Finished the preface and the first two chapters to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
This book is a mind-blower. It seems to me to be blurring, if not removing, the distinction between science-plus-pre-science and every other kind of human discussion that is within the pale of rationality. It seems to me that Kuhn's theory of the pre-scientific stage of science could quite adequately describe any of the existing branches of philosophy, but my particular interest is in the sphere of ethics. I have hitherto noted that scientists must rely on an enormous body of theory in order to make their "observations". There therefore seems no reason to exclude moral intuitions from coupling with perceptions to produce accurate moral observations. In fact, because Kuhn's theory applies equally to mathematics, it can be argued that one's conception of ethics need not even be 'empirical' at all. Kuhn's theory will quite adequately explain absolutely any discipline that (eventually) manages to achieve non-coercive agreement.
Do you believe that Western society contains its own kind of paradigm?
It seems to me that it must, or else there would be no way that the society would even be cohesive if it did not, as we discussed earlier.
It seems to me that this cannot be the equivalent of a Kuhnian paradigm. The notion that society and its practices cannot be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms is clearly circular. It makes no distinction between normative and descriptive ethics, where the mores of a culture must be clearly descriptive, but bespeak nothing necessarily of a theory of normative ethics. Normative ethics must, of necessity, not simply document that a culture has certain moral beliefs, but also explain why it has them.
In this respect, it seems clear enough that ethics has no moral paradigm, although it does have various schools. The goal of all this ethical debate can only be a firm research consensus. But the history of science suggests that the road to a firm research consensus in any field of study is extraordinarily arduous.
(p.15.)
What 'facts' could possibly pertain to the development of a science of ethics? Doesn't the development of an ethical theory typically involve our assessment of various moral intuitions, usually through hypothetical scenarios, combined with an attempt at a theory that explains them? Of course, we never find a theory that satisfies all our intuitions, but exactly the same thing holds true for science:
(pp. 17-18.)
A fact is nothing more than the statement of an observation, and as such it is theory-laden. I see no reason, therefore, not to treat a moral intuition as a kind of fact for the purposes of ethics, as long as the context in which we experience this intuition is clearly delimited. Clearly, people's intuitions can vary greatly depending on the circumstances (culture?). But that moral intuition forms the raw material for the vast majority of normative ethical theorising seems hard to deny. If there were any paradigmatic assumption to be found across all the different schools of ethics, it would surely be the applicability of moral intuitions to various situations, real or hypothetical. As such, I am prepared to employ hypothetical scenarios as a source of moral 'facts', with reservations. I may find reason to dismiss an example on the grounds that it is too farfetched, where an example that was more drawn from one's life experience would be more appropriate.
What of Anne Maclean's objection (1993) that philosophy cannot teach moral expertise? Surely this is an important difference between ethics and science. A scientist might justifiably be dogmatic with a lay person about the theory of relativity, but an ethicist can never be dogmatic with a lay person about a moral judgement.
If a scientist had the time, however, she certainly could patiently explain the theory of relativity to a lay person until he 'got it'. In fact, science would always have to be teachable to a lay person in principle, or else the scientific paradigm's adherents would die out after the current generation. I see no reason why the same thing could not apply to ethics. I think you are right that in the case of ethics, a dogmatic approach does not seem justifiable, but that is only because the subject matter of ethics is so much more sensitive. The point is, that in a properly successful moral scientific paradigm, a moral scientist could in principle argue and convince a lay person of the truth of her claims.
This would, however, involve an element of the arbitrary. There is always an element of the arbitrary in scientific paradigms, due to the fact that they are a product of a particular culture, where another culture might have come up with quite a different and successful paradigm. As such, part of the success of science consists in its promotion and preservation of a specific culture within which a non-coercive consensus is reached. But surely you don't want simply to brainwash a lay person into adhering to the moral judgements of a particular culture! If their beliefs before they entered the culture were no better than their beliefs after they entered the culture, then they should not be persuaded by arational means.
This is our most fruitful discussion yet--which we are going to have to continue in another section!
Do you believe that Western society contains its own kind of paradigm?
It seems to me that it must, or else there would be no way that the society would even be cohesive if it did not, as we discussed earlier.
It seems to me that this cannot be the equivalent of a Kuhnian paradigm. The notion that society and its practices cannot be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms is clearly circular. It makes no distinction between normative and descriptive ethics, where the mores of a culture must be clearly descriptive, but bespeak nothing necessarily of a theory of normative ethics. Normative ethics must, of necessity, not simply document that a culture has certain moral beliefs, but also explain why it has them.
In this respect, it seems clear enough that ethics has no moral paradigm, although it does have various schools. The goal of all this ethical debate can only be a firm research consensus. But the history of science suggests that the road to a firm research consensus in any field of study is extraordinarily arduous.
History also suggests, however, some reasons for the difficulties encountered on that road. In the absence of a paradigm, or some candidate for a paradigm, all of the facts that could possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem equally relevant.
(p.15.)
What 'facts' could possibly pertain to the development of a science of ethics? Doesn't the development of an ethical theory typically involve our assessment of various moral intuitions, usually through hypothetical scenarios, combined with an attempt at a theory that explains them? Of course, we never find a theory that satisfies all our intuitions, but exactly the same thing holds true for science:
To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must seem better than its competitors, but it need not, and in fact never does, explain all the facts with which it can be confronted. (My emphasis.)
(pp. 17-18.)
A fact is nothing more than the statement of an observation, and as such it is theory-laden. I see no reason, therefore, not to treat a moral intuition as a kind of fact for the purposes of ethics, as long as the context in which we experience this intuition is clearly delimited. Clearly, people's intuitions can vary greatly depending on the circumstances (culture?). But that moral intuition forms the raw material for the vast majority of normative ethical theorising seems hard to deny. If there were any paradigmatic assumption to be found across all the different schools of ethics, it would surely be the applicability of moral intuitions to various situations, real or hypothetical. As such, I am prepared to employ hypothetical scenarios as a source of moral 'facts', with reservations. I may find reason to dismiss an example on the grounds that it is too farfetched, where an example that was more drawn from one's life experience would be more appropriate.
What of Anne Maclean's objection (1993) that philosophy cannot teach moral expertise? Surely this is an important difference between ethics and science. A scientist might justifiably be dogmatic with a lay person about the theory of relativity, but an ethicist can never be dogmatic with a lay person about a moral judgement.
If a scientist had the time, however, she certainly could patiently explain the theory of relativity to a lay person until he 'got it'. In fact, science would always have to be teachable to a lay person in principle, or else the scientific paradigm's adherents would die out after the current generation. I see no reason why the same thing could not apply to ethics. I think you are right that in the case of ethics, a dogmatic approach does not seem justifiable, but that is only because the subject matter of ethics is so much more sensitive. The point is, that in a properly successful moral scientific paradigm, a moral scientist could in principle argue and convince a lay person of the truth of her claims.
This would, however, involve an element of the arbitrary. There is always an element of the arbitrary in scientific paradigms, due to the fact that they are a product of a particular culture, where another culture might have come up with quite a different and successful paradigm. As such, part of the success of science consists in its promotion and preservation of a specific culture within which a non-coercive consensus is reached. But surely you don't want simply to brainwash a lay person into adhering to the moral judgements of a particular culture! If their beliefs before they entered the culture were no better than their beliefs after they entered the culture, then they should not be persuaded by arational means.
This is our most fruitful discussion yet--which we are going to have to continue in another section!