One possible empirical model for a theory of ethics

I have read twenty pages of The Moral Animal since I last wrote an entry. It is discussing sexual selection, and the explanation of why the female of the species is more sexually discerning than the male. Actually, I have heard this explanation a dozen times before. I suspect that if any of these explanations has truly gained currency, then I would have heard of them through all the usual channels, not necessarily from the original source. Still, it provides abundant evidence of why morals cannot be reduced to Darwinian evolution any more than it can to social functioning.

Is there any interplay to be found between Darwinian evolution and social functioning?

I guess what I'm concerned about now is why we value what we value. I mean, it seems to me that this is simply going to become a psychological and anthropological exercise in one form or another.

I think it goes back ages ago, to an assignment that you wrote for Ethical Theory. You were talking about how the point of ethics was to use our hearts, with our heads as ancillary extensions therefrom. Unfortunately, both markers misunderstood what I meant by this sentence. They treated it like an unqualified sentence that the point of ethics was to use our hearts. What I meant by saying that we should use our heads as ancillary extensions from our hearts was that all our heads can give us is self-consistency, but not content per se. The heart will give us raw content, which we can then refine with our heads.

I think that the same thing applies to our impulses that are mentioned in The Moral Animal. On reflection, we will clearly find that some of these impulses are acceptable and others unacceptable. The point is, that the impulses of human nature will give us the raw material for our moral judgements. After that, all our reason can do is make those judgements self-consistent.

This, however, already raises an interesting question. Can human nature alone give us the raw material we need for our moral judgements? That is, even if reason will make those judgements self-consistent, would we arrive at a reasonable theory of ethics if all we had to work with were simply the impulses of human nature? Is human nature plus reason sufficient to explain a reasonable theory of ethics, or do we need some other input besides human nature? At least in principle, this sounds like an interesting project, and it would be undoubtedly empirical.

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