Free Will: Two Issues
I finished the whole book The Moral Animal last night. I have been stimulated by Robert Wright's discussion of (the lack of) free will. Sociobiology is (or aims at being) a completely deterministic science. Under the sociobiological paradigm, therefore, free will, to the extent that we appear to have it, is indeed an illusion.
For a long time during my philosophical studies, this was my opinion as well. I was simply impressed by the success of the deterministic sciences, on the one hand. But on the other hand, I did not see that indeterminism would give you free will either. Suppose that you ask someone whom to explain an action that she has just performed. If she simply said, "I just happened to do it", then that would not indicate a free action. Exactly what, then, was this mysterious third quantity that gave you free will? It seemed to me that the only two logical choices were either causation or randomness.
I mentioned this to two educated people. Both simply opined that they thought we obtained free will from a combination of causation and randomness. Both agreed that neither ingredient on its own would give you free will. I could not see why, if this were the case, any combination of the two was supposed to magically produce it either. I didn't exactly think it was like mixing black and white and obtaining grey. Surely from the action you could still isolate the caused portion and the random portion. If this were the case, then both parts would be seen not to be free. It also seemed to me that the entire action was thus reducible to causation and randomness. These two non-free components did not seem to form some emergent property of "freedom".
Of course, this presupposes that lack of causation entails randomness. But this seems to me to be the case. For if something does NOT determine the action, to whatever degree, then how can this not simply be a random thing to that extent by definition? I do not know what work has been done in this area, but it seems a most basic issue. It also requires a positive account of free will, rather than merely saying, "It's not caused!".
Well, what is a cause and what is free will? We must suppose at least some minimal content to these notions for the two to conflict. Here is one possible way to structure that conflict. Free will with regard to an action that one actually performs is, at least in part, the ability to abstain from that action. A cause of an event is, at least in part, that which eliminates the possibility that that event could not have occurred. An action is, among other things, a type of event. This seems to be the bare minimum required to establish an incompatibility between a caused action and a free action.
My supervisor said if an action was caused, then you could not decide anything. I looked up the word "decide" in the dictionary. It meant, basically "to reach a position or opinion or judgment after consideration". Well, you could be caused to consider something, and these considerations could cause a conclusion. I therefore decided that I simply had to disagree with him on that issue.
How to characterise the difference between a caused and a free decision: OK, first, a decision is always made between one or more hypothetical alternatives. But if libertarianism is true, then all of those hypothetical alternatives are also possible. If determinism is true, then only one of those alternatives is possible. In either case, however, only one of those hypothetical alternatives will ever be actual. The difference, therefore, is simply that in how many alternatives are possible. If determinism is true, only one alternative is ever possible. If Libertarianism is true, then any number of alternatives must be. To put it another way, if determinism is true, then only the actual alternative will actually be possible. But if libertarianism is true, then hypothetical alternatives will also be possible. The same can also be illustrated for a choice. As it is, if I am to follow neo-Darwinism here, then I must believe that only one alternative is ever truly possible for a human being at one time.
This does not mean that you know what that alternative is, prior to deliberation. Indeed, your deliberation is almost certainly the efficient cause of what it will be. That is why I don't have any difficulty believing that I have no free will. Because I can still say that I determine my own actions.
This seems to me to be one of the central fallacies of libertarianism. Some libertarians claim that if you have no free will, then you do not determine your own actions. But this is to trade on an ambiguity in the phrase "I determine my own actions". That could mean "I am the efficient cause of my own actions". Or, it could mean "I am the first cause of my own actions". It seems to me that I can perfectly well claim that I am the efficient cause of my own actions. But it would seem to me to be very peculiar if I am the first cause of my own actions. If this were true, then it would be as if everyone were a walking microcosm, and this seems to me to be totally bizarre. We're not the first causes of our own actions, the first cause is the Big Bang! That happened way, way before I was born, but it doesn't matter. It still doesn't mean that I know what the future of my life is going to be like. It also doesn't mean that I'm not the efficient cause of that life. So I still feel in control of my life, and life still seems interesting.
