Subjectivity vs Objectivity in Ethics
I take it that a basic 'subjectivist' approach states that morality inheres in subjects. A basic 'objectivist' approach states that morality inheres in objects.
What makes it an interesting debate whether ethics is subjective or objective? The argument runs that if ethics is subjective, then we have no reason to take ethics seriously as a guide to human behaviour. If ethics is objective, then we do.
I don't believe this claim for one second. First, let's suppose that when we judge human actions to be either right or wrong, this rightness or wrongness inheres in the actions themselves, rather than in the people judging them. Let's suppose that I do something that someone else judges to be wrong. According to this 'objectivist' view, someone is claiming that my action contains a specific property known as 'wrongness'. I am supposed to worry about what I have done because of it. On the other hand, if 'subjectivism' is correct, then someone who claims that my action is wrong must by definition not approve of what I have done, and I am now supposed to worry about this instead.
What is the practical difference between the two examples? Whether the wrongness exists in my actions, or whether it exists in the beholder of those actions, I have no more reason prima facie in either case to change my behaviour. If objective wrongness exists in my actions, the degree to which I will take it seriously is still entirely subjective. The alternative is that subjective wrongness exists in some beholders of my actions in the form of disapproval. Even then, the degree to which it exists within me is still subjective. In other words, the subjectivity or objectivity of the wrongness is irrelevant to how seriously I will take it.
The same problem merely re-emerges if we say that someone should take ethics seriously if it is objective. If objectivism is true, this 'shouldness' is just another objective property of a hypothetical action of taking ethics seriously. It is no reflection of whether I will actually take ethics seriously or not. The converse claim, that ethics should not be taken seriously if it is subjective, is simply irrational. It is rather like people who claim that life has no meaning or purpose, and that we are therefore mistaken to allow anything to matter to us. All that one can say is that these people are muddled, or one can get annoyed with them and wonder who they are. What right does anyone have to state that one's cares and concerns, the things that one finds important, are such that one is somehow foolish or mistaken? The point to be gotten is that we have no more reason to take ethics seriously if it is objective than if it is subjective.
I think that there is also another reason why various philosophers have taken the debate seriously about subjectivity versus objectivity. They claim that 'objectivity' legitimises moral disagreements and arguments, and 'subjectivity' does not. I don't believe this claim for any longer than I did the first one.
Any kind of disagreement, be it moral or otherwise, requires just one thing to be legitimate. It is commensurability, as I have defined it in the section titled Commensurability 5.0. We regard disagreements as legitimate if they can register on at least the lowest level of commensurability. If the disagreement is at level 4, then it is legitimate simply so that we come to better understand each other's motives and perceptions through argument. If the disagreement is at level 3, then it is legitimate because it clarifies and deepens each other's views through the process of trying to convince each other that they are correct. If the disagreement is at level 2, it is legitimate because it is likely to be actually resolved through rational debate. Finally, if two people both hold claims that are at level 1 with each other, then they are already in agreement by definition.
Commensurability is not affected by subjectivity or objectivity in ethics. If ethics is objective, then we will be engaged in a disagreement about a fact of the world, which presumably exists on level 2 or level 3. On the other hand, if ethics is subjective, then we are involved in a disagreement about whose values we shall adopt in what way in a particular situation, which can just as demonstrably exist at level 2 or 3. The only real difference, therefore, between subjectivism and objectivism with respect to moral disagreements, is what is actually being negotiated. If objectivism is true, the negotiation is between the relative strengths of intuitions about a fact of the world. If subjectivism is true, the negotiation is between the relative strengths of values and their application. But in virtue of the fact that both kinds of disagreement have the same level of commensurability in either case, the subjectivist/objectivist debate can have no impact on the legitimacy of moral arguments.
What makes it an interesting debate whether ethics is subjective or objective? The argument runs that if ethics is subjective, then we have no reason to take ethics seriously as a guide to human behaviour. If ethics is objective, then we do.
I don't believe this claim for one second. First, let's suppose that when we judge human actions to be either right or wrong, this rightness or wrongness inheres in the actions themselves, rather than in the people judging them. Let's suppose that I do something that someone else judges to be wrong. According to this 'objectivist' view, someone is claiming that my action contains a specific property known as 'wrongness'. I am supposed to worry about what I have done because of it. On the other hand, if 'subjectivism' is correct, then someone who claims that my action is wrong must by definition not approve of what I have done, and I am now supposed to worry about this instead.
What is the practical difference between the two examples? Whether the wrongness exists in my actions, or whether it exists in the beholder of those actions, I have no more reason prima facie in either case to change my behaviour. If objective wrongness exists in my actions, the degree to which I will take it seriously is still entirely subjective. The alternative is that subjective wrongness exists in some beholders of my actions in the form of disapproval. Even then, the degree to which it exists within me is still subjective. In other words, the subjectivity or objectivity of the wrongness is irrelevant to how seriously I will take it.
The same problem merely re-emerges if we say that someone should take ethics seriously if it is objective. If objectivism is true, this 'shouldness' is just another objective property of a hypothetical action of taking ethics seriously. It is no reflection of whether I will actually take ethics seriously or not. The converse claim, that ethics should not be taken seriously if it is subjective, is simply irrational. It is rather like people who claim that life has no meaning or purpose, and that we are therefore mistaken to allow anything to matter to us. All that one can say is that these people are muddled, or one can get annoyed with them and wonder who they are. What right does anyone have to state that one's cares and concerns, the things that one finds important, are such that one is somehow foolish or mistaken? The point to be gotten is that we have no more reason to take ethics seriously if it is objective than if it is subjective.
I think that there is also another reason why various philosophers have taken the debate seriously about subjectivity versus objectivity. They claim that 'objectivity' legitimises moral disagreements and arguments, and 'subjectivity' does not. I don't believe this claim for any longer than I did the first one.
Any kind of disagreement, be it moral or otherwise, requires just one thing to be legitimate. It is commensurability, as I have defined it in the section titled Commensurability 5.0. We regard disagreements as legitimate if they can register on at least the lowest level of commensurability. If the disagreement is at level 4, then it is legitimate simply so that we come to better understand each other's motives and perceptions through argument. If the disagreement is at level 3, then it is legitimate because it clarifies and deepens each other's views through the process of trying to convince each other that they are correct. If the disagreement is at level 2, it is legitimate because it is likely to be actually resolved through rational debate. Finally, if two people both hold claims that are at level 1 with each other, then they are already in agreement by definition.
Commensurability is not affected by subjectivity or objectivity in ethics. If ethics is objective, then we will be engaged in a disagreement about a fact of the world, which presumably exists on level 2 or level 3. On the other hand, if ethics is subjective, then we are involved in a disagreement about whose values we shall adopt in what way in a particular situation, which can just as demonstrably exist at level 2 or 3. The only real difference, therefore, between subjectivism and objectivism with respect to moral disagreements, is what is actually being negotiated. If objectivism is true, the negotiation is between the relative strengths of intuitions about a fact of the world. If subjectivism is true, the negotiation is between the relative strengths of values and their application. But in virtue of the fact that both kinds of disagreement have the same level of commensurability in either case, the subjectivist/objectivist debate can have no impact on the legitimacy of moral arguments.
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