An argument from probabilities for rejecting the many-universes interpretation of Schrödinger's Cat
In science we always search for the simplest explanation. In biology, we often do not have the facility to conduct experiments that result in evolution occurring over a suitable number of generations. However, we can still show that given certain cross-cultural values--not necessary moral ones!--can be best explained by the evolutionary model. It involves fewer assumptions than the notion that culture alone has produced such cross-cultural values.
Of course, there is more to a powerful explanation than simply minimising the number of assumptions made. Look at the paradox of Schrödinger's Cat. The resolution that involves the smallest number of assumptions is that at the end of the experiment, the cat is both alive and dead--in two different universes! But the assumptions that have to be made in this case are so bizarre to most physicists that this is enough reason for them to reject them.
We can reconcile these two views if we make a paradigmatic assumption: Other things being equal, the probability of an assumption is proportional to its intuitive plausibility. G.E. Moore would have approved of such an assumption, for it is very similar to his own appeals to common sense. We already know that all the different assumptions cannot be equiprobable, but (nearly) all of them will have a probably less than 1. Numbers less than 1, when multiplied by each other, produce a product that is smaller than any of its factors. Therefore, other things being equal, the larger the number of assumptions made, the lower will be the resulting probability of the theory. That is why, other things being equal, scientists try to minimise the number of assumptions that they make. It results in a theory that is more likely to be true. However, if the intuitive plausibility of an assumption reflects its probability, then other things are suddenly not equal because the more intuitively plausible the assumption, the higher its probability. Therefore, a small number of bizarre assumptions could well result in a less probable theory than a large number of plausible assumptions. Hence, it is rational for scientists to reject the many-universes interpretation of Schrödinger's Cat. It involves the smallest number of assumptions, but their apparent relatively low probability still results in an unlikely overall solution.
I call that an argument from probabilities for rejecting the many-universes interpretation of Schrödinger's Cat. It may well be covered in a book on the philosophy of science somewhere. But I haven't read it from anywhere, and I was just led to think of it from reading the latest ten pages of The Moral Animal.
Of course, there is more to a powerful explanation than simply minimising the number of assumptions made. Look at the paradox of Schrödinger's Cat. The resolution that involves the smallest number of assumptions is that at the end of the experiment, the cat is both alive and dead--in two different universes! But the assumptions that have to be made in this case are so bizarre to most physicists that this is enough reason for them to reject them.
We can reconcile these two views if we make a paradigmatic assumption: Other things being equal, the probability of an assumption is proportional to its intuitive plausibility. G.E. Moore would have approved of such an assumption, for it is very similar to his own appeals to common sense. We already know that all the different assumptions cannot be equiprobable, but (nearly) all of them will have a probably less than 1. Numbers less than 1, when multiplied by each other, produce a product that is smaller than any of its factors. Therefore, other things being equal, the larger the number of assumptions made, the lower will be the resulting probability of the theory. That is why, other things being equal, scientists try to minimise the number of assumptions that they make. It results in a theory that is more likely to be true. However, if the intuitive plausibility of an assumption reflects its probability, then other things are suddenly not equal because the more intuitively plausible the assumption, the higher its probability. Therefore, a small number of bizarre assumptions could well result in a less probable theory than a large number of plausible assumptions. Hence, it is rational for scientists to reject the many-universes interpretation of Schrödinger's Cat. It involves the smallest number of assumptions, but their apparent relatively low probability still results in an unlikely overall solution.
I call that an argument from probabilities for rejecting the many-universes interpretation of Schrödinger's Cat. It may well be covered in a book on the philosophy of science somewhere. But I haven't read it from anywhere, and I was just led to think of it from reading the latest ten pages of The Moral Animal.
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