Morality and anthropology
Stephen Jay Gould seems to me to provide a good summation of what the anthropology of morals is. I am interested in "why some (or most) peoples practise certain values"1. However, Gould is also quick to distinguish the anthropology of morals from the morality of morals2. The anthropology of morals is a descriptive endeavour about why people do practise certain values. The morality of morals, on the other hand, asks what values people should practise. This is similar to an observation made by Henry Hazlitt3, that the ethicist's job, unlike the anthropologist's, is precisely to judge, and not merely to explain, human actions and values.
It is important to make this distinction, for to conflate the one with the other could result in incorrect moral judgements. For example, consider the anthropology of the morals of slavery. Definite explanations can surely be given for why certain people practised the values of slave holders and traders. These explanations will range from sociological and economic factors to the ways in which these people justified such practices to themselves. But none of these explanations can in itself constitute a justification of slavery, either then or now. To assume otherwise is to assume that slavery must have been right in the past because we could explain why it was valued then. Yet we can also surely explain why we do not value slavery now, yet we seem to need no such explanation to be able to justify why it is wrong. Furthermore, if we think it is wrong now, then we must think it was wrong then, whether we can explain its practice then or not. Explanation, therefore, cannot be the same thing as justification.
Why, then, ought we concern ourselves with an explanation for why people practised certain values at certain times? Our ultimate goal, after all, is not explanation of human actions, but justification. How, then, do we get from an explanation of human actions to their justification? We may find out how some people justified their actions to themselves, but it does not follow that we could justify their actions to ourselves.
But then, this itself becomes a question of interest. If they justify their actions differently from the way that we would justify them (or not justify them), then we might legitimately ask why this is so, particularly with an issue such as slavery. Slavery was practised for thousands of years. It was universally practised in the ancient world, whether we are talking about the Ancient Greeks, the Mesopotamians, the Aztecs, the Incas or the Egyptians4. No less than Aristotle himself claimed that nothing was wrong with slavery5. Yet today, slavery would not occur to us as even a potentially satisfactory social institution. It seems to me to be an object of serious study into just why such a revolution in our collective psyche should have taken place.
In this respect, socioeconomic factors would seem to play at least some part in the answer. For example, slavery was often essential to the economy and society of ancient civilisations6. On the other hand, slavery does not serve the purposes of the modern economic system of capitalism, which requires greater individual liberty7. Of course, moral reasoning forms an essential factor. People used to think that some people were inherently suited to slavery, others to being masters of slaves8. These days we would take for granted that everyone has a certain equality, as well as certain liberties9. How, then, did the sociological context of slavery or freedom change from then to now, and more importantly, how did our moral reasoning change? We may be more interested in judging what our society ought to practise than in explaining what it did and does practise. But it seems myopic simply to ignore why we judge things the way we judge them as well. If there are certain extra-moral factors behind moral reasoning, it would seem to impinge upon us to find out what they are. An awareness of this process would surely bring enlightenment into our moral judgements, as there are some of these extra-moral factors that we might accept, and others we might not.
1"Let's Leave Darwin Out of It" By Stephen Jay Gould (Web Search: "anthropology of morals", exact phrase)
2Ibid.
3Foundations of Morality, Chapter 18, Section 1. (Web search: "morality commensurability")
4"Slavery," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2004, Section II: Ancient Period.
5Politics, Book I, Chapters iii-vii, Nichomachean Ethics, Book VII, cited in "Aristotle on Slavery". (Web search: "Aristotle slavery")
6See note 4 above.
7For example, John Ashworth argues in Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic that the American Civil War was America's "bourgeois revolution". That is, it liberated the feudalist economy of the South and prepared the foundations for a full capitalist system all across America. (Web search: "slavery capitalism") Likewise, Ayn Rand noted that slavery is incompatible with the individual rights on which capitalism is based. (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, cited on "Great Thinkers: Ayn Rand", web search: "slavery capitalism 'Ayn Rand'")
8Aristotle thus argues that slavery is natural rather than conventional--see note 5 above.
9"Abolitionist Movement," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2004, Section III: Early Influences on Abolitionism.
It is important to make this distinction, for to conflate the one with the other could result in incorrect moral judgements. For example, consider the anthropology of the morals of slavery. Definite explanations can surely be given for why certain people practised the values of slave holders and traders. These explanations will range from sociological and economic factors to the ways in which these people justified such practices to themselves. But none of these explanations can in itself constitute a justification of slavery, either then or now. To assume otherwise is to assume that slavery must have been right in the past because we could explain why it was valued then. Yet we can also surely explain why we do not value slavery now, yet we seem to need no such explanation to be able to justify why it is wrong. Furthermore, if we think it is wrong now, then we must think it was wrong then, whether we can explain its practice then or not. Explanation, therefore, cannot be the same thing as justification.
Why, then, ought we concern ourselves with an explanation for why people practised certain values at certain times? Our ultimate goal, after all, is not explanation of human actions, but justification. How, then, do we get from an explanation of human actions to their justification? We may find out how some people justified their actions to themselves, but it does not follow that we could justify their actions to ourselves.
But then, this itself becomes a question of interest. If they justify their actions differently from the way that we would justify them (or not justify them), then we might legitimately ask why this is so, particularly with an issue such as slavery. Slavery was practised for thousands of years. It was universally practised in the ancient world, whether we are talking about the Ancient Greeks, the Mesopotamians, the Aztecs, the Incas or the Egyptians4. No less than Aristotle himself claimed that nothing was wrong with slavery5. Yet today, slavery would not occur to us as even a potentially satisfactory social institution. It seems to me to be an object of serious study into just why such a revolution in our collective psyche should have taken place.
In this respect, socioeconomic factors would seem to play at least some part in the answer. For example, slavery was often essential to the economy and society of ancient civilisations6. On the other hand, slavery does not serve the purposes of the modern economic system of capitalism, which requires greater individual liberty7. Of course, moral reasoning forms an essential factor. People used to think that some people were inherently suited to slavery, others to being masters of slaves8. These days we would take for granted that everyone has a certain equality, as well as certain liberties9. How, then, did the sociological context of slavery or freedom change from then to now, and more importantly, how did our moral reasoning change? We may be more interested in judging what our society ought to practise than in explaining what it did and does practise. But it seems myopic simply to ignore why we judge things the way we judge them as well. If there are certain extra-moral factors behind moral reasoning, it would seem to impinge upon us to find out what they are. An awareness of this process would surely bring enlightenment into our moral judgements, as there are some of these extra-moral factors that we might accept, and others we might not.
1"Let's Leave Darwin Out of It" By Stephen Jay Gould (Web Search: "anthropology of morals", exact phrase)
2Ibid.
3Foundations of Morality, Chapter 18, Section 1. (Web search: "morality commensurability")
4"Slavery," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2004, Section II: Ancient Period.
5Politics, Book I, Chapters iii-vii, Nichomachean Ethics, Book VII, cited in "Aristotle on Slavery". (Web search: "Aristotle slavery")
6See note 4 above.
7For example, John Ashworth argues in Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in the Antebellum Republic that the American Civil War was America's "bourgeois revolution". That is, it liberated the feudalist economy of the South and prepared the foundations for a full capitalist system all across America. (Web search: "slavery capitalism") Likewise, Ayn Rand noted that slavery is incompatible with the individual rights on which capitalism is based. (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, cited on "Great Thinkers: Ayn Rand", web search: "slavery capitalism 'Ayn Rand'")
8Aristotle thus argues that slavery is natural rather than conventional--see note 5 above.
9"Abolitionist Movement," Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 2004, Section III: Early Influences on Abolitionism.