Two difficulties with commensurability

1. In my Masters thesis I stated that in order to call a theory a moral theory, that theory must have level 3 commensurability with our own values. At the time, I used the word "commensurability" to mean "conduciveness to a non-coercive convergence of opinion". I grew to deem that to be unsatisfactory, because it was too inconsistent with the dictionary definition of that word, which is "measurability by a common standard". However, I have still not found a satisfactory alternate term.
   
2. My current theory of "commensurability", linked to on the right-hand side of the page, is still the version with which I am the happiest. However, I seem more and more often to want to speak of "incommensurability" to mean what Kuhn meant, i.e. lack of level 2 commensurability. For example, that would be a convenient way to speak of moral paradigms across cultures that are 'incommensurable' with each other. It seems, therefore, that I should instead use the term "commensurability" as Kuhn meant it, and use a different key concept for this theory as well.
   

The answer to 2, I think, is to use the word 'commensuration'. That can mean the state of being commensurate, which can mean 'having a common measure'. Hence, level 1 commensuration is agreement, level 2 commensuration is agreeability/commensurability, and level 3 commensuration is incommensurability/respectability. Once one uses this term, I regard the entire concept as too banal to be worth describing as a theory, but I can still accept it as an account.

No, I'm not satisfied with that. The point of using the word 'commensurability' to describe level 3 commensurability is precisely that a claim can be measured by a common standard of respectability. Likewise, one can legitimately claim of level 4 claims that they are measurable by a common standard of appreciability. In other words, it is the standard that is represented by the keyword for each level, rather than the measurability by that standard.

Furthermore, I think that this can also solve problem number 1. If we are to understand the six levels of commensurability that we describe in our entry "Commensurability 1.0" as measurability by the common standard referred to by each of the keywords, then we are already halfway there. When we say that something is level-3 commensurable with our own values, we mean that it is respectable to our own values. In other words, it is measurable by a standard of respectability that we share.

Does it have to be measurable by a standard of respectability that we share with the other side? I do not think that any shared standard is necessary for what we meant by 'commensurability'. It only needs to be respectable to our own values, not mutually respectable with them. This can therefore be seen as little more than a favourability with our own values, which falls short of agreeability, but is still at the level of respectability.

Is it, therefore, anything more than simply 'plausibility'? It should be apparent enough that there are different levels of plausibility, which can rightly be characterised as triviality, agreeability and respectability. These three levels of plausibility quite rightly correspond to our three levels of commensurability discussed earlier, in a tight way. It is the level of commensurability of the discourse that determines the level of plausibility in the resulting claim that is reliably possible, so a discussion of commensurability still seems desirable and prior to a discussion of plausibility.

We have therefore now resolved our two difficulties with commensurability. Difficulty 2 is resolvable by appreciating that the common standard required for commensurability is represented by the keyword corresponding to the level of commensurability in question. Difficulty 1 is resolved by changing the word 'commensurability' to 'plausibility'. The levels of plausibility need then only be linked to their corresponding levels in the theory of commensurability so that we understand why each level of plausibility is what it is.