Subjectivism vs objectivism: a false dichotomy
I here refer to the essay "Key Distinctions for Value Theories, and the Importance of Hume", by Kelley L. Ross.
I am disappointed to see in the first paragraph Kelley L. Ross buying into the crudity of the dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism. He starts out promisingly, claiming "Most fundamental is whether morality is a matter of rational knowledge or not." It seems to me, from my various philosophical investigations up to now, that it must indeed be a matter of rational knowledge. I certainly believe in the legitimacy of moral arguments, and that there is a definite truth-value to moral propositions that we cannot voluntarily control. Unfortunately, Ross draws an unwarranted conclusion from the implication that morality is a matter of rational knowledge: "If it is [...], then our doctrine would be objectivism, which implies that morality is 'out there,' in the objects, and so is independent of personal preferences or sentiments." I argue that this claim is false, because that of which one commonly conceives as morality need not be "out there" even if it is a matter of rational knowledge. It could perfectly well still be "in here" while still being a matter of rational knowledge. That is, what determines the truth-value of a moral proposition could be located within a person, yet not subject to that person's voluntary control.
One source of confusion here is ambiguity in the word "subject". For example, if by "subject" we mean that which does have voluntary control over the matter that is subjective, then it should be clear enough that ethics can be objective even if it inheres in persons. All that ethics requires to be objective, under this criterion, is that it admit of truth-values that are not subject to voluntary control. However, to then claim that this implies that ethics must somehow be "out there" rather than "in here" is false. Ethics can be "in here" without people being able to help what the moral facts of the matter are. In fact, many objective things can be "in here" in the sense that they pertain to persons yet not be something that persons can help, such as details of physiology or psychology. One might argue that insofar as they pertain to things not subject to the voluntary control of persons, these things are still "objects" for the purposes of the discussion, and can be discussed as though they were "out there" as facts in the world. However, I resist the phrase "out there" as it applies to ethics. It seems very misleading to hold that one needs to believe that immorality exists "out there" in a cat being set on fire by thugs in order to believe that it is objective. That is, there is no reason that the immorality of an action need inhere in the action itself, rather than in the beholder of that action, in order to believe that the immorality is thereby "objective". Hence, I still think that use of the word "objective" to describe ethics is misleading.
On the other hand, if by "subject" what we mean is "person", then it should be clear by now that Ross's claim must be false. Ethics does not have to inhere in non-person objects in order to be a matter of rational knowledge, for all the reasons given above.
I am disappointed to see in the first paragraph Kelley L. Ross buying into the crudity of the dichotomy between subjectivism and objectivism. He starts out promisingly, claiming "Most fundamental is whether morality is a matter of rational knowledge or not." It seems to me, from my various philosophical investigations up to now, that it must indeed be a matter of rational knowledge. I certainly believe in the legitimacy of moral arguments, and that there is a definite truth-value to moral propositions that we cannot voluntarily control. Unfortunately, Ross draws an unwarranted conclusion from the implication that morality is a matter of rational knowledge: "If it is [...], then our doctrine would be objectivism, which implies that morality is 'out there,' in the objects, and so is independent of personal preferences or sentiments." I argue that this claim is false, because that of which one commonly conceives as morality need not be "out there" even if it is a matter of rational knowledge. It could perfectly well still be "in here" while still being a matter of rational knowledge. That is, what determines the truth-value of a moral proposition could be located within a person, yet not subject to that person's voluntary control.
One source of confusion here is ambiguity in the word "subject". For example, if by "subject" we mean that which does have voluntary control over the matter that is subjective, then it should be clear enough that ethics can be objective even if it inheres in persons. All that ethics requires to be objective, under this criterion, is that it admit of truth-values that are not subject to voluntary control. However, to then claim that this implies that ethics must somehow be "out there" rather than "in here" is false. Ethics can be "in here" without people being able to help what the moral facts of the matter are. In fact, many objective things can be "in here" in the sense that they pertain to persons yet not be something that persons can help, such as details of physiology or psychology. One might argue that insofar as they pertain to things not subject to the voluntary control of persons, these things are still "objects" for the purposes of the discussion, and can be discussed as though they were "out there" as facts in the world. However, I resist the phrase "out there" as it applies to ethics. It seems very misleading to hold that one needs to believe that immorality exists "out there" in a cat being set on fire by thugs in order to believe that it is objective. That is, there is no reason that the immorality of an action need inhere in the action itself, rather than in the beholder of that action, in order to believe that the immorality is thereby "objective". Hence, I still think that use of the word "objective" to describe ethics is misleading.
On the other hand, if by "subject" what we mean is "person", then it should be clear by now that Ross's claim must be false. Ethics does not have to inhere in non-person objects in order to be a matter of rational knowledge, for all the reasons given above.
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