Truth as uncontentious
Yesterday you said that people do not value too high a disparity between rich and poor. I thought you might like to elaborate on that.
I was reflecting on this passage from Wilson. I have also thought about it in the context of when real people I know make moral judgments similar to that. I know someone, for example, who has always had conservative politics. But even he finds outrageous the salaries that some of these top business entrepreneurs make. Nobody is worth so-many-millions-of-dollars a year. But this is still consistent with the intuition that rewards should be proportionate to contributions. Specifically, the ratio of contributions to rewards should be the same for everybody. Some people seem to get rewarded according to a ratio that is higher than that for most other people. This is what seems unfair, and this why no one is worth that much money. Even then, however, the people I know do not necessarily say that those people should not take the money. They should not take it if it were acquired through some form of corruption. But if it is part of the normal workings of supply and demand, then they have every right to it. But we might still think that whoever paid them so much money was still being very foolish.
It's interesting that the proportion of rewards to contributions should be the same. It almost certainly is not. It seems fairly easy to quantify the rewards that people get, because that is what money is for. But it does seem fairly difficult to quantify the contribution that people put into anything.
It is not so difficult in certain circumstances. In most companies your salary is partly commensurate with your job performance. We all know who is doing a better job than someone else is, and it is only right that they get paid more because of it.
But how can anybody say that a film star contributes more than a coal miner?
He contributes more per unit head. Obviously, nobody can calculate exactly what anyone "contributes", but this does not mean that you can't do it to a certain extent. To the extent that you can do it, rewards should be proportionate to contributions.
Are you sure that that is the only intuition at play? I remember when I auditioned for a certain play. On the one hand, the director did say that there was no doubt that I gave a good audition. On the other hand, she said that I had already had a fair number of roles at the theatre company in the time that I had been there. She thought that some new people should be given their chance on the stage as well. This certainly suggests that some intuitions other than proportionality are at play when distributing goods. Perhaps we really do think in terms of an absolute ceiling above which no one is worth. This might be why we tax the rich at a higher percentage than we tax the poor. We have a mentality that there is a certain amount of money that should be enough for anyone. Above that amount of money, other less fortunate people should have some as well. Charity also seems to work on a similar principle. There is a certain amount of money that should be enough for anyone to consider that they are not underprivileged. Above this amount, people should give some of their money to worthwhile charities. This does not mean that they need give all of their surplus to charities, as Peter Singer thinks. But that some should be given away does seem to a certain degree intuitive.
Of course, these intuitions also have a converse. There is a certain amount of money below which we ourselves might be considered charities. Or at least there is a certain amount of money below which we do not have to give to charities ourselves. Some people only make enough money for themselves. If they had so much more, then they might be more willing to give to charities. I think that this is the way that most people's intuitions work: the more rich you feel, the more generous you feel. Bill Gates gave a billion dollars to charity, the most money that anyone has ever given to charity. But someone I know who is always struggling for money dislikes being asked to give other people money.
I already have one concern with these arguments. On the one hand, I find them sound, but on the other hand, I don't really find them contentious. Only someone who had a doctrinaire theory to peddle like Rawls, Singer or Nozick would disagree with them. But they are so commonsensical that there seems no point in trying to advocate them. At most, it shows what I think should be called the philosopher's fallacy. Some people like utilitarians seem to fall in love with a formalised principle. They can see how elastically it can stretch to cover potentially every aspect of moral thinking. It might be able to do so only crudely. But they become too enamoured of the simplicity and elegance of the theory. It leads them no longer to care whether it satisfies certain whole areas of our moral intuitions. In other words, they allow their philosopher's love of system to cloud their moral judgment.
This is where you reach the other problem. What does philosophy really have to contribute to moral issues?
You want to read Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by Bernard Williams. He does not think that philosophy can supply us with the ethical answers to our questions. Fortunately I have that book at home, so I don't have to buy it specially.
I was reflecting on this passage from Wilson. I have also thought about it in the context of when real people I know make moral judgments similar to that. I know someone, for example, who has always had conservative politics. But even he finds outrageous the salaries that some of these top business entrepreneurs make. Nobody is worth so-many-millions-of-dollars a year. But this is still consistent with the intuition that rewards should be proportionate to contributions. Specifically, the ratio of contributions to rewards should be the same for everybody. Some people seem to get rewarded according to a ratio that is higher than that for most other people. This is what seems unfair, and this why no one is worth that much money. Even then, however, the people I know do not necessarily say that those people should not take the money. They should not take it if it were acquired through some form of corruption. But if it is part of the normal workings of supply and demand, then they have every right to it. But we might still think that whoever paid them so much money was still being very foolish.
It's interesting that the proportion of rewards to contributions should be the same. It almost certainly is not. It seems fairly easy to quantify the rewards that people get, because that is what money is for. But it does seem fairly difficult to quantify the contribution that people put into anything.
It is not so difficult in certain circumstances. In most companies your salary is partly commensurate with your job performance. We all know who is doing a better job than someone else is, and it is only right that they get paid more because of it.
But how can anybody say that a film star contributes more than a coal miner?
He contributes more per unit head. Obviously, nobody can calculate exactly what anyone "contributes", but this does not mean that you can't do it to a certain extent. To the extent that you can do it, rewards should be proportionate to contributions.
Are you sure that that is the only intuition at play? I remember when I auditioned for a certain play. On the one hand, the director did say that there was no doubt that I gave a good audition. On the other hand, she said that I had already had a fair number of roles at the theatre company in the time that I had been there. She thought that some new people should be given their chance on the stage as well. This certainly suggests that some intuitions other than proportionality are at play when distributing goods. Perhaps we really do think in terms of an absolute ceiling above which no one is worth. This might be why we tax the rich at a higher percentage than we tax the poor. We have a mentality that there is a certain amount of money that should be enough for anyone. Above that amount of money, other less fortunate people should have some as well. Charity also seems to work on a similar principle. There is a certain amount of money that should be enough for anyone to consider that they are not underprivileged. Above this amount, people should give some of their money to worthwhile charities. This does not mean that they need give all of their surplus to charities, as Peter Singer thinks. But that some should be given away does seem to a certain degree intuitive.
Of course, these intuitions also have a converse. There is a certain amount of money below which we ourselves might be considered charities. Or at least there is a certain amount of money below which we do not have to give to charities ourselves. Some people only make enough money for themselves. If they had so much more, then they might be more willing to give to charities. I think that this is the way that most people's intuitions work: the more rich you feel, the more generous you feel. Bill Gates gave a billion dollars to charity, the most money that anyone has ever given to charity. But someone I know who is always struggling for money dislikes being asked to give other people money.
I already have one concern with these arguments. On the one hand, I find them sound, but on the other hand, I don't really find them contentious. Only someone who had a doctrinaire theory to peddle like Rawls, Singer or Nozick would disagree with them. But they are so commonsensical that there seems no point in trying to advocate them. At most, it shows what I think should be called the philosopher's fallacy. Some people like utilitarians seem to fall in love with a formalised principle. They can see how elastically it can stretch to cover potentially every aspect of moral thinking. It might be able to do so only crudely. But they become too enamoured of the simplicity and elegance of the theory. It leads them no longer to care whether it satisfies certain whole areas of our moral intuitions. In other words, they allow their philosopher's love of system to cloud their moral judgment.
This is where you reach the other problem. What does philosophy really have to contribute to moral issues?
You want to read Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy by Bernard Williams. He does not think that philosophy can supply us with the ethical answers to our questions. Fortunately I have that book at home, so I don't have to buy it specially.
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