Pre-science and philosophy
I have hitherto noted that Kuhn (1996) seems to have blurred the distinction between science and general rational human discussion. It raises the question of whether ethics, or indeed philosophy, is capable of progressing as science does. The end of the previous section noted a difficulty in this regard. The primary problems that are of concern to philosophers are precisely those problems that our intuitions seem indeterminate in solving. I have noted elsewhere that science is capable of resolving its disputes, in part, through some kind of hierarchy of intuitions. But prima facie, it seems as if philosophy is incapable of forming a consensus on such a hierarchy of intuitions. It seems reasonable to suppose that different philosophers would simply create their own intuitive hierarchies. The result would be a proliferation of different and incommensurable schools of philosophy. This indeed does appear to be the case, and it has been so for thousands of years.
Yet philosophy seems in other respects to be quite like pre-science. It contains various competing theories, each with their own views of the world, each of which is incommensurable with the others. There is intense intellectual competition between the schools for cogent and compelling argumentation and support. Why, then, have there never emerged dominant paradigms in the branches of philosophy that continue to exist, such as ethics? Why should a consistent common hierarchy of intuitions for the majority of philosophers in the profession not be possible? In other words, what is the difference between the competing schools of philosophy, and the competing theories of pre-science?
It seems to me that one important difference with pre-science is already the razor of disagreement. One thing that has not yet been elucidated is how the razor of disagreement is meant to work in pre-science. I shall now take some time to draw this out.
We have already seen that in pre-science, competing pre-paradigmatic schools eventually disappear, leaving room for only one that remains. It is remarkable that this should happen at all. What makes it even more remarkable, however, is the degree to which the victorious school still needs more work:
(Kuhn, 1996, pp. 23-24)
It is important to note just how generous this criterion is for a victorious pre-paradigmatic school. Most philosophers would never be so generous with their respect to any new would-be school of philosophy. One can only wonder why there is this discrepancy in the standard of justification between philosophy and science.
I can think of two reasons off the top of my head. The first reason is that the razor of disagreement probably lowers the entry bar for new would-be paradigms in science. Pre-paradigmatic schools are not measured according to their explanatory power over the universe all by themselves, but also in relation to other schools. One school must clearly be more efficacious than the others, but that is all that is required. The razor of disagreement will be impelling scientists to look for one school to agree upon, but there still must be one clear victor. If there is not one clear victor, then the choice will be completely arbitrary, and no non-coercive agreement on the matter will be possible. But once one pre-paradigmatic school displays a convincingly greater prowess over the rest, the choice will no longer be arbitrary. The razor of disagreement will then impel the scientists all to adopt the clear winner as the one common theory--the paradigm--between them. And to be this clear winner, as we have observed, does not require nearly the same rigor as would be accepted for the respectability of a philosophical school.
The second reason is also rather compelling. First, to achieve explanatory power in science is to a large degree harder than it is in philosophy. A scientific theory must achieve some kind of startling and accurate prediction relative to the other theories. Kuhn placed a lot of emphasis on the incommensurability of different schools, but surely one strong source of commensuration between competing schools must be prediction. An experienced scientist will build a clear set of intuitions about what constitutes a startling and accurate prediction relative to what he has seen. It must be something strikingly above the norm relative to all the other competing schools. One this is observed, it is a clear catalyst for consensus in the scientific community, as other scientists want to further develop the theory to yield ever more and greater predictions.
What on earth would be the equivalent commensuration between philosophical theories? For example, how are ethical theories supposed to make startling and accurate predictions? When a scientific theory achieves a prediction, it adds a new observation to the set of observations already observed, in a way that is consistent with the original theory. This is a stunning thing, because it requires the cooperation of the universe to supply that prediction. But what would be the equivalent of a moral prediction? The creation of a new moral observation (read: intuition) that was consistent with the original theory? I suggest that it is obvious that such a thing does not require any kind of cooperation with the universe in the same way, only the cooperation of our own mind to be persuaded (brainwashed?) by the theory. In this case, however, nothing startling has happened at all. There has never been such a startling advantage of one extant philosophical school as there has been with pre-scientific schools, and it is not clear that this will in fact ever be possible.
