Chapter 6: Two Logical Fallacies
I have identified two logical difficulties with chapter 6 of my thesis. The first has to do with the moral observation that an established moral system is an essential of social functioning, as Lord Patrick Devlin said. Near the end of the chapter, I draw a moral hypothesis, which is that the duties of an ethic must not be incompatible with the needs of society. It should be clear that this hypothesis does not logically follow from the observation. The observation states simply that an established moral system is a necessary condition for social functioning. Whereas, the hypothesis says that social functioning is a necessary condition for a moral system. If I were to be claiming that the hypothesis logically followed from the observation, then I could be accused of committing the fallacy of asserting the consequent. Of course, I was not claiming that the hypothesis logically derived from the observation. But I cannot ignore the fact that at that time, the hypothesis was suggested to me by the observation--and, admittedly, other observations as well. Nevertheless, having the logical invalidity of the maneuver exposed in such a clear way does make me less inclined to claim the hypothesis.
Another logical fallacy is, I think, more critically damaging. I also think that this is the root of one of the criticisms that the external reviewer made that was actually legitimate. He said that the thesis seemed to depend on the--undefended--claim that 'society and its practices' could be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms. I have already argued elsewhere that this would not have occurred to me one way or the other. Certainly, it never came up in any of the discussions that I had with my supervisor on the matter. He seemed to think that it did, and that we argued about it at some length, but I think that he is mistaken about this. I think that he was thinking of the time when we were arguing about whether I could construct a general prescriptive theory without a constitutive reliance on moral terms. I think that that is quite a separate issue from whether society and its practices can be specified without such a reliance. Surely the project of the specification of society is far more of a descriptive affair than the issue of constructing a prescriptive theory!
This leads me back to what the second logical fallacy was in Chapter 6: No distinction was made between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. That is, no distinction was made between what a society's mores were at any one time, and what would have actually been moral for that society to practise. That distinction should have been made. For it seems clear enough that an established system of mores is indeed an essential of social functioning, because basic beliefs about right and wrong are indispensable for the reliability of human interactions. However, it is not at all clear that a moral system in the normative sense is necessary for social functioning at all. In other words, it is not clear that human beings actually have to do the right thing by each other in order to function effectively in society. Indeed, if human history is any example, it is not. Many societies have managed to function perfectly well using immoral systems of mores--such as slavery for the ancient Greeks.
This leads me to conclude that the difficulty raised by the external reviewer can be addressed successfully. One simply has to make the distinction between morals and mores. Society and its practices indeed cannot be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on terms that pertain to mores. But it can certainly be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on terms that pertain to morals. Part of what we mean by 'society' might well be an entity that has its own standards of right and wrong, but it certainly does not thereby have to actually behave rightly or wrongly. This confusion seems to have arisen in the first place because mores and morals both share the same basic termset.
What are the implications of the second logical fallacy for my thesis? At the least, it makes me want to withdraw the moral hypothesis altogether. If I have to make a distinction between morals and mores, then it seems clear enough that I must claim that the duties of morals might be incompatible with the needs of society. It will always be possible for an entire society to be unjust, and this might mean that the lives of all the people in that society are not worth living. Yet the alternate claim, that the duties of mores cannot be incompatible with the needs of their society, seems at least misleading. Mores can change due to moral observations and accompanying moral pressures. Society is flexible enough to accommodate changing mores to arrive at a new balance, but the interim can be tumultuous--as in the abolition of slavery. In the US, after all, it resulted in the American Civil War. But it was a (normatively) moral war that had to be fought, with a right side and a wrong side, and--fortunately for us all--the right side won.
The previous considerations raise an important issue of how to use terms such as "moral" or "immoral". It seems that they can be used in a descriptive and a prescriptive way. The descriptive way is "moral according to the norms of a particular society". The prescriptive way is "moral in general", or a Kantian sense of "absolutely moral", or "moral according to me and (I expect) my audience". I think that a philosopher's natural tendency is to use the word "moral" prescriptively, and that use of the term descriptively will be misleading. Therefore, where I would otherwise use such words descriptively, I will instead try to use phrases such as "required by the mores of some society". This may be cumbersome, but I think it will avoid untold unnecessary controversy.
Another logical fallacy is, I think, more critically damaging. I also think that this is the root of one of the criticisms that the external reviewer made that was actually legitimate. He said that the thesis seemed to depend on the--undefended--claim that 'society and its practices' could be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms. I have already argued elsewhere that this would not have occurred to me one way or the other. Certainly, it never came up in any of the discussions that I had with my supervisor on the matter. He seemed to think that it did, and that we argued about it at some length, but I think that he is mistaken about this. I think that he was thinking of the time when we were arguing about whether I could construct a general prescriptive theory without a constitutive reliance on moral terms. I think that that is quite a separate issue from whether society and its practices can be specified without such a reliance. Surely the project of the specification of society is far more of a descriptive affair than the issue of constructing a prescriptive theory!
This leads me back to what the second logical fallacy was in Chapter 6: No distinction was made between descriptive ethics and normative ethics. That is, no distinction was made between what a society's mores were at any one time, and what would have actually been moral for that society to practise. That distinction should have been made. For it seems clear enough that an established system of mores is indeed an essential of social functioning, because basic beliefs about right and wrong are indispensable for the reliability of human interactions. However, it is not at all clear that a moral system in the normative sense is necessary for social functioning at all. In other words, it is not clear that human beings actually have to do the right thing by each other in order to function effectively in society. Indeed, if human history is any example, it is not. Many societies have managed to function perfectly well using immoral systems of mores--such as slavery for the ancient Greeks.
This leads me to conclude that the difficulty raised by the external reviewer can be addressed successfully. One simply has to make the distinction between morals and mores. Society and its practices indeed cannot be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on terms that pertain to mores. But it can certainly be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on terms that pertain to morals. Part of what we mean by 'society' might well be an entity that has its own standards of right and wrong, but it certainly does not thereby have to actually behave rightly or wrongly. This confusion seems to have arisen in the first place because mores and morals both share the same basic termset.
What are the implications of the second logical fallacy for my thesis? At the least, it makes me want to withdraw the moral hypothesis altogether. If I have to make a distinction between morals and mores, then it seems clear enough that I must claim that the duties of morals might be incompatible with the needs of society. It will always be possible for an entire society to be unjust, and this might mean that the lives of all the people in that society are not worth living. Yet the alternate claim, that the duties of mores cannot be incompatible with the needs of their society, seems at least misleading. Mores can change due to moral observations and accompanying moral pressures. Society is flexible enough to accommodate changing mores to arrive at a new balance, but the interim can be tumultuous--as in the abolition of slavery. In the US, after all, it resulted in the American Civil War. But it was a (normatively) moral war that had to be fought, with a right side and a wrong side, and--fortunately for us all--the right side won.
The previous considerations raise an important issue of how to use terms such as "moral" or "immoral". It seems that they can be used in a descriptive and a prescriptive way. The descriptive way is "moral according to the norms of a particular society". The prescriptive way is "moral in general", or a Kantian sense of "absolutely moral", or "moral according to me and (I expect) my audience". I think that a philosopher's natural tendency is to use the word "moral" prescriptively, and that use of the term descriptively will be misleading. Therefore, where I would otherwise use such words descriptively, I will instead try to use phrases such as "required by the mores of some society". This may be cumbersome, but I think it will avoid untold unnecessary controversy.
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