Two principles of animal welfare
Section 1.3 of the Code of Practice pretty much says it all. "The first and most important consideration for any feedlot manager is the well-being of all cattle under his control, whether on the feedlot or in transit." What follows is a set of specifications for how this well-being is to be achieved.
I note further that the phrase used consistently throughout these guidelines in relation to such matters is "animal welfare". What strikes me about this is the fact that "animal rights" shows up on far more web searches. By default, therefore, this is the term that I would prefer to use. But it seems that "animal welfare" is the phrase that is used instead in actual government documents pertaining to the consideration to which it still seems to me that animals are entitled. This leads me to suspect that this is the primary phrase that I should use in web searches instead myself. It is understandable that a government organisation would prefer the term "animal welfare" to the more popular "animal rights". Calling them "rights" would set a dangerous legal precedent, especially when animals cannot be the equal of humans. One might easily find oneself on a slippery slope of exactly what rights animals have, compared with what rights a human has.
Besides, calling the animal entitlements "rights" is very misleading. The emphasis is really more about the duty of care that humans have towards animals. For example, if a human being has a right not to be interfered with, it seems reasonable that this right is a legally enforceable claim against both animals and humans. If an animal had such a right, it would make sense that it be legally enforceable against humans. But it would become very strange that it should be legally enforceable against other animals.
The reason for this has to do with the natural order. We accept that it is simply the natural order that animals prey on other animals, and we see no sense in legally limiting this tendency. It is the natural order that there is an arms race between predators and prey in the wild, because it comprises part of the forces behind natural selection. But the reasons that humans have ethics and law in the first place is precisely because that is not how we choose to function. It would make no sense for us to function in such a manner. It takes us many years of education to mature, to contribute properly to society can take decades of work, and we naturally have goals that may take us a lifetime to reach. It would frustrate too many of our preferences for goals that we must reach over time if we were constantly under threat of attack by a predator. We therefore require a system of rights in order to safeguard our ability to plan for the long-term. Because an animal has no such faculty, an animal can have no rights.
This, of course, does not mean that we do not have certain duties to promote animal welfare. In fact, I can already see some principles coming out of this discussion:
Beef cattle seem quite well looked after in Australia. In fact, the leading Australian animal rights movement1, Animals Australia, does not have a fact sheet for beef cattle, although they do have an active campaign against pig stalls. During 2004 the Australian Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals - the Pig, will be reviewed. Animals Australia and its member societies are campaigning to have sow stalls banned.
It seems that progress is being made constantly in the treatment of animals at intensive farms. Some of the changes might incur overheads that add to the cost of the meat consumed. However, it does not seem unreasonable to pass this cost onto the consumer. One thing that I would deny is that cost-cutting would be considered a legitimate excuse to neglect duties of care towards the animals in the possession of the farmers. If this makes the Australian meat industry less competitive with more inhumane overseas industries, protectionism could then be looked at as a way of levelling out the playing field. That, however, is a separate controversy to be treated separately!
I will draw another conclusion about the above principles. It seems that animals have a moral status somewhere in between inanimate objects and human beings. Ceteris paribus, there does not seem anything inherently immoral about treating inanimate objects any way we please. One cannot inflict pain and suffering on an inanimate object, nor can one interfere with its long-term goals. Property rights, therefore, seem readily creatable and transferrable onto inanimate objects. Animals, with their capacity to feel pain and suffering, seem to thereby be entitled to certain forms of consideration when human beings have rights over animals. That is to say that human can have no rights over animals without responsibilities that accompany those rights, which amount to duties of care. Hence, rights over inanimate matter can be unconditional but rights over animals must be conditional. If you breach your duties of care towards the animals in your possession, then you can have those animals taken off you. Finally, a human being is, to use Kantian language, an end in herself. Her rational faculty precludes her from being the property of anybody, conditional or unconditional, and ceteris paribus, her life is hers to do with as she sees fit.
1It has the top-ranked web page on a search for "'animal rights' Australia" for such a movement.