Yet philosophy seems in other respects to be quite like pre-science. It contains various competing theories, each with their own views of the world, each of which is incommensurable with the others. There is intense intellectual competition between the schools for cogent and compelling argumentation and support. Why, then, have there never emerged dominant paradigms in the branches of philosophy that continue to exist, such as ethics? Why should a consistent common hierarchy of intuitions for the majority of philosophers in the profession not be possible? In other words, what is the difference between the competing schools of philosophy, and the competing theories of pre-science?
It seems to me that one important difference with pre-science is already the razor of disagreement. One thing that has not yet been elucidated is how the razor of disagreement is meant to work in pre-science. I shall now take some time to draw this out.
We have already seen that in pre-science, competing pre-paradigmatic schools eventually disappear, leaving room for only one that remains. It is remarkable that this should happen at all. What makes it even more remarkable, however, is the degree to which the victorious school still needs more work:
To be more successful is not, however, to be either completely successful with a single problem or notably successful with any large number. The success of a paradigm--whether Aristotle's analysis of motion, Ptolemy's computations of planetary position, Lavoisier's application of the balance, or Maxwell's mathematisation of the electromagnetic field--is at the start largely a promise of success deliverable in selected and still incomplete examples.
(Kuhn, 1996, pp. 23-24)
It is important to note just how generous this criterion is for a victorious pre-paradigmatic school. Most philosophers would never be so generous with their respect to any new would-be school of philosophy. One can only wonder why there is this discrepancy in the standard of justification between philosophy and science.
I can think of two reasons off the top of my head. The first reason is that the razor of disagreement probably lowers the entry bar for new would-be paradigms in science. Pre-paradigmatic schools are not measured according to their explanatory power over the universe all by themselves, but also in relation to other schools. One school must clearly be more efficacious than the others, but that is all that is required. The razor of disagreement will be impelling scientists to look for one school to agree upon, but there still must be one clear victor. If there is not one clear victor, then the choice will be completely arbitrary, and no non-coercive agreement on the matter will be possible. But once one pre-paradigmatic school displays a convincingly greater prowess over the rest, the choice will no longer be arbitrary. The razor of disagreement will then impel the scientists all to adopt the clear winner as the one common theory--the paradigm--between them. And to be this clear winner, as we have observed, does not require nearly the same rigor as would be accepted for the respectability of a philosophical school.
The second reason is also rather compelling. First, to achieve explanatory power in science is to a large degree harder than it is in philosophy. A scientific theory must achieve some kind of startling and accurate prediction relative to the other theories. Kuhn placed a lot of emphasis on the incommensurability of different schools, but surely one strong source of commensuration between competing schools must be prediction. An experienced scientist will build a clear set of intuitions about what constitutes a startling and accurate prediction relative to what he has seen. It must be something strikingly above the norm relative to all the other competing schools. One this is observed, it is a clear catalyst for consensus in the scientific community, as other scientists want to further develop the theory to yield ever more and greater predictions.
What on earth would be the equivalent commensuration between philosophical theories? For example, how are ethical theories supposed to make startling and accurate predictions? When a scientific theory achieves a prediction, it adds a new observation to the set of observations already observed, in a way that is consistent with the original theory. This is a stunning thing, because it requires the cooperation of the universe to supply that prediction. But what would be the equivalent of a moral prediction? The creation of a new moral observation (read: intuition) that was consistent with the original theory? I suggest that it is obvious that such a thing does not require any kind of cooperation with the universe in the same way, only the cooperation of our own mind to be persuaded (brainwashed?) by the theory. In this case, however, nothing startling has happened at all. There has never been such a startling advantage of one extant philosophical school as there has been with pre-scientific schools, and it is not clear that this will in fact ever be possible.
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