What morality is not
The question we faced at the end of the last section was, can you have a social network with no moral protocols? This, of course, depends on what a moral protocol is. A related question here is also what a non-moral protocol is, for although we concluded in the last section that some protocols are necessary to society, it does not follow that those protocols must be moral, if a viable definition exists of a non-moral protocol. Certainly we do not think that every rule that society sets for us is necessarily a moral rule.
For example, the laws that govern human society are not necessarily the same thing as morals. There is probably no non-controversial definition of law, but it should be sufficient to show here that a definition can be found that distinguishes law from morality proper. It does not have to be the only possible definition of law. It only needs to be able to demonstrate that there is at least one possible class of social protocols that must fall outside the domain of morality.
For this definition, I shall consult Duhaime's Legal Dictionary. "Law" refers to "[a]ll the rules of conduct that have been approved by the government and which are in force over a certain territory and which must be obeyed by all persons on that territory (eg. the 'laws' of Australia). ... Synonymous to act or statute although in common usage, 'law' refers not only to legislation or statutes but also to the body of unwritten law in those states which recognize common law."
To me, this definition suits our common sense of the law in terms of what were to happen if one were to break the law. If one gets a parking ticket, it is because one has violated a rule of conduct that has been approved by the government and is in force over one's own municipality. Laws are encoded in legal documents and are enforced by the police and the courts. They are drafted by a legislature and ratified in legislative assemblies for application over a specified geographical region.
It should also be clear that this kind of law, as a collection of rules of conduct, does not necessarily consist completely of moral rules. Some laws, for example, pertain to what side of the road on which one should drive. It is not at all clear that morality even enters into such an issue, except very indirectly--the issue of what side of the road on which to drive is morally neutral. Furthermore, some laws might well be immoral, such as the laws that came into force during the Third Reich.
Another kind of non-moral protocol, less controversially, is the rules of etiquette. I would go so far as to say that part of what we mean by etiquette is surely that it is distinct from morality. For example, it seems very farfetched to say, "It's rude to kill somebody", as though etiquette entered at all into a judgement that seems to fall within the explicit domain of morality. Etiquette, however, does refer to socially acceptable behaviour, which morality certainly can do. But if we are to exclude etiquette from the moral domain, then we are left with etiquette as the protocols governing behaviour that is socially acceptable but morally neutral. As such, it governs such things as manners, decorum, propriety and the like, and typically involves commonsense consideration for others that yet falls short of full moral considerations.
Yet another kind of non-moral protocol is aesthetics, which can define the art of a particular society or culture. Just as a work of art is a creation characterised independently of moral considerations, so is aesthetics a set of morally independent protocols. Aesthetics can apply also more broadly to the kinds of things in a culture in which its members tend to find pleasure, such as a particular style of cooking or architecture. Aesthetics can also refer to individual reactions of pleasure or displeasure at various objects or states of affairs.
In all these respects, however, aesthetics differs from ethics in another very important respect: whereas ethics is normative, aeshetics is not. If one marvels at or praises an essay or work of art, one does not judge, even implicitly, that everyone ought or must respond as one does. Whereas, if one makes a moral judgement, this carries an implicit requirement that others make that same judgement. If they do not, then this becomes the source of a moral disagreement. It is, of course, possible to have an aesthetic disagreement and engage in an aesthetic argument, but this does not at all carry the same kind of mandatoriness or force that a moral disagreement has.
Morality is also commonly distinguished from prudence. It is inadequate, when attempting to justify an action morally, merely to refer to one's own interests in the justification. As Peter Singer writes, "When Macbeth, contemplating the murder of Duncan, admits that only 'vaulting ambition' drives him to do it, he is admitting that the act cannot be justified ethically."1 Likewise, Kelly L. Ross writes, "Prudence, just because it is personally advantageous, is not morally praiseworthy."2 A moral justification of an action must be independent of the self-interest of any one person affected by the action. Consequently, assuming that the self-interests of all people cannot be met at the same time by a given action, to that extent morality will actually place certain limitations upon the self-interests of each of the people concerned. Hence, prudence, though not itself a social protocol, must be taken into account by certain other social protocols, such as legal or moral ones. In this regard, prudence might be considered an individual protocol. It concerns the individual primarily, but can be regulated by social protocols as well.
