A difficulty in descriptive ethics
I recognise three different distinct branches of prescriptive philosophy: ethics, aesthetics and rationality. If you're wondering where politics is in there, I subsume it under ethics, i.e. politics is concerned what what is (morally) good government. We know that aesthetics is concerned with what is beautiful, which ought in some way to please us in virtue of its beauty. We know that rationality is concerned with what is rational, which we ought to follow in virtue of what our rational faculty leads us to conclude. We also know that ethics is concerned with the good, in a way that is separate from either aesthetics or rationality. But we could say the same of any other branch of prescriptive philosophy that might exist, because with whatever it must be concerned, it must be something good, by definition, and separate from aesthetics and rationality, by definition. Does this therefore mean that ethics must simply extend to every other possible prescriptive theory that exists?
It seems that this cannot be the case. For example, egoism--undoubtedly a prescriptive theory--has often been proffered as a moral theory, by proponents such as Ayn Rand, but many philosophers will claim that egoism is not actually a moral theory at all. For example, it is debatable whether an egoist could will that everyone else should also do what is in their own enlightened self-interests. Brian Medlin argues that she could not1, on the grounds that the self-interests of different people conflict with each other. As Kant would argue, if one could not will a rule to be a universal law, then it would not be a moral rule2. It may not necessarily be a rational rule either, or an aesthetic rule, as it may or may not fit the criteria for what one ought to find beautiful, or what one ought to obey through the use of one's reason. But it would not not fit the criteria for a moral rule either.
Yet does this not beg the question in favour of a Kantian theory of ethics? Kant holds that a necessary condition for a moral theory is that it be 'universalisable' in the manner described above, but there are various problems with Kantian universalisability. For example, if one is a masochist, does it follow that one may universalise the rule that everybody should be tortured? Mill's objection to Kant is precisely that Kant really fails to show that any number of heinous human actions could not be consistently willed as universal laws. All that he can show is that the consequences of those actions are such that nobody would want to will them as universal3. It is a powerful objection that one should have to appeal to the consequences of an action as a measure of its undesirability. For if this is so, then it already takes one a fair distance towards Mill's own, utilitarian ethics.
This illustrates a difficulty with trying to characterise what a moral theory is, as opposed to some other kind of prescriptive theory. The danger is that one will beg the question in favour of one kind of moral theory over another. Is it possible, therefore, to describe a moral theory in abstract terms without a constitutive reliance on some kind of moral content? Furthermore, is it possible to distinguish a moral theory from another kind of general normative theory in a way that does not beg the question in favour of the moral theory over the other kind of normative theory?
1. Brian Medlin, "Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism," Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35 (1957), pp. 111-118, cited in "Professional Ethics and the Theory of Enlightened Self-interest", by Robert J. Ralfalko, PhD, Department of Philosophy, The University of New Haven, Connecticut, USA, p.3, as found in http://www.ssgrr.it/en/ssgrr2003s/papers/212b.pdf.
2. "Professional Ethics and the Theory of Enlightened Self-interest", by Robert J. Ralfalko, PhD, Department of Philosophy, The University of New Haven, Connecticut, USA, p.3, as found in http://www.ssgrr.it/en/ssgrr2003s/papers/212b.pdf.
3. As cited by G. J. Mattey, UC Davis Philosophy 1, Introduction to Philosophy, Lecture Notes from Spring 1994, Mill's Ethics, http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/phi001/millec.htm.
It seems that this cannot be the case. For example, egoism--undoubtedly a prescriptive theory--has often been proffered as a moral theory, by proponents such as Ayn Rand, but many philosophers will claim that egoism is not actually a moral theory at all. For example, it is debatable whether an egoist could will that everyone else should also do what is in their own enlightened self-interests. Brian Medlin argues that she could not1, on the grounds that the self-interests of different people conflict with each other. As Kant would argue, if one could not will a rule to be a universal law, then it would not be a moral rule2. It may not necessarily be a rational rule either, or an aesthetic rule, as it may or may not fit the criteria for what one ought to find beautiful, or what one ought to obey through the use of one's reason. But it would not not fit the criteria for a moral rule either.
Yet does this not beg the question in favour of a Kantian theory of ethics? Kant holds that a necessary condition for a moral theory is that it be 'universalisable' in the manner described above, but there are various problems with Kantian universalisability. For example, if one is a masochist, does it follow that one may universalise the rule that everybody should be tortured? Mill's objection to Kant is precisely that Kant really fails to show that any number of heinous human actions could not be consistently willed as universal laws. All that he can show is that the consequences of those actions are such that nobody would want to will them as universal3. It is a powerful objection that one should have to appeal to the consequences of an action as a measure of its undesirability. For if this is so, then it already takes one a fair distance towards Mill's own, utilitarian ethics.
This illustrates a difficulty with trying to characterise what a moral theory is, as opposed to some other kind of prescriptive theory. The danger is that one will beg the question in favour of one kind of moral theory over another. Is it possible, therefore, to describe a moral theory in abstract terms without a constitutive reliance on some kind of moral content? Furthermore, is it possible to distinguish a moral theory from another kind of general normative theory in a way that does not beg the question in favour of the moral theory over the other kind of normative theory?
Notes
1. Brian Medlin, "Ultimate Principles and Ethical Egoism," Australian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35 (1957), pp. 111-118, cited in "Professional Ethics and the Theory of Enlightened Self-interest", by Robert J. Ralfalko, PhD, Department of Philosophy, The University of New Haven, Connecticut, USA, p.3, as found in http://www.ssgrr.it/en/ssgrr2003s/papers/212b.pdf.
2. "Professional Ethics and the Theory of Enlightened Self-interest", by Robert J. Ralfalko, PhD, Department of Philosophy, The University of New Haven, Connecticut, USA, p.3, as found in http://www.ssgrr.it/en/ssgrr2003s/papers/212b.pdf.
3. As cited by G. J. Mattey, UC Davis Philosophy 1, Introduction to Philosophy, Lecture Notes from Spring 1994, Mill's Ethics, http://www-philosophy.ucdavis.edu/phi001/millec.htm.
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