Rationality, consensus and appreciability in the role of reason
I don't think that this is something that is appreciated very much by philosophers themselves. I cannot believe that they would consider either consensus or appreciability to be rational, yet they obviously accept them as part of the rational process. This is understandable (appreciable) because consensus and appreciability have something philosophically relevant in common with rationality. They both work with our intuitions as they currently are, in a state of pristinity. It's just that consensus works with our existing, integrated, unprocessed intuitions, appreciability works with our existing, unintegrated intuitions, and rationality works by processing our existing intuitions.
Hence, we can see that the raw material in each case is working with our existing intuitions, which we accept as what philosophers/reasoners do. The first major dichotomy in the way that reasoning handles our existing intuitions is whether or not it processes them. If it processes them, then it is rationality, and if it does not process them, then it is bare intuition. Between the two different kinds of bare intuition in reason, the dichotomy to be drawn is whether or not the unprocessed existing intuitions are integrated or not. If they are integrated with our other systems of belief, then the bare intuitions form a consensus, whereby we see our explicit views mirrored in each other. If they are not integrated, the intuition is appreciability, where you recognise some of your unintegrated intuitions realised in somebody else's beliefs, making you sympathetic to them.
For example, suppose that you are an atheist discussing metaphysics with a theist. You cannot possibly see the rationality of the theist's views, yet you are hesitant to call the theist irrational, possibly because you are touched by his sense of faith. Perhaps you see what comfort it gives him, or sense how well it has socialised him into being a good person. But for whatever reason, you can appreciate why he would want to hold his view, even if you do not consider it to be rational. Perhaps you have an intuition of fearing death that you try to suppress because as an atheist, you have no means to properly assuage it, so it is never properly integrated into your system of belief. Because you can feel it being assuaged in the presence of the faith of the theist, however, you do not try to question his faith too roundly.
Actually, it seems like the psychology of appreciability is an area rich for study. It seems to me that there is another reason that you might appreciate a theist perspective. You might simply note that ninety-five percent of the population believes in a supreme being in one form or another, and even though you are not one of them, you have social instincts forcing you to respect the choices that other people have made. In that case, I suppose that your intuition might be respect for autonomy, but it seems unfair to call that unintegrated. It seems to me that that could be perfectly integrated into your perspective, and that you could hold it quite explicitly as an atheist.
There is a form of that kind of appreciability that I think would be held less explicitly in certain cases: academic respect. Consider the example of rubbishing the work of a postgraduate student that you do not even know. The student may have written a brilliant work, yet someone with an axe to grind can still rubbish it because the student is unknown. But if the person is the chair of the department, or Immanuel Kant, then a certain amount of sympathy becomes mandatory. Academic respect can be very annoying if you don't like the person who is very well respected. A pedantic person becomes 'meticulous', and a narrow-minded person becomes 'heavily influenced by' a specific philosopher.
Mmmm, I'd be inclined to say that if you respected autonomy explicitly, you would not necessarily appreciate a theist's view, just the theist himself. That cannot be what appreciability is. It does not have to do with treating the holder of the view as an end in herself, but rather having a sympathetic understanding of her motive towards the view. A Kantian respect for a holder of an opinion can be such a detached, impersonal thing, but appreciability requires some kind of personal attachment.
Is that the difference between appreciability and consensus? The fact that appreciability involves shared motives, whereas consensus involves shared grounds/assumptions/discursive claims/etc? If that is the case, then the fundamental dichotomy to be made in reason is between shared motives and shared grounds. If one is working from shared motives (not necessarily grounds), then the result is appreciability, and if one is working from shared grounds (not necessarily motives) then the result is rationality or consensus. If the grounds are processed, then the result is rationality, and if the grounds are unprocessed--i.e. raw shared opinion--then the ground is consensus.
Hence, we can see that the raw material in each case is working with our existing intuitions, which we accept as what philosophers/reasoners do. The first major dichotomy in the way that reasoning handles our existing intuitions is whether or not it processes them. If it processes them, then it is rationality, and if it does not process them, then it is bare intuition. Between the two different kinds of bare intuition in reason, the dichotomy to be drawn is whether or not the unprocessed existing intuitions are integrated or not. If they are integrated with our other systems of belief, then the bare intuitions form a consensus, whereby we see our explicit views mirrored in each other. If they are not integrated, the intuition is appreciability, where you recognise some of your unintegrated intuitions realised in somebody else's beliefs, making you sympathetic to them.
For example, suppose that you are an atheist discussing metaphysics with a theist. You cannot possibly see the rationality of the theist's views, yet you are hesitant to call the theist irrational, possibly because you are touched by his sense of faith. Perhaps you see what comfort it gives him, or sense how well it has socialised him into being a good person. But for whatever reason, you can appreciate why he would want to hold his view, even if you do not consider it to be rational. Perhaps you have an intuition of fearing death that you try to suppress because as an atheist, you have no means to properly assuage it, so it is never properly integrated into your system of belief. Because you can feel it being assuaged in the presence of the faith of the theist, however, you do not try to question his faith too roundly.
Actually, it seems like the psychology of appreciability is an area rich for study. It seems to me that there is another reason that you might appreciate a theist perspective. You might simply note that ninety-five percent of the population believes in a supreme being in one form or another, and even though you are not one of them, you have social instincts forcing you to respect the choices that other people have made. In that case, I suppose that your intuition might be respect for autonomy, but it seems unfair to call that unintegrated. It seems to me that that could be perfectly integrated into your perspective, and that you could hold it quite explicitly as an atheist.
There is a form of that kind of appreciability that I think would be held less explicitly in certain cases: academic respect. Consider the example of rubbishing the work of a postgraduate student that you do not even know. The student may have written a brilliant work, yet someone with an axe to grind can still rubbish it because the student is unknown. But if the person is the chair of the department, or Immanuel Kant, then a certain amount of sympathy becomes mandatory. Academic respect can be very annoying if you don't like the person who is very well respected. A pedantic person becomes 'meticulous', and a narrow-minded person becomes 'heavily influenced by' a specific philosopher.
Mmmm, I'd be inclined to say that if you respected autonomy explicitly, you would not necessarily appreciate a theist's view, just the theist himself. That cannot be what appreciability is. It does not have to do with treating the holder of the view as an end in herself, but rather having a sympathetic understanding of her motive towards the view. A Kantian respect for a holder of an opinion can be such a detached, impersonal thing, but appreciability requires some kind of personal attachment.
Is that the difference between appreciability and consensus? The fact that appreciability involves shared motives, whereas consensus involves shared grounds/assumptions/discursive claims/etc? If that is the case, then the fundamental dichotomy to be made in reason is between shared motives and shared grounds. If one is working from shared motives (not necessarily grounds), then the result is appreciability, and if one is working from shared grounds (not necessarily motives) then the result is rationality or consensus. If the grounds are processed, then the result is rationality, and if the grounds are unprocessed--i.e. raw shared opinion--then the ground is consensus.
Comments