What is the point of philosophy for me?
I was actually extremely skeptical about the claim at the end of the previous entry at the time that I took the course. I wrote as much in my essay, although at the time, I did not present the view at all persuasively. But basically, the reason for my skepticism was that I believed that no matter what theory you chose to adopt, it would not change your practices, because all the people around me just seemed to be hypocrites. These intutitions eventually found their way into my Masters thesis. I was trying to assemble some groundwork for an eventual theory that would be both preachable in principle and liveable in practice, and was looking to the epistemological tradition of empiricism to achieve it.
Could I continue this line of reasoning today? Well, based on my blog entry titled "The Minimum for Moral Judgements", I would say that if I were to re-write my thesis today, it would be nothing like it was back then. To start off with, my thesis back then began with a destructive project where I was pointing out the difficulties in Kant's theory of ethics, and placing the blame on the rationalist position that he adopts. In the second chapter I compare Aristotle favourably to Kant, arguing that Aristotle makes for a more robust theory through his consideration of empirical information.
These days, I would start the thesis on a much more basic level, of epistemology and meta-philosophy, to really hit the nail on the head. I would start off by asking why the study of ethics was not tightly connected to practice, so that hypocrisy, if it arose, was a separate issue. Academic ethicists seemed to keep producing theories that ordinary people simply could not be expected to take seriously as worth living up to. In itself, this might not be a problem, but it is when the theorist himself does not obey his own ethics! As argued in "The Minimum for Moral Judgements", I would say that it constitutes a reasonable rebuttal to catch her in the process of hypocrisy. If it constitutes a legitimate argument in epistemology against an inductive skeptic, then it should work in ethics just as effectively. The point is that a hypocrite's actions speak louder than her words.
Philosophy seems to mean a lot more when we are actually expected to practice our beliefs consistently. In fact, one could logically argue that this would be in the interests of developing philosophical intuitions that were experience-dependent. This was one of the foundational assumptions for which I had argued in the section called "The experience-dependence of intuitions". Because intuitions were experience-dependent, then reliable intuitions were to be fostered through experience, and therefore anything that encouraged first-hand experience with a view was to be sought. By forcing people to practice their beliefs consistently, they would develop first-hand experience with them with which to form their philosophical intuitions about them--a bit like Marx's praxis.
Note that this would mean that hypocrisy would become a relevant issue immediately in any philosophical debate. It would also rule out whole areas of philosophy that were impossible to practice consistently. Any form of strong skepticism in epistemology would be thrown out the window, as would extreme altruism in ethics--though it might still be preserved in the form of supererogatory acts. It would no doubt be a down-to-earth philosophy that had come out of the ivory tower. Because of its paradigmatic assumption that intuitions were experience-dependent, it would also be robustly empirical.
So really, my "empirical theory of ethics" from my Masters thesis wasn't too far off the mark after all. Starting from my theory of commensurability, which had been noted as a contribution from my Masters thesis, I could move towards a philosophical paradigm. It would include an empirical theory of ethics, but it would not necessarily be tightly connected to sociology this time around, because it wouldn't need to. Integrity would this time be fused into the ethics at the proper epistemological level where it belongs.
Yes, I certainly could pursue some groundwork for that in a doctorate if I wanted to. But really, the subject is so enormous that it seems far more like material for a book, or a series of volumes--"Towards a Philosophical Paradigm". Eliminating unrealiable intuitions from the mix, forming a clear hierarchy of intuitions based on their experience-dependent nature, living a properly integral life for once. It would never end pure speculation in philosophy, but it could at least spark a philosophical tradition.
I have no idea whether I'll actually get around to writing any of this stuff, but if I keep this energy up, something's bound to happen. I know that the treatment of any one topic in most of these blog entries is brief, but I don't think that there's much that I can do about it. That's just the nature of a blog. All that I can say is that if there is anything that you want me to cover in more detail, you can leave me a comment and I will write more about it in another blog entry.
