The elasticity of utilitarianism
Utilitarianism has become popular as a theory, I think, because of three major attributes: simplicity, elasticity and elegance. It seems clear enough what simplicity is. Lots of people--such as my ethics lecturer, a Kantian--have commented on the fact that utilitarianism is a very simple philosophy, stemming as it does from just one rule, the principle of utility. Anne Maclean writes about different moral principles in The Elimination of Morality, such as the principle of beneficence, and the principle of non-maleficence (pp.199-200). In this regard, therefore, utilitarianism can be seen as little more than a specific formulation of the principle of beneficence. It cannot be considered a principle of non-maleficence, for example, because in principle it can justify maleficence when it is to an end of beneficence.
Murder springs to mind as an act of maleficence. In fact, one of the common test cases that we have for any new theory of ethics seems to me to be how it covers the prohibition of murder. If we are simply concerned with promoting happiness, then utilitarianism would seem to fall short of prohibiting murder of someone--for example, if she were euthanatised in her sleep. On the other hand, many different versions of utilitarianism exist, whereby happiness is not necessarily the main thing that we are promoting. Peter Singer, for example, is a preference utilitarian, who believes in maximising the satisfaction of preferences that exist in the world. This applies rather ingeniously to the prohibition of killing humans, because humans, through being self-aware, have a preference for their continued existence. Killing humans against their will is therefore impermissible prima facie because it does not satisfy their natural preference for continuing to exist. Of course, this does not stop the justification in principle of killing a human being against her will if it maximises the satisfaction of preferences elsewhere. Nevertheless, in this case, we can now start to generate alternatives to actually killing a human being to remove this problem for utilitarianism in practice. In other words, a principle of beneficence is being stretched to fit a judgement that would normally be made from a principle of non-maleficence. It is this ability of utilitarianism to stretch to fit judgements more naturally appropriate to other moral principles that I call the elasticity of utilitarianism.
Finally, simplicity and elasticity combine to make utilitarianism a very comprehensive theory of morality. It can and has been stretched to fit judgements that would be reserved for just about any other moral intuition one can think of. This property affords utilitarianism a certain theoretical elegance that I think attracts many people to its adoption. As such, it contains formal strengths that--for many, I think--outweigh its substantive weaknesses.
Murder springs to mind as an act of maleficence. In fact, one of the common test cases that we have for any new theory of ethics seems to me to be how it covers the prohibition of murder. If we are simply concerned with promoting happiness, then utilitarianism would seem to fall short of prohibiting murder of someone--for example, if she were euthanatised in her sleep. On the other hand, many different versions of utilitarianism exist, whereby happiness is not necessarily the main thing that we are promoting. Peter Singer, for example, is a preference utilitarian, who believes in maximising the satisfaction of preferences that exist in the world. This applies rather ingeniously to the prohibition of killing humans, because humans, through being self-aware, have a preference for their continued existence. Killing humans against their will is therefore impermissible prima facie because it does not satisfy their natural preference for continuing to exist. Of course, this does not stop the justification in principle of killing a human being against her will if it maximises the satisfaction of preferences elsewhere. Nevertheless, in this case, we can now start to generate alternatives to actually killing a human being to remove this problem for utilitarianism in practice. In other words, a principle of beneficence is being stretched to fit a judgement that would normally be made from a principle of non-maleficence. It is this ability of utilitarianism to stretch to fit judgements more naturally appropriate to other moral principles that I call the elasticity of utilitarianism.
Finally, simplicity and elasticity combine to make utilitarianism a very comprehensive theory of morality. It can and has been stretched to fit judgements that would be reserved for just about any other moral intuition one can think of. This property affords utilitarianism a certain theoretical elegance that I think attracts many people to its adoption. As such, it contains formal strengths that--for many, I think--outweigh its substantive weaknesses.
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