Reading Cicero II
It seems to me that this discussion of the conflict between duty and expediency is proving very helpful. To start off with, I would certainly not have thought that duty and expediency were simply the same thing, as Cicero is contending. However, it seems to me that in the best of all possible worlds, they would indeed be the same thing. That is to say, in an idealised society, the most expedient possible ends would indeed be produced by the idealised members of that society. In a world where people do not lie, cheat or steal, and who present the proper amount of benevolence towards each other, their own individual advantages may not always be met, but their essentials would surely still be met. For if they were able-bodied, they would take care of themselves, and if they were frail, they would be looked after by others. Those who had money would pay for their goods or services, and those who had not money would still show what kindness they could in appreciation for same. All would enjoy the simple and beautiful things in life, such as the sunshine, the trees, the grass, and the company of dear ones with whom to share it. The meretricious glamour of power, fame or money would not cause any to stray from the path of righteousness. But power would be earned through aptitude of justice, money through valuable goods or services, and fame through just merits. In short, justice would be had by all and served by all, with no conflicts of interests that could not themselves be settled either justly or amicably.
On the other hand, Cicero's writing abounds with examples of various immoralities that were committed for the sake of apparent expediency. The example is provided of someone who would be a king by immoral means (On Duties, III 82-3). The argument is that this is not an expedient act because why would one want to be 'Father of the Country' in which justice had thus been thwarted? The problem with this argument, however, is that it begs the question. It assumes that the inexpediency of the act is the very immorality whose expediency is in question in the first place. In other words, the only way that the act can be considered inexpedient may simply be that it is immoral--but this can hardly be the point. For if a conflict between morality and expediency is a conflict between a moral and an apparently non-moral value, then it does not address the issue simply to assert that the moral value is always right. The question is, rather, whether the moral value will enable one to attain everything that one actually desires, which seems in this case to be of non-moral value.
It seems to me that in order to resolve the issue on the side of morality, there is only one option. One must be educated to be such a virtuous person that one does not desire that which is in conflict with a moral value. This is the only moral resolution of the conflict between morality and expediency: the cultivation of proper virtue--for, as Aristotle observed, a virtuous person is cultivated, not born.
This in turn raises the question of what is actually moral. If it is not necessarily what we naturally desire, then what is it that we are to condition ourselves to desire? This would lead, I think, into the various ways that philosophers have tried to answer this question, in Part 2 of the book, noting that their answers typically involve some arbitrary formalism that does not capture moral content adequately. I can argue from there that commonsense morality--which is at the same time socially viable for the culture that deems it moral--is actually rather banal. Anyone who needs an example of this can read the first two books of Cicero's On Duties. As moral advice to his son, it is uncontroversial, but as the subject of philosophical study, it seems trivial. Furthermore, I strongly suspect that this is the reason that most philosophers do not concern themselves with commonsense morality, that it is banal.
Except that sometimes they are actually capable of improving on the banality of common sense morality. It has happened only once in a major way of which I know, and that is in the time of the Enlightenment. But there were also many more factors behind the Enlightenment movement than merely philosophical ones--particularly economic factors, which resulted in social and political changes as well. Many things happened in the time of the Enlightenment to change our common sense about morality. In many ways, we still have yet to fully think through the ramifications of that change, which is exactly why Singer's arguments have achieved the popularity that they have. They were suggested by the social changes that took place in the Enlightenment, but they are not necessarily entailed by them, nor do I think that they are attractive conclusions to reach. It is not clear what the final resolution of our ethos will be in the new post-Enlightenment ethics, however. But it will not be a decision made by any one person, but by all of us in our society. Individuals, I take it, always have the right to agree or disagree with their society, because moral belief will always ultimately be determined by individual conscience. Yet society must still have its ethos, and this ethos is by definition a group effort--leading us right into Part 3, concerning society and the individual.
On the other hand, Cicero's writing abounds with examples of various immoralities that were committed for the sake of apparent expediency. The example is provided of someone who would be a king by immoral means (On Duties, III 82-3). The argument is that this is not an expedient act because why would one want to be 'Father of the Country' in which justice had thus been thwarted? The problem with this argument, however, is that it begs the question. It assumes that the inexpediency of the act is the very immorality whose expediency is in question in the first place. In other words, the only way that the act can be considered inexpedient may simply be that it is immoral--but this can hardly be the point. For if a conflict between morality and expediency is a conflict between a moral and an apparently non-moral value, then it does not address the issue simply to assert that the moral value is always right. The question is, rather, whether the moral value will enable one to attain everything that one actually desires, which seems in this case to be of non-moral value.
It seems to me that in order to resolve the issue on the side of morality, there is only one option. One must be educated to be such a virtuous person that one does not desire that which is in conflict with a moral value. This is the only moral resolution of the conflict between morality and expediency: the cultivation of proper virtue--for, as Aristotle observed, a virtuous person is cultivated, not born.
This in turn raises the question of what is actually moral. If it is not necessarily what we naturally desire, then what is it that we are to condition ourselves to desire? This would lead, I think, into the various ways that philosophers have tried to answer this question, in Part 2 of the book, noting that their answers typically involve some arbitrary formalism that does not capture moral content adequately. I can argue from there that commonsense morality--which is at the same time socially viable for the culture that deems it moral--is actually rather banal. Anyone who needs an example of this can read the first two books of Cicero's On Duties. As moral advice to his son, it is uncontroversial, but as the subject of philosophical study, it seems trivial. Furthermore, I strongly suspect that this is the reason that most philosophers do not concern themselves with commonsense morality, that it is banal.
Except that sometimes they are actually capable of improving on the banality of common sense morality. It has happened only once in a major way of which I know, and that is in the time of the Enlightenment. But there were also many more factors behind the