The experience-dependence of intuitions
I have now made enough observations in the preceding sections to wager a tentative hypothesis: The strength (reliability) of intuitions is experience-dependent. We might think of intuitions as being strengthened by experiences. The intuitive compellingness of the Laws of Thought, for example, stems from their constantly repeated reinforcement by our experiences, so that when we look at an apple:
We can apply the above reasoning to anything else that we happen to observe. So perhaps this is why the Laws of Thought are so intuitively compelling.
The experience of the imagination is, however, much weaker than the experience of the outside world. Indeed, if our experiences of our own imaginations were as strong as our experiences of outside reality, we may well be psychotic! The relative weakness of the experience of the imagination is important if intuitions are experience-dependent: It commensurately weakens the reliability and strength of the intuitions that can be formed from them.
This, therefore, is the explanation of why farfetched examples do not allow us to form reliable intuitions. Intuitions that depend entirely upon the imagination are commensurately weaker than intuitions that depend upon direct observation.
- It is an apple;
- It cannot be both an apple and a non-apple; and
- Everything in the world is either an apple or a non-apple.
We can apply the above reasoning to anything else that we happen to observe. So perhaps this is why the Laws of Thought are so intuitively compelling.
The experience of the imagination is, however, much weaker than the experience of the outside world. Indeed, if our experiences of our own imaginations were as strong as our experiences of outside reality, we may well be psychotic! The relative weakness of the experience of the imagination is important if intuitions are experience-dependent: It commensurately weakens the reliability and strength of the intuitions that can be formed from them.
This, therefore, is the explanation of why farfetched examples do not allow us to form reliable intuitions. Intuitions that depend entirely upon the imagination are commensurately weaker than intuitions that depend upon direct observation.
Comments