Do we want ethics to be at level 2 commensurability?
(If you're wondering what I mean by level 2 commensurability, the link to the theory is on the right side of the page.)
It is probably best if we here make the distinction between levels 2 and 3 of commensurability. At level 2, non-coercive agreement will be possible between ethics. At level 3, it will not, hence respectable arguments can in principle be made for both sides of a moral debate.
The question therefore becomes, do we want non-coercive agreeability out of our theory of ethics? The reality is that in principle we do not need it. We can form an argument instead that subjectivity plays a role in ethics, to the extent that there may be more than one legitimate right answer for something. It would not affect the degree to which either side would take their own mores seriously, simply because it does not do so already. I argue for this more extensively in the section titled, "Subjectivity versus Objectivity in Ethics". It uses a slightly outdated model of commensurability, but it is similar enough to my current model that I think that people will get the general idea. David Wiggins has apparently most recently argued for what he deems to be a sensible form of subjectivism. When I get the time, I'm sure I'll read that paper as well as the others on my long list, but I doubt seriously that it will affect any of my basic arguments.
Having said that, Stevenson, in his famous paper on emotivism, does have a point. We do seem to value that other people hold the same beliefs as us. For this reason if nothing else, we should try to reach level 2 in ethics if we can--but to do this, we will have to add more requirements to our paradigm for ethics. In future sections, we will have a look at various attempts to do just this.
It is probably best if we here make the distinction between levels 2 and 3 of commensurability. At level 2, non-coercive agreement will be possible between ethics. At level 3, it will not, hence respectable arguments can in principle be made for both sides of a moral debate.
The question therefore becomes, do we want non-coercive agreeability out of our theory of ethics? The reality is that in principle we do not need it. We can form an argument instead that subjectivity plays a role in ethics, to the extent that there may be more than one legitimate right answer for something. It would not affect the degree to which either side would take their own mores seriously, simply because it does not do so already. I argue for this more extensively in the section titled, "Subjectivity versus Objectivity in Ethics". It uses a slightly outdated model of commensurability, but it is similar enough to my current model that I think that people will get the general idea. David Wiggins has apparently most recently argued for what he deems to be a sensible form of subjectivism. When I get the time, I'm sure I'll read that paper as well as the others on my long list, but I doubt seriously that it will affect any of my basic arguments.
Having said that, Stevenson, in his famous paper on emotivism, does have a point. We do seem to value that other people hold the same beliefs as us. For this reason if nothing else, we should try to reach level 2 in ethics if we can--but to do this, we will have to add more requirements to our paradigm for ethics. In future sections, we will have a look at various attempts to do just this.
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