Will philosophy ever reach level 2?
It is very tempting here to introduce the example of natural philosophy. Once upon a time, questions about the nature of the universe belonged to philosophy, not science. Kuhn would have called this the prescientific stage of science, when there were many competing paradigms, none of which had yet achieved dominance. Once one paradigm attained dominance, science could start to progress as 'normal'. Yet when this happened, we stopped calling it philosophy, and started calling it something else: science.
There is another example of a branch of philosophy that reached level 2, however, that arguably still belongs to philosophy: logic. Of course, this is a grey area, because logic can also be considered a branch of mathematics, which must be classified as a science. The laws of thought themselves are arguably at level 1. However, I have known some students to argue some of them (perhaps because they have not understood them?). In any case, once logic reaches a high enough level of complexity, specific logical--and for that matter mathematical--theorems must be considered at level 2, simply because it is impossible to determine their truth or falsity simply on face value. One must use the tools of logic in order to arrive at a non-coercive agreement about their truth or falsity.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of what remains known as "philosophy" seems quite hopelessly stuck at level 3. Conflicting schools of philosophy can achieve mutual respectability but not agreeability. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that this is the main thing that distinguishes typical philosophy from science: that science possesses a unified paradigm, and philosophy does not. If another branch of philosophy acquires a unified paradigm, what is to stop it from becoming a science as well?
This also raises an interesting question. I can think of only twice in its history that philosophy has reached paradigmatic unity: once with the natural sciences, and once with formal logic. What was so special about these areas, therefore, that we could reach paradigmatic unity about them and not about anything else? It suggests that we naturally possess intuitions about the natural world, and the derivation of inferences about it, that are far more universal than in other areas of philosophy.
If so, then perhaps the rest of philosophy will always have competing 'paradigms', to use Kuhn's term. And if paradigmatic unity should ever occur again in philosophy, then perhaps it will no longer be called philosophy there either, but science. Hence, whether it be by nature or by definition, it seems that philosophy is generally unlikely to reach level 2.
There is another example of a branch of philosophy that reached level 2, however, that arguably still belongs to philosophy: logic. Of course, this is a grey area, because logic can also be considered a branch of mathematics, which must be classified as a science. The laws of thought themselves are arguably at level 1. However, I have known some students to argue some of them (perhaps because they have not understood them?). In any case, once logic reaches a high enough level of complexity, specific logical--and for that matter mathematical--theorems must be considered at level 2, simply because it is impossible to determine their truth or falsity simply on face value. One must use the tools of logic in order to arrive at a non-coercive agreement about their truth or falsity.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of what remains known as "philosophy" seems quite hopelessly stuck at level 3. Conflicting schools of philosophy can achieve mutual respectability but not agreeability. It is tempting, therefore, to conclude that this is the main thing that distinguishes typical philosophy from science: that science possesses a unified paradigm, and philosophy does not. If another branch of philosophy acquires a unified paradigm, what is to stop it from becoming a science as well?
This also raises an interesting question. I can think of only twice in its history that philosophy has reached paradigmatic unity: once with the natural sciences, and once with formal logic. What was so special about these areas, therefore, that we could reach paradigmatic unity about them and not about anything else? It suggests that we naturally possess intuitions about the natural world, and the derivation of inferences about it, that are far more universal than in other areas of philosophy.
If so, then perhaps the rest of philosophy will always have competing 'paradigms', to use Kuhn's term. And if paradigmatic unity should ever occur again in philosophy, then perhaps it will no longer be called philosophy there either, but science. Hence, whether it be by nature or by definition, it seems that philosophy is generally unlikely to reach level 2.
Comments