A morally independent specification of society
Can society be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms? We are now in a position to answer this question. First, we could see that society can be considered to be a network of interactions, which are regulated by various protocols. We have also seen that there are plenty of protocols that are non-moral in nature. Law, etiquette and aesthetics can all be specified non-morally. Prudence also plays a role in society as an individual protocol, and prudence is quite distinct from morality as well. Morality can be considered its own kind of protocol again.
We are therefore faced with two questions: (1) Can a society exist without morality, and (2) is question (1) asking for an answer that is an analytic or a synthetic truth? That is, is it consistent to suppose that a society could exist without morality? It seems to me that it must be. For we can imagine a society that existed with prudence, etiquette, aesthetics and law, but without morality. An enlightened form of prudence might expand to fill in the space left by morality. This might theoretically occur in laissez-faire capitalism. Various models of a such a society, after all, are either not concerned with moral values or re-fashion morality in terms of enlightened self-interest. Ayn Rand's model springs to mind as an example of the latter. But if morality requires disinterest, as we have discussed, then this would be a society without morality. A merely prudential rationale in the society would not be enough to establish the existence of morality. Hence, society can be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms.
We are therefore faced with two questions: (1) Can a society exist without morality, and (2) is question (1) asking for an answer that is an analytic or a synthetic truth? That is, is it consistent to suppose that a society could exist without morality? It seems to me that it must be. For we can imagine a society that existed with prudence, etiquette, aesthetics and law, but without morality. An enlightened form of prudence might expand to fill in the space left by morality. This might theoretically occur in laissez-faire capitalism. Various models of a such a society, after all, are either not concerned with moral values or re-fashion morality in terms of enlightened self-interest. Ayn Rand's model springs to mind as an example of the latter. But if morality requires disinterest, as we have discussed, then this would be a society without morality. A merely prudential rationale in the society would not be enough to establish the existence of morality. Hence, society can be specified independently of a constitutive reliance on moral terms.
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