The moral sense
We have now decided that society can be specified independently of moral considerations. It is therefore consistent to conceive of a society without morality. Of course, in one way, however, the point is rather academic. All societies do contain some sort of morality. Darwin himself postulated the notion of a "moral sense" after observing the behaviour of tribal natives, including the tribes on Tierra del Fuego1. There is widespread empirical support for the cross-culturality of morality2. Everyone has a sensitivity to public opinion. Everyone has some need to justify themselves in terms of norms upon which all can agree. Everyone (except a psychotic) feels some guilt or shame at having transgressed a recognised norm. Peter Singer has also noted that the psychological need for a moral justification is strong3. The general existence of morality in the human species is thus no accident. It does not follow, however, that moral content is innate. Indeed, moral norms vary widely from culture to culture. This has prompted some philosophers, such as Peter Winch, to adopt various positions of relativism as they relate to other cultures.
I do not consider, however, that an attitude of relativism is mandated by the evidence. For one thing, the view is extremely difficult to practise consistently. We all tend naturally to judge other cultures by standards that are not their own. But this seems reasonable, given the biological basis of morality. Part of the sense we have of following a moral norm is precisely that that norm should apply to everyone equally. As discussed previously, it is not enough merely to respond morally in a certain way. This response carries an implicit requirement that others respond the same way. This effect is significant for proximate members in a given geographic region. It tends over time to produce a general consensus of moral norms. This consensus is reinforced through such means as the socialisation of youth and legal sanctions against miscreants. We would expect from this that different regions could arrive at different consensuses. This indeed seems to be the case. However, we would also expect that adherents to different consensuses would still judge other cultures by their own. This is also the case, and is arguably an innate tendency.
Furthermore, I do not think that this tendency is wrong. It seems reasonable, due to the presuppositions of morality, that people ought to try to reach some kind of consensus. Two different moral beliefs cannot be correct at once if they contradict each other. It seems that where moral arguments are entered into, their basis is quite legitimate. It does not follow, however, that people can succeed in reaching the desired consensus. For this, there must be some kind of commensurability between the two moral views.
1The Voyage of the Beagle, Chapter 10, "Tierra del Fuego".
2James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense, Free Press, 1995.
3Peter Singer, How are we to Live?, East Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 1993, p.7.
I do not consider, however, that an attitude of relativism is mandated by the evidence. For one thing, the view is extremely difficult to practise consistently. We all tend naturally to judge other cultures by standards that are not their own. But this seems reasonable, given the biological basis of morality. Part of the sense we have of following a moral norm is precisely that that norm should apply to everyone equally. As discussed previously, it is not enough merely to respond morally in a certain way. This response carries an implicit requirement that others respond the same way. This effect is significant for proximate members in a given geographic region. It tends over time to produce a general consensus of moral norms. This consensus is reinforced through such means as the socialisation of youth and legal sanctions against miscreants. We would expect from this that different regions could arrive at different consensuses. This indeed seems to be the case. However, we would also expect that adherents to different consensuses would still judge other cultures by their own. This is also the case, and is arguably an innate tendency.
Furthermore, I do not think that this tendency is wrong. It seems reasonable, due to the presuppositions of morality, that people ought to try to reach some kind of consensus. Two different moral beliefs cannot be correct at once if they contradict each other. It seems that where moral arguments are entered into, their basis is quite legitimate. It does not follow, however, that people can succeed in reaching the desired consensus. For this, there must be some kind of commensurability between the two moral views.
1The Voyage of the Beagle, Chapter 10, "Tierra del Fuego".
2James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense, Free Press, 1995.
3Peter Singer, How are we to Live?, East Melbourne: The Text Publishing Company, 1993, p.7.
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