The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding

I refer to the article mentioned in the previous entry, Scientific Naturalism and the Value of Knowledge:

This motivation for the view constrains the kind of epistemological theory one can adopt, and my goal is to show how these constraints push inexorably toward a kind of attitudinalism or non-cognitivism in epistemology, an attitudinalism modeled on non-cognitivist approaches in ethics.

OK, I want definitions for attitudinalism and non-cognitivism before I go any further.

Well, "attitudinalism" is hardly a common word. It only appears in Google on 19 pages, and the top-ranked page is a reference to a book written by the same author who wrote the above article, Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Nothing else on the page looks like an explicit definition of the term. The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy does not include it, and the only place where it seems clearly explicated is indeed in this book written by Kvanvig. Given the fact that this book was only published in October last year, this is obviously quite new, so I should find out about it for that reason alone.

The book he wrote is called The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. At US$60.00, it's too expensive to purchase, but we could always look for it in the library of my alma mater.

OK, the book doesn't show up under a title search, but it does show up under an author search. Don't ask me how that works, but I can check the shelf, assuming that I get a moment.

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