A difficulty with Chapter 4
I have just read "Prudence, Goodness and Wisdom" by Kelley L. Ross. It contains a passage that made me realise that there is a difficulty with Chapter 4 of my Masters thesis. In that chapter, I introduced a distinction between a moral theory that was intended a posteriori and one that was intended a priori. I don't think that this distinction was ever particularly well drawn, and now I don't think it should be included at all.
The reason for this has to do with the original intention of the theory towards which I was working. It was intended to be a practical theory of ethics, which was able successfully to combine principle with practice. The destructive part of the project involved a criticism of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, for siding with principle at the expense of practice. In the following chapter, I compared Aristotle favourably to Kant in virtue of his viewing ethics as a practical theory. I was very happy with the way the thesis was progressing. Then my supervisor turned around and said that I would already have disturbed readers with my practice-oriented approach. This angered me, because my intention was to be rational, and certainly not to be controversial. I was also more than a little resentful that it should be this hard to be practical about a subject like ethics, which I had always thought would be practical.
Nevertheless, there was no way that I was going to cop controversy over being immoral. When it came time to revise what I had done, I decided to drop any overt appeal to practicality. This time, instead of emphasising Kant's focus on principle, I emphasised his focus on the a priori. Instead of emphasising Aristotle's focus on practice, I emphasised his focus on the a posteriori. Instead of calling the thesis Towards a Practical Theory of Ethics, it became known by its current title, Towards an Empirical Theory of Ethics. But to make sure that the focus on practicality was not lost in the process, I introduced a distinction that I now think is spurious. It was the distinction between a theory intended a priori and a theory intended a posteriori. This was meant to distinguish between a theory like Kantianism and a theory like utilitarianism. The empirical world would not affect the use of a theory like Kantianism at all, because it was intended a priori. But it would greatly affect a theory like utilitarianism, which was intended a posteriori. That is, utilitarianism was meant to make a difference to the empirically observed world, and empirical information would provide feedback on how to use the theory. Kantianism was an absolute to apply to the noumenal world, no matter what the empirical world was like.
The basic idea behind this was that a theory intended a priori would be useless. A theory intended a posteriori, on the other hand, would be useful. Hence, practicality would be built into this "empirical theory of ethics" from the ground up. The only trouble is, Kant can claim without contradiction that his theory is practical--for the noumenal world, while Mill can claim that his theory is practical--for the phenomenal world. So the claim that the empirical theory of ethics would be more practical would really only be related to denying the existence of the noumenal world. On the one hand, I didn't have any problem with that, as the noumenal world sounded rather fantastical to me. On the other hand, it still did not end up solving the basic problem of devising a plausible moral theory that would still ultimately be practical.
This fact was illustrated to me by a passage in Ross's abovementioned essay. He describes Aristotle's conception of the ultimate human good as happiness:
(Nichomachean Ethics I, vii, 15.)
However, Aristotle does not believe in the existence of just one virtue. There are various virtues, some of which are better than others, and better happiness goes with better virtue. Aristotle goes on to say that the greatest virtue is wisdom, and wisdom for Aristotle consists in the contemplation of eternal truths and God. Therefore, for Aristotle, the supreme happiness is a life of philosophy (not unlike his own) devoted to this contemplation. Aristotle would have been the first to note that this is not a practical activity. But in fact, Aristotle regarded the nature of wisdom--the ultimate human good--as consisting of knowledge that was thoroughly theoretical and impractical!
Certainly Aristotle's theory aimed at being thoroughly empirical, and intended to be practised in the empirical world. But this did not make it practical! As such, this passage in the essay served as a counterexample to my notion that a theory intended a posteriori would be practical, and it therefore casts doubt on the merit of my distinction.
The reason for this has to do with the original intention of the theory towards which I was working. It was intended to be a practical theory of ethics, which was able successfully to combine principle with practice. The destructive part of the project involved a criticism of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, for siding with principle at the expense of practice. In the following chapter, I compared Aristotle favourably to Kant in virtue of his viewing ethics as a practical theory. I was very happy with the way the thesis was progressing. Then my supervisor turned around and said that I would already have disturbed readers with my practice-oriented approach. This angered me, because my intention was to be rational, and certainly not to be controversial. I was also more than a little resentful that it should be this hard to be practical about a subject like ethics, which I had always thought would be practical.
Nevertheless, there was no way that I was going to cop controversy over being immoral. When it came time to revise what I had done, I decided to drop any overt appeal to practicality. This time, instead of emphasising Kant's focus on principle, I emphasised his focus on the a priori. Instead of emphasising Aristotle's focus on practice, I emphasised his focus on the a posteriori. Instead of calling the thesis Towards a Practical Theory of Ethics, it became known by its current title, Towards an Empirical Theory of Ethics. But to make sure that the focus on practicality was not lost in the process, I introduced a distinction that I now think is spurious. It was the distinction between a theory intended a priori and a theory intended a posteriori. This was meant to distinguish between a theory like Kantianism and a theory like utilitarianism. The empirical world would not affect the use of a theory like Kantianism at all, because it was intended a priori. But it would greatly affect a theory like utilitarianism, which was intended a posteriori. That is, utilitarianism was meant to make a difference to the empirically observed world, and empirical information would provide feedback on how to use the theory. Kantianism was an absolute to apply to the noumenal world, no matter what the empirical world was like.
The basic idea behind this was that a theory intended a priori would be useless. A theory intended a posteriori, on the other hand, would be useful. Hence, practicality would be built into this "empirical theory of ethics" from the ground up. The only trouble is, Kant can claim without contradiction that his theory is practical--for the noumenal world, while Mill can claim that his theory is practical--for the phenomenal world. So the claim that the empirical theory of ethics would be more practical would really only be related to denying the existence of the noumenal world. On the one hand, I didn't have any problem with that, as the noumenal world sounded rather fantastical to me. On the other hand, it still did not end up solving the basic problem of devising a plausible moral theory that would still ultimately be practical.
This fact was illustrated to me by a passage in Ross's abovementioned essay. He describes Aristotle's conception of the ultimate human good as happiness:
The human good [anthrópon agathón] becomes the activity [enérgeia] of the soul according to virtue [areté].
(Nichomachean Ethics I, vii, 15.)
However, Aristotle does not believe in the existence of just one virtue. There are various virtues, some of which are better than others, and better happiness goes with better virtue. Aristotle goes on to say that the greatest virtue is wisdom, and wisdom for Aristotle consists in the contemplation of eternal truths and God. Therefore, for Aristotle, the supreme happiness is a life of philosophy (not unlike his own) devoted to this contemplation. Aristotle would have been the first to note that this is not a practical activity. But in fact, Aristotle regarded the nature of wisdom--the ultimate human good--as consisting of knowledge that was thoroughly theoretical and impractical!
Certainly Aristotle's theory aimed at being thoroughly empirical, and intended to be practised in the empirical world. But this did not make it practical! As such, this passage in the essay served as a counterexample to my notion that a theory intended a posteriori would be practical, and it therefore casts doubt on the merit of my distinction.
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