What morality is
From the previous section, we may already infer two things about what morality is. Our first lesson came from one of the differences between morality and aesthetics. The judgements of aesthetics are not universally binding, but those of morality are. We can clearly accept that certain works of art may not be in everyone's taste. Morality, however, is not a matter of taste. Part of what it means to make a moral judgement is precisely that we at the same require that all moral agents have the same judgement. In practice, of course, this never happens. But that does not stop the requirement from being there in principle, and from its having certain important practical consequences.
First, this provides the logical foundation for a moral disagreement. When we morally value something, we not only value that we value it, but also that all else value it in a similar way. Hence, we are often morally obliged to judge other cultures by standards that are not their own, because they perform certain actions that, although they might consider them to be moral, we do not. And because there is a genuine contradiction thereby taking place between what they value and what we value, this forms the foundation for a moral disagreement. Note, however, that it does not follow that anyone is necessarily entitled to impose their own morality onto everyone else. Just because we can be involved in a moral disagreement does mean that that disagreement has to be resolved coercively. It is to suggest, however, that as long as two people have two different moral opinions, then this will be a source of disagreement between them.
Second, to the extent that a culture possesses a morality, it is important that it be a shared morality. Moral disagreements will exist within the same culture, but the basic values of the morality of each person in a culture must be shared, or at least respected. If they are not, the dissonance caused by this is considered serious enough that transgressions of the generally accepted moral law can be legally prohibited. If the very basic mores are not shared between everyone in a particular region, then this tends to cause a split into two different cultures. It was precisely this sharp moral disagreement that prompted the American Civil War, for example. It also means that the basic morality is reinforced by acculturation of children born into the culture through their parents, schools, churches and so on. It also requires that 'when in Rome, one must do as the Romans do' and respect the norms and mores of that particular culture.
Our second lesson about what morality is came from our discussion of prudence. One does not have a moral justification of an action merely because it is in one's own interests, precisely because morality is disinterested1. This does not mean necessarily that the morality of an action is necessarily contrary to the self-interest of someone affected by that action. It is to suggest, however, that the reason for performing that action must be independent of the self-interest of any one person thereby affected. Some ethicists such as Peter Singer actually try to infer from this that moral conduct consists in giving equal consideration to the interests of everyone affected by an action. It is important to note, therefore, that this step does not necessarily follow from the notion that morality is disinterested. For example, one might well decide that not everyone's interests affected by an action are morally relevant in the first place. For example, the family of a victim of murder might desire that the murderer be put to death, and understandably so, but it does not follow that it would be in the interests of justice to do this. Equally, one might decide that the interests of some people are to be favoured over the interests of others by means of a disinterested principle. One might give more weight to the interests of one's own children on the grounds that everyone equally has a special obligation to take care of their own children.
This notion of disinterest seems to stem from the first lesson, that all must agree on the content of a moral rule. For a moral rule is disinterested in the sense that one must be able to justify it to others in terms of a shared principle. These shared principles are undoubtedly what form part of a culture, and they become things that are very broad-based, such as respect for beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and so on. Because of the requirement that all must share certain moral judgements, moral therefore becomes a powerful force of social cohesion. It forms many of the rules, universally agreed upon, that people use to interact with each other in a social network.
1For the notion of disinterest here described, and the fallacy committed by Peter Singer in attempting to infer from this his own Equality Principle, I am indebted to Anne Maclean, from her book The Elimination of Morality, Routledge, 1993, Chapter 4.
First, this provides the logical foundation for a moral disagreement. When we morally value something, we not only value that we value it, but also that all else value it in a similar way. Hence, we are often morally obliged to judge other cultures by standards that are not their own, because they perform certain actions that, although they might consider them to be moral, we do not. And because there is a genuine contradiction thereby taking place between what they value and what we value, this forms the foundation for a moral disagreement. Note, however, that it does not follow that anyone is necessarily entitled to impose their own morality onto everyone else. Just because we can be involved in a moral disagreement does mean that that disagreement has to be resolved coercively. It is to suggest, however, that as long as two people have two different moral opinions, then this will be a source of disagreement between them.
Second, to the extent that a culture possesses a morality, it is important that it be a shared morality. Moral disagreements will exist within the same culture, but the basic values of the morality of each person in a culture must be shared, or at least respected. If they are not, the dissonance caused by this is considered serious enough that transgressions of the generally accepted moral law can be legally prohibited. If the very basic mores are not shared between everyone in a particular region, then this tends to cause a split into two different cultures. It was precisely this sharp moral disagreement that prompted the American Civil War, for example. It also means that the basic morality is reinforced by acculturation of children born into the culture through their parents, schools, churches and so on. It also requires that 'when in Rome, one must do as the Romans do' and respect the norms and mores of that particular culture.
Our second lesson about what morality is came from our discussion of prudence. One does not have a moral justification of an action merely because it is in one's own interests, precisely because morality is disinterested1. This does not mean necessarily that the morality of an action is necessarily contrary to the self-interest of someone affected by that action. It is to suggest, however, that the reason for performing that action must be independent of the self-interest of any one person thereby affected. Some ethicists such as Peter Singer actually try to infer from this that moral conduct consists in giving equal consideration to the interests of everyone affected by an action. It is important to note, therefore, that this step does not necessarily follow from the notion that morality is disinterested. For example, one might well decide that not everyone's interests affected by an action are morally relevant in the first place. For example, the family of a victim of murder might desire that the murderer be put to death, and understandably so, but it does not follow that it would be in the interests of justice to do this. Equally, one might decide that the interests of some people are to be favoured over the interests of others by means of a disinterested principle. One might give more weight to the interests of one's own children on the grounds that everyone equally has a special obligation to take care of their own children.
This notion of disinterest seems to stem from the first lesson, that all must agree on the content of a moral rule. For a moral rule is disinterested in the sense that one must be able to justify it to others in terms of a shared principle. These shared principles are undoubtedly what form part of a culture, and they become things that are very broad-based, such as respect for beneficence, non-maleficence, respect for autonomy and so on. Because of the requirement that all must share certain moral judgements, moral therefore becomes a powerful force of social cohesion. It forms many of the rules, universally agreed upon, that people use to interact with each other in a social network.
1For the notion of disinterest here described, and the fallacy committed by Peter Singer in attempting to infer from this his own Equality Principle, I am indebted to Anne Maclean, from her book The Elimination of Morality, Routledge, 1993, Chapter 4.
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