1Practical Ethics, Cambridge Press, 1993, p. 10.
2"Prudence, Goodness and Wisdom", Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series, www.friesian.com.
For example, the laws that govern human society are not necessarily the same thing as morals. There is probably no non-controversial definition of law, but it should be sufficient to show here that a definition can be found that distinguishes law from morality proper. It does not have to be the only possible definition of law. It only needs to be able to demonstrate that there is at least one possible class of social protocols that must fall outside the domain of morality.
For this definition, I shall consult Duhaime's Legal Dictionary. "Law" refers to "[a]ll the rules of conduct that have been approved by the government and which are in force over a certain territory and which must be obeyed by all persons on that territory (eg. the 'laws' of Australia). ... Synonymous to act or statute although in common usage, 'law' refers not only to legislation or statutes but also to the body of unwritten law in those states which recognize common law."
To me, this definition suits our common sense of the law in terms of what were to happen if one were to break the law. If one gets a parking ticket, it is because one has violated a rule of conduct that has been approved by the government and is in force over one's own municipality. Laws are encoded in legal documents and are enforced by the police and the courts. They are drafted by a legislature and ratified in legislative assemblies for application over a specified geographical region.
It should also be clear that this kind of law, as a collection of rules of conduct, does not necessarily consist completely of moral rules. Some laws, for example, pertain to what side of the road on which one should drive. It is not at all clear that morality even enters into such an issue, except very indirectly--the issue of what side of the road on which to drive is morally neutral. Furthermore, some laws might well be immoral, such as the laws that came into force during the Third Reich.
Another kind of non-moral protocol, less controversially, is the rules of etiquette. I would go so far as to say that part of what we mean by etiquette is surely that it is distinct from morality. For example, it seems very farfetched to say, "It's rude to kill somebody", as though etiquette entered at all into a judgement that seems to fall within the explicit domain of morality. Etiquette, however, does refer to socially acceptable behaviour, which morality certainly can do. But if we are to exclude etiquette from the moral domain, then we are left with etiquette as the protocols governing behaviour that is socially acceptable but morally neutral. As such, it governs such things as manners, decorum, propriety and the like, and typically involves commonsense consideration for others that yet falls short of full moral considerations.
Yet another kind of non-moral protocol is aesthetics, which can define the art of a particular society or culture. Just as a work of art is a creation characterised independently of moral considerations, so is aesthetics a set of morally independent protocols. Aesthetics can apply also more broadly to the kinds of things in a culture in which its members tend to find pleasure, such as a particular style of cooking or architecture. Aesthetics can also refer to individual reactions of pleasure or displeasure at various objects or states of affairs.
In all these respects, however, aesthetics differs from ethics in another very important respect: whereas ethics is normative, aeshetics is not. If one marvels at or praises an essay or work of art, one does not judge, even implicitly, that everyone ought or must respond as one does. Whereas, if one makes a moral judgement, this carries an implicit requirement that others make that same judgement. If they do not, then this becomes the source of a moral disagreement. It is, of course, possible to have an aesthetic disagreement and engage in an aesthetic argument, but this does not at all carry the same kind of mandatoriness or force that a moral disagreement has.
Morality is also commonly distinguished from prudence. It is inadequate, when attempting to justify an action morally, merely to refer to one's own interests in the justification. As Peter Singer writes, "When Macbeth, contemplating the murder of Duncan, admits that only 'vaulting ambition' drives him to do it, he is admitting that the act cannot be justified ethically."1 Likewise, Kelly L. Ross writes, "Prudence, just because it is personally advantageous, is not morally praiseworthy."2 A moral justification of an action must be independent of the self-interest of any one person affected by the action. Consequently, assuming that the self-interests of all people cannot be met at the same time by a given action, to that extent morality will actually place certain limitations upon the self-interests of each of the people concerned. Hence, prudence, though not itself a social protocol, must be taken into account by certain other social protocols, such as legal or moral ones. In this regard, prudence might be considered an individual protocol. It concerns the individual primarily, but can be regulated by social protocols as well.
1Practical Ethics, Cambridge Press, 1993, p. 10.
2"Prudence, Goodness and Wisdom", Proceedings of the Friesian School, Fourth Series, www.friesian.com.