Fairness
I don't think that I can sustain my interest in a determinist theory of mind. Just because you believe in sociobiology doesn't mean you have to believe in determinism. Heredity and environment certainly have an influence over human behaviour. But this does not mean that that influence is a causal influence. This is the only way in which sociobiology needs to be mended in order to be compatible with libertarianism. That seems like a very small price to pay in order to preserve your existing intuitions.
Particularly striking as an influence on human behaviour, I think, is the moral sense. I am learning some fascinating things about its cross-cultural nature1. Particularly enlightening so far has been Wilson's chapter on fairness. It gives me valuable ammunition against both John Rawls and Peter Singer. Their theories of justice and ethics respectively are not fair. Among other things, they do not respect the principle of rewards as proportionate to contributions. I also think that they do not take proper account of reciprocity. Their theories are justified in terms of helping people who would not necessarily find the kind of "help" welcome that they had in mind. In some ways, it would be bad if they did. Why would anybody want to grow up with an expectation of getting handouts purely on the basis that you need something? It sounds like a recipe for disaster.
Having said this, people do not value too high a disparity between rich and poor. One does not want the rich to become arrogant or the poor to become envious. But that a certain disparity will exist is still justifiable. Furthermore, it is not justifiable merely because it will maximise the benefits of the least well-off. Maybe it will and maybe it won't. But it is far from clear that it will, and in any case, that is not the reason for the disparity's existing. The reason is that people who contribute more to society deserve more in return.
This is where Rawls and Singer raise a particularly repugnant objection. Neither philosopher really has a problem with rewarding greater effort. This is because effort is something that people can help. Anything that people can help is something for which they deserve praise or blame, and reward or punishment. But some people might contribute more to society simply in virtue of having a greater ability in some area. These people could not help having that greater ability. Consequently, they do not deserve a greater reward just because of their greater ability.
Neither I nor Wilson thinks that this reflects real human moral reasoning. I do accept that an ethic must be universalisable, as do Rawls and Singer. This might even mean placing myself in a Rawlsian original position. But I do not need to draw a Rawlsian conclusion just because I have found myself in a Rawlsian original position. I certainly do not need to draw any conclusion to the effect that people do not deserve their natural assets. I might be a coal miner with no special ability in any area, earning a typically low salary. I might watch an Academy-award-winning performance of a notable actor and be moved to tears. I might reflect on the large amount of money that he earns, and the commensurate extravagance of his lifestyle. But if I am a fan of his, then I will actually feel good for his success. I will probably not even bother to compare my wealth to his, simply because I do admire him. One does not compare one's wealth to those with whom one does not consider that one is in the same league. On the other hand, suppose I know another coal miner who does the same work as I do and with the same results. Then I find out that he actually earns more per fortnight than I do. I might be quite irate about this, because his contribution is equal to mine, yet he is receiving a greater reward for it. But I do not at all resent a movie star earning a fortune, even if I do not think that he is a particularly nice person. He has a gift that I do not have and his exploitation of that gift results in a greater net contribution. People like that deserve whatever rewards they can get for what makes them special.
I find the notion that people do not deserve their natural abilities to be repulsive. Imagine that university student A works hard and gets a Credit for his assignment. He knows another university student B who is smarter than he is. B does less work than A, but gets a Distinction for the same assignment. This can be an annoying phenomenon, I'm sure. One might even speculate that in the best of all possible worlds, everybody would be a genius and would do equally well on assignments for equal effort. It does not follow that the brighter student did not "deserve" to do better on the assignment. It does not matter whether her labour for her result was great or small. It only matters that it was her labour rather than someone else's. If she didn't work as hard because she plagiarised her assignment, then as a minimum, she deserves to fail that assignment. But if it were her labour, then she deserves whatever the fruits of that labour are. What if student A complained that student B did not deserve her mark? I do not think that most of us would be very impressed by this. It sounds like sour grapes, and as such is a childish reaction of envy. Such a mentality is certainly not a sound basis for distributive justice.
1James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense Free Press, 1993.
Particularly striking as an influence on human behaviour, I think, is the moral sense. I am learning some fascinating things about its cross-cultural nature1. Particularly enlightening so far has been Wilson's chapter on fairness. It gives me valuable ammunition against both John Rawls and Peter Singer. Their theories of justice and ethics respectively are not fair. Among other things, they do not respect the principle of rewards as proportionate to contributions. I also think that they do not take proper account of reciprocity. Their theories are justified in terms of helping people who would not necessarily find the kind of "help" welcome that they had in mind. In some ways, it would be bad if they did. Why would anybody want to grow up with an expectation of getting handouts purely on the basis that you need something? It sounds like a recipe for disaster.
Having said this, people do not value too high a disparity between rich and poor. One does not want the rich to become arrogant or the poor to become envious. But that a certain disparity will exist is still justifiable. Furthermore, it is not justifiable merely because it will maximise the benefits of the least well-off. Maybe it will and maybe it won't. But it is far from clear that it will, and in any case, that is not the reason for the disparity's existing. The reason is that people who contribute more to society deserve more in return.
This is where Rawls and Singer raise a particularly repugnant objection. Neither philosopher really has a problem with rewarding greater effort. This is because effort is something that people can help. Anything that people can help is something for which they deserve praise or blame, and reward or punishment. But some people might contribute more to society simply in virtue of having a greater ability in some area. These people could not help having that greater ability. Consequently, they do not deserve a greater reward just because of their greater ability.
Neither I nor Wilson thinks that this reflects real human moral reasoning. I do accept that an ethic must be universalisable, as do Rawls and Singer. This might even mean placing myself in a Rawlsian original position. But I do not need to draw a Rawlsian conclusion just because I have found myself in a Rawlsian original position. I certainly do not need to draw any conclusion to the effect that people do not deserve their natural assets. I might be a coal miner with no special ability in any area, earning a typically low salary. I might watch an Academy-award-winning performance of a notable actor and be moved to tears. I might reflect on the large amount of money that he earns, and the commensurate extravagance of his lifestyle. But if I am a fan of his, then I will actually feel good for his success. I will probably not even bother to compare my wealth to his, simply because I do admire him. One does not compare one's wealth to those with whom one does not consider that one is in the same league. On the other hand, suppose I know another coal miner who does the same work as I do and with the same results. Then I find out that he actually earns more per fortnight than I do. I might be quite irate about this, because his contribution is equal to mine, yet he is receiving a greater reward for it. But I do not at all resent a movie star earning a fortune, even if I do not think that he is a particularly nice person. He has a gift that I do not have and his exploitation of that gift results in a greater net contribution. People like that deserve whatever rewards they can get for what makes them special.
I find the notion that people do not deserve their natural abilities to be repulsive. Imagine that university student A works hard and gets a Credit for his assignment. He knows another university student B who is smarter than he is. B does less work than A, but gets a Distinction for the same assignment. This can be an annoying phenomenon, I'm sure. One might even speculate that in the best of all possible worlds, everybody would be a genius and would do equally well on assignments for equal effort. It does not follow that the brighter student did not "deserve" to do better on the assignment. It does not matter whether her labour for her result was great or small. It only matters that it was her labour rather than someone else's. If she didn't work as hard because she plagiarised her assignment, then as a minimum, she deserves to fail that assignment. But if it were her labour, then she deserves whatever the fruits of that labour are. What if student A complained that student B did not deserve her mark? I do not think that most of us would be very impressed by this. It sounds like sour grapes, and as such is a childish reaction of envy. Such a mentality is certainly not a sound basis for distributive justice.
1James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense Free Press, 1993.
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