Of course, knowing how much detail to include in any piece of philosophical writing is very hard. Too much detail and you end up saying something banal; too little, and you end up being sketchy. As to what is banal and what is insightful, one man's banality is another man's insight in a field with such little consensus of intuition as philosophy. I simply must content myself in the knowledge that my work will continue to evolve based on discussions with others and my own reflection.
Could I continue this line of reasoning today? Well, based on my blog entry titled "The Minimum for Moral Judgements", I would say that if I were to re-write my thesis today, it would be nothing like it was back then. To start off with, my thesis back then began with a destructive project where I was pointing out the difficulties in Kant's theory of ethics, and placing the blame on the rationalist position that he adopts. In the second chapter I compare Aristotle favourably to Kant, arguing that Aristotle makes for a more robust theory through his consideration of empirical information.
These days, I would start the thesis on a much more basic level, of epistemology and meta-philosophy, to really hit the nail on the head. I would start off by asking why the study of ethics was not tightly connected to practice, so that hypocrisy, if it arose, was a separate issue. Academic ethicists seemed to keep producing theories that ordinary people simply could not be expected to take seriously as worth living up to. In itself, this might not be a problem, but it is when the theorist himself does not obey his own ethics! As argued in "The Minimum for Moral Judgements", I would say that it constitutes a reasonable rebuttal to catch her in the process of hypocrisy. If it constitutes a legitimate argument in epistemology against an inductive skeptic, then it should work in ethics just as effectively. The point is that a hypocrite's actions speak louder than her words.
Philosophy seems to mean a lot more when we are actually expected to practice our beliefs consistently. In fact, one could logically argue that this would be in the interests of developing philosophical intuitions that were experience-dependent. This was one of the foundational assumptions for which I had argued in the section called "The experience-dependence of intuitions". Because intuitions were experience-dependent, then reliable intuitions were to be fostered through experience, and therefore anything that encouraged first-hand experience with a view was to be sought. By forcing people to practice their beliefs consistently, they would develop first-hand experience with them with which to form their philosophical intuitions about them--a bit like Marx's praxis.
Note that this would mean that hypocrisy would become a relevant issue immediately in any philosophical debate. It would also rule out whole areas of philosophy that were impossible to practice consistently. Any form of strong skepticism in epistemology would be thrown out the window, as would extreme altruism in ethics--though it might still be preserved in the form of supererogatory acts. It would no doubt be a down-to-earth philosophy that had come out of the ivory tower. Because of its paradigmatic assumption that intuitions were experience-dependent, it would also be robustly empirical.
So really, my "empirical theory of ethics" from my Masters thesis wasn't too far off the mark after all. Starting from my theory of commensurability, which had been noted as a contribution from my Masters thesis, I could move towards a philosophical paradigm. It would include an empirical theory of ethics, but it would not necessarily be tightly connected to sociology this time around, because it wouldn't need to. Integrity would this time be fused into the ethics at the proper epistemological level where it belongs.
Yes, I certainly could pursue some groundwork for that in a doctorate if I wanted to. But really, the subject is so enormous that it seems far more like material for a book, or a series of volumes--"Towards a Philosophical Paradigm". Eliminating unrealiable intuitions from the mix, forming a clear hierarchy of intuitions based on their experience-dependent nature, living a properly integral life for once. It would never end pure speculation in philosophy, but it could at least spark a philosophical tradition.
I have no idea whether I'll actually get around to writing any of this stuff, but if I keep this energy up, something's bound to happen. I know that the treatment of any one topic in most of these blog entries is brief, but I don't think that there's much that I can do about it. That's just the nature of a blog. All that I can say is that if there is anything that you want me to cover in more detail, you can leave me a comment and I will write more about it in another blog entry.
Of course, knowing how much detail to include in any piece of philosophical writing is very hard. Too much detail and you end up saying something banal; too little, and you end up being sketchy. As to what is banal and what is insightful, one man's banality is another man's insight in a field with such little consensus of intuition as philosophy. I simply must content myself in the knowledge that my work will continue to evolve based on discussions with others and my own reflection.
Comments