute an entry (book?) in itself.