Ways to handle the dilemma: No. 1--Decide that one does not need reason to be non-coercive

I don't want to give up my scale of degrees, because I think it is accurately descriptive of what philosophers actually do. But if we are to consider that it is legitimate, then we cannot think that reason is the be-all and end-all. I also take it that if we want to preserve philosophers' existing methods, then we must also consider what we want to exclude from them. For example, we would want to exclude methods like brainwashing from conduciveness to a convergence of opinion. Furthermore, it seems legitimately that the reason things like brainwashing are wrong is that they are actually coercive. Surely the only relevant difference between that and sympathy cannot simply be that one phenomenon is more common.

It seems to me, therefore, that if we are to consider human nature, some non-coercive methods are not strictly rational. It is not coercive on somebody to hold a certain opinion simply that everybody else already holds that opinion. It is also not coercive on somebody to to hold a certain opinion merely that she understands the (non-rational) motives behind it. Brainwashing, on the other hand, is indeed coercive.

As to what actually makes one thing coercive and another not coercive, that would probably produce a paper in itself. I may or may not get around to writing it.