For a long time during my philosophical studies, this was my opinion as well. I was simply impressed by the success of the deterministic sciences, on the one hand. But on the other hand, I did not see that indeterminism would give you free will either. Suppose that you ask someone whom to explain an action that she has just performed. If she simply said, "I just happened to do it", then that would not indicate a free action. Exactly what, then, was this mysterious third quantity that gave you free will? It seemed to me that the only two logical choices were either causation or randomness.
I mentioned this to two educated people. Both simply opined that they thought we obtained free will from a combination of causation and randomness. Both agreed that neither ingredient on its own would give you free will. I could not see why, if this were the case, any combination of the two was supposed to magically produce it either. I didn't exactly think it was like mixing black and white and obtaining grey. Surely from the action you could still isolate the caused portion and the random portion. If this were the case, then both parts would be seen not to be free. It also seemed to me that the entire action was thus reducible to causation and randomness. These two non-free components did not seem to form some emergent property of "freedom".
Of course, this presupposes that lack of causation entails randomness. But this seems to me to be the case. For if something does NOT determine the action, to whatever degree, then how can this not simply be a random thing to that extent by definition? I do not know what work has been done in this area, but it seems a most basic issue. It also requires a positive account of free will, rather than merely saying, "It's not caused!".
Well, what is a cause and what is free will? We must suppose at least some minimal content to these notions for the two to conflict. Here is one possible way to structure that conflict. Free will with regard to an action that one actually performs is, at least in part, the ability to abstain from that action. A cause of an event is, at least in part, that which eliminates the possibility that that event could not have occurred. An action is, among other things, a type of event. This seems to be the bare minimum required to establish an incompatibility between a caused action and a free action.
My supervisor said if an action was caused, then you could not decide anything. I looked up the word "decide" in the dictionary. It meant, basically "to reach a position or opinion or judgment after consideration". Well, you could be caused to consider something, and these considerations could cause a conclusion. I therefore decided that I simply had to disagree with him on that issue.
How to characterise the difference between a caused and a free decision: OK, first, a decision is always made between one or more hypothetical alternatives. But if libertarianism is true, then all of those hypothetical alternatives are also possible. If determinism is true, then only one of those alternatives is possible. In either case, however, only one of those hypothetical alternatives will ever be actual. The difference, therefore, is simply that in how many alternatives are possible. If determinism is true, only one alternative is ever possible. If Libertarianism is true, then any number of alternatives must be. To put it another way, if determinism is true, then only the actual alternative will actually be possible. But if libertarianism is true, then hypothetical alternatives will also be possible. The same can also be illustrated for a choice. As it is, if I am to follow neo-Darwinism here, then I must believe that only one alternative is ever truly possible for a human being at one time.
This does not mean that you know what that alternative is, prior to deliberation. Indeed, your deliberation is almost certainly the efficient cause of what it will be. That is why I don't have any difficulty believing that I have no free will. Because I can still say that I determine my own actions.
This seems to me to be one of the central fallacies of libertarianism. Some libertarians claim that if you have no free will, then you do not determine your own actions. But this is to trade on an ambiguity in the phrase "I determine my own actions". That could mean "I am the efficient cause of my own actions". Or, it could mean "I am the first cause of my own actions". It seems to me that I can perfectly well claim that I am the efficient cause of my own actions. But it would seem to me to be very peculiar if I am the first cause of my own actions. If this were true, then it would be as if everyone were a walking microcosm, and this seems to me to be totally bizarre. We're not the first causes of our own actions, the first cause is the Big Bang! That happened way, way before I was born, but it doesn't matter. It still doesn't mean that I know what the future of my life is going to be like. It also doesn't mean that I'm not the efficient cause of that life. So I still feel in control of my life, and life still seems interesting.
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