The triumph of a pre-paradigmatic school
It seems to me that part of the means by which society socialises people into its norms simply is arational. But I don't think there's anything wrong with that. It is justified for scientists because of the large degree to which it explains our observations about the world, and it can be justified for ethics because of the degree to which it explains our moral intuitions.
But I think that ethics has a property that science lacks. If it is intuitions that we are trying to explain in ethics, rather than facts, then it seems clear that ethical theories have a power to shape those intuitions in a way that scientific theories simply do not have to shape facts. Think of Robert Nozick, whose intuitions about justice changed quite drastically based on his own philosophical reflection. For that matter, think of yourself, while you were thinking of counter-examples to the notion that the plummeting astronaut had an altruistic duty to kill himself.
It does seem to me that you can convince yourself of almost anything in a vacuum. Nevertheless, part of the nature of science is not just that you have particular intuitions, but that others share them. You still have to persuade a majority of participants in the exercise that your own beliefs are correct.
Why does it have to be a majority of participants? Why can't a minority of participants go their own way towards non-coercive agreement within a particular paradigm, even though the majority of other people in their field do not follow them?
I guess here we are left with the empirical observation of Kuhn's that this never happens. While there is a multiplicity of views in any given field, then it must also mean there is doubt among the adherents of any one view that theirs is correct enough to go far beyond foundational claims.
Then what actually ever makes one view become predominant, as it does in science? Kuhn writes that "What is surprising, and perhaps unique in its degree in the fields we call science, is that such initial divergences should ever largely disappear."
(p.17)
In other words, if ethics is ever to become a science, then adherents to all the other views of ethics bar one must actually disappear. That would seem to be an extraordinary development, and one that has not occurred for thousands of years of discussion on these important issues. Their disappearance would have to be caused by the triumph of one of the pre-paradigm schools. In this regard, it seems to me that utilitarianism is by far the leading moral theory in the field today. Also, because of its own characteristic beliefs and preconceptions, it emphasizes only some special part of the too sizeable and inchoate pool of moral intuitions. Indeed, this is Anne Maclean's criticism of utilitarianism, that it takes a special part of our moral intuitions and attempts to apply them to every other aspect of human conduct.
Indeed, that it can do so with the power that it does, is a testimony to its enduring popularity. Nevertheless, it seems clearly to lack too much explanatory power to the intuitions that it leaves behind ever to achieve paradigmatic dominance. It just has to keep sliding away from its difficulties by demonstrating that they are not really problems in practice, but I don't think that that is enough to satisfy a majority of ethicists.
Much support for utilitarianism can be found from the moral intuitions of university students, as I discovered on that eventful day. However, what I think will be found is that when they actually have to bother to argue their view professionally on a regular basis to people who start off disagreeing with them, their confidence in their own theory will indeed waver. Indeed, I think that Peter Singer is notorious for ignoring the difficulties with his own theory in preference to applying it to the situations where it clearly does seem to work reasonably well. This is indeed typical of the behaviour of pre-paradigmatic schools, but that it will ever result in a dominant paradigm in ethics seems clearly dubious. For that to happen, there must be some clear triumph of that school.
But what form would this take for an ethical theory? In the realm of science, those electricians who thought electricity a fluid conceived the idea of bottling the fluid, which resulted in the invention of the Leyden jar, a rather stunning confirmation that they must have been onto something. What on earth would be the equivalent success story of a theory of ethics?
To do that, we would have to have some idea in mind of a formulation for a moral hypothesis, experimentation and confirmation or refutation. I have a few ideas already floating around in my head, but they will have to wait for a later section, I think.
But I think that ethics has a property that science lacks. If it is intuitions that we are trying to explain in ethics, rather than facts, then it seems clear that ethical theories have a power to shape those intuitions in a way that scientific theories simply do not have to shape facts. Think of Robert Nozick, whose intuitions about justice changed quite drastically based on his own philosophical reflection. For that matter, think of yourself, while you were thinking of counter-examples to the notion that the plummeting astronaut had an altruistic duty to kill himself.
It does seem to me that you can convince yourself of almost anything in a vacuum. Nevertheless, part of the nature of science is not just that you have particular intuitions, but that others share them. You still have to persuade a majority of participants in the exercise that your own beliefs are correct.
Why does it have to be a majority of participants? Why can't a minority of participants go their own way towards non-coercive agreement within a particular paradigm, even though the majority of other people in their field do not follow them?
I guess here we are left with the empirical observation of Kuhn's that this never happens. While there is a multiplicity of views in any given field, then it must also mean there is doubt among the adherents of any one view that theirs is correct enough to go far beyond foundational claims.
Then what actually ever makes one view become predominant, as it does in science? Kuhn writes that "What is surprising, and perhaps unique in its degree in the fields we call science, is that such initial divergences should ever largely disappear."
For they do disappear to a very considerable extent and then apparently once and for all. Furthermore, their disappearance is usually caused by the triumph of one of the pre-paradigm schools, which, because of its own characteristic beliefs and preconceptions, emphasized only some special part of the too sizeable and inchoate pool of information.
(p.17)
In other words, if ethics is ever to become a science, then adherents to all the other views of ethics bar one must actually disappear. That would seem to be an extraordinary development, and one that has not occurred for thousands of years of discussion on these important issues. Their disappearance would have to be caused by the triumph of one of the pre-paradigm schools. In this regard, it seems to me that utilitarianism is by far the leading moral theory in the field today. Also, because of its own characteristic beliefs and preconceptions, it emphasizes only some special part of the too sizeable and inchoate pool of moral intuitions. Indeed, this is Anne Maclean's criticism of utilitarianism, that it takes a special part of our moral intuitions and attempts to apply them to every other aspect of human conduct.
Indeed, that it can do so with the power that it does, is a testimony to its enduring popularity. Nevertheless, it seems clearly to lack too much explanatory power to the intuitions that it leaves behind ever to achieve paradigmatic dominance. It just has to keep sliding away from its difficulties by demonstrating that they are not really problems in practice, but I don't think that that is enough to satisfy a majority of ethicists.
Much support for utilitarianism can be found from the moral intuitions of university students, as I discovered on that eventful day. However, what I think will be found is that when they actually have to bother to argue their view professionally on a regular basis to people who start off disagreeing with them, their confidence in their own theory will indeed waver. Indeed, I think that Peter Singer is notorious for ignoring the difficulties with his own theory in preference to applying it to the situations where it clearly does seem to work reasonably well. This is indeed typical of the behaviour of pre-paradigmatic schools, but that it will ever result in a dominant paradigm in ethics seems clearly dubious. For that to happen, there must be some clear triumph of that school.
But what form would this take for an ethical theory? In the realm of science, those electricians who thought electricity a fluid conceived the idea of bottling the fluid, which resulted in the invention of the Leyden jar, a rather stunning confirmation that they must have been onto something. What on earth would be the equivalent success story of a theory of ethics?
To do that, we would have to have some idea in mind of a formulation for a moral hypothesis, experimentation and confirmation or refutation. I have a few ideas already floating around in my head, but they will have to wait for a later section, I think.
Comments