I note further that the phrase used consistently throughout these guidelines in relation to such matters is "animal welfare". What strikes me about this is the fact that "animal rights" shows up on far more web searches. By default, therefore, this is the term that I would prefer to use. But it seems that "animal welfare" is the phrase that is used instead in actual government documents pertaining to the consideration to which it still seems to me that animals are entitled. This leads me to suspect that this is the primary phrase that I should use in web searches instead myself. It is understandable that a government organisation would prefer the term "animal welfare" to the more popular "animal rights". Calling them "rights" would set a dangerous legal precedent, especially when animals cannot be the equal of humans. One might easily find oneself on a slippery slope of exactly what rights animals have, compared with what rights a human has.
Besides, calling the animal entitlements "rights" is very misleading. The emphasis is really more about the duty of care that humans have towards animals. For example, if a human being has a right not to be interfered with, it seems reasonable that this right is a legally enforceable claim against both animals and humans. If an animal had such a right, it would make sense that it be legally enforceable against humans. But it would become very strange that it should be legally enforceable against other animals.
The reason for this has to do with the natural order. We accept that it is simply the natural order that animals prey on other animals, and we see no sense in legally limiting this tendency. It is the natural order that there is an arms race between predators and prey in the wild, because it comprises part of the forces behind natural selection. But the reasons that humans have ethics and law in the first place is precisely because that is not how we choose to function. It would make no sense for us to function in such a manner. It takes us many years of education to mature, to contribute properly to society can take decades of work, and we naturally have goals that may take us a lifetime to reach. It would frustrate too many of our preferences for goals that we must reach over time if we were constantly under threat of attack by a predator. We therefore require a system of rights in order to safeguard our ability to plan for the long-term. Because an animal has no such faculty, an animal can have no rights.
This, of course, does not mean that we do not have certain duties to promote animal welfare. In fact, I can already see some principles coming out of this discussion:
- We have duties to protect the welfare of the animals in our care, or in our possession.
- We have no duties to protect the welfare of the animals not in our care or possession.
Beef cattle seem quite well looked after in Australia. In fact, the leading Australian animal rights movement1, Animals Australia, does not have a fact sheet for beef cattle, although they do have an active campaign against pig stalls. During 2004 the Australian Model Code of Practice for the Welfare of Animals - the Pig, will be reviewed. Animals Australia and its member societies are campaigning to have sow stalls banned.
It seems that progress is being made constantly in the treatment of animals at intensive farms. Some of the changes might incur overheads that add to the cost of the meat consumed. However, it does not seem unreasonable to pass this cost onto the consumer. One thing that I would deny is that cost-cutting would be considered a legitimate excuse to neglect duties of care towards the animals in the possession of the farmers. If this makes the Australian meat industry less competitive with more inhumane overseas industries, protectionism could then be looked at as a way of levelling out the playing field. That, however, is a separate controversy to be treated separately!
I will draw another conclusion about the above principles. It seems that animals have a moral status somewhere in between inanimate objects and human beings. Ceteris paribus, there does not seem anything inherently immoral about treating inanimate objects any way we please. One cannot inflict pain and suffering on an inanimate object, nor can one interfere with its long-term goals. Property rights, therefore, seem readily creatable and transferrable onto inanimate objects. Animals, with their capacity to feel pain and suffering, seem to thereby be entitled to certain forms of consideration when human beings have rights over animals. That is to say that human can have no rights over animals without responsibilities that accompany those rights, which amount to duties of care. Hence, rights over inanimate matter can be unconditional but rights over animals must be conditional. If you breach your duties of care towards the animals in your possession, then you can have those animals taken off you. Finally, a human being is, to use Kantian language, an end in herself. Her rational faculty precludes her from being the property of anybody, conditional or unconditional, and ceteris paribus, her life is hers to do with as she sees fit.
Notes
1It has the top-ranked web page on a search for "'animal rights' Australia" for such a movement.
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