Subsumptive justification
True non-coercive agreement is not possible without a commonality of shared assumptions. These assumptions can themselves be argued for or against. In that case, however, the arguments will still themselves ultimately have to rely on assumptions, making for infinite potential for disagreements.
How, then, can agreement be non-coercive? We have already seen that science requires assumptions to be made on the grounds that they thereby make an opening for the reception of other truths that depend upon them. This is worded deliberately similarly to a claim of Jeremy Bentham's:
(Source: Bentham, Jeremy, Of Promulgation of the Laws and Promulgation of the Reasons Thereof, Section 2, Promulgation of Reasons)
Note, however, that science achieves its progress not by attempting to prove various foundational claims. Bentham is right to point out that theories can be formed by the attempt to prove certain basic assumptions. But just as importantly, theories can also be formed by the closure from speculation of certain basic issues. Bentham's justification for the proofs of certain truths is the higher-order truths that can thereby be discovered. Note that this is exactly the same justification for assuming without proof certain claims in science. Geometry takes advantage of this approach just as much as do the physical sciences.
We normally consider derived claims to be justified in terms of the fundamental claims from which they are derived. Hence, the chain of justification flows in entailment order. (P therefore Q), in other words, implies (P justifies Q) in a typical foundationalist structure. In this case, however, the fundamental claims are justified in terms of the claims that can be derived from them, in subsumptive order, so that (P therefore Q) actually implies (Q justifies P). This avenue is not often explicitly explored in philosophy, but there are examples of it. For instance, Nozick justifies employing State-of-Nature theory in Anarchy, State and Utopia, at least initially, in terms of the theory of justice it produces. So that I can refer to this method of justification quickly in future, I will term it subsumptive justification.
How, then, can agreement be non-coercive? We have already seen that science requires assumptions to be made on the grounds that they thereby make an opening for the reception of other truths that depend upon them. This is worded deliberately similarly to a claim of Jeremy Bentham's:
There are truths which it is necessary to prove; not for their own sakes, because they are acknowledged, but that an opening may be made for the reception of other truths which depend upon them.
(Source: Bentham, Jeremy, Of Promulgation of the Laws and Promulgation of the Reasons Thereof, Section 2, Promulgation of Reasons)
Note, however, that science achieves its progress not by attempting to prove various foundational claims. Bentham is right to point out that theories can be formed by the attempt to prove certain basic assumptions. But just as importantly, theories can also be formed by the closure from speculation of certain basic issues. Bentham's justification for the proofs of certain truths is the higher-order truths that can thereby be discovered. Note that this is exactly the same justification for assuming without proof certain claims in science. Geometry takes advantage of this approach just as much as do the physical sciences.
We normally consider derived claims to be justified in terms of the fundamental claims from which they are derived. Hence, the chain of justification flows in entailment order. (P therefore Q), in other words, implies (P justifies Q) in a typical foundationalist structure. In this case, however, the fundamental claims are justified in terms of the claims that can be derived from them, in subsumptive order, so that (P therefore Q) actually implies (Q justifies P). This avenue is not often explicitly explored in philosophy, but there are examples of it. For instance, Nozick justifies employing State-of-Nature theory in Anarchy, State and Utopia, at least initially, in terms of the theory of justice it produces. So that I can refer to this method of justification quickly in future, I will term it subsumptive justification.
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