Whence morality?

In this section, I will try to address the relative merits of positivism versus non-positivism. The original arguments I had with my supervisor on this issue were, in my opinion, of a different sort than the issue raised by the external reviewer. My supervisor's objections were to my original attempt to form a prescriptive theory to compete with ethics. These objections I have come to regard as fair enough. In many respects, I regard academic philosophy as akin to law (cf. "Why I gave up philosophy"), and as Richard Rorty would say, I lacked any relevant precedent for this attempt. The question of devising an account of society independent of moral considerations, however, is a separate issue again. Do I even particularly want a positive account of society independent of moral considerations?

Well, I am trying to ground an ethics, at least partially, in social functioning. If it turns out, therefore, that society is partly defined in terms of morality, then it will render my argument circular.

Fair enough, but then how does someone like Emanuel Smikun do it in "Timeless Moral Imperatives in Causal Analysis of Social Functioning"?

I don't think that Smikun is trying to ground ethics in sociological functionalism. If anything, he is trying to ground sociological functionalism in terms of timeless moral imperatives. I don't really think that you will find any support for your project from the likes of him.

Morality might in fact create society. It does this according to its own rules rather than the other way around, although I assume that there must be social pressures on the moral as well.

Do you think that morality is something primary that shapes everything else? If it is, then this would abolish the sort of arbitrary (i.e. utilitarian) speculation that I want to eschew.

I think we ought to get The Moral Animal and read it. If nothing else, the title strongly suggests that we will benefit from this book. In any case, the science of evolutionary psychology is something with which I should familiarise myself. I do believe that my original objection to the Kantian project still stands, that morality must, at least in some fundamental ways, have something to do with the kind of (empirically observed) organisms that we are. It may well be semantically tied up with the fact that we are social animals. I have certainly read anthropological literature to support this, such as much of Jeremy Griffith's excellent Free: The End of the Human Condition.

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