An objection to Hume

Ross goes on to quote Hume as the locus classicus for subjectivism:

Nor does this reasoning only prove, that morality consists not in any relations, that are the objects of science; but if examin'd, will prove with equal certainty, that it consists not in any matter of fact, which can be discover'd by the understanding. This is the second part of our argument; and if it can be made evident, we may conclude, that morality is not an object of reason.... Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call vice. In which-ever way you take it, you find only certain passions, motives, volitions and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. The vice entirely escapes you, as long as you consider the object. You never can find it, till you turn your reflexion into your own breast, and find a sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action. Here is a matter of fact; but 'tis the object of feeling, not of reason. It lies in youself, not in the object. So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment of blame from the contemplation of it.

A Treatise of Human Nature, Shelby-Bigge edition, Oxford, 1888, 1968, pp.468-469.

This gives me something meaty to play off of. I follow Hume's chain of reasoning as far as the claim that you can never find the vice of willful murder till you turn your reflection into your own self. However, I deny that the only thing that can be found through introspection is a sentiment of disapprobation. It seems clear enough that this sentiment of disapprobation can in turn arise from a definite moral proposition with a clear truth value, regarding the immorality of willfully killing someone without her consent. Hume goes on to say that when you pronounce any action to be vicious, you mean nothing but that from the constitution of your nature, you have a feeling of blame from the contemplation of it. I regard it as important that he considers the sentiment in question as stemming from the constitution of one's nature. This is because there is much about one's nature that one cannot help. Furthermore, it seems to me that in order to be able to take ethics seriously as a guide to practice, one must not be able to help that which determines the truth-value of a moral proposition. If one could, then, for example, it would be be possible to wake up in the morning and decide that today it would be moral to willfully kill my enemies. I could then kill all my enemies today, and then wake up again tomorrow morning, and decide that then it would be immoral for any relative of those enemies to retaliate against me. If moral judgements were subject to voluntary control, they would be too unstable to take the weight of the decisions that regularly depend upon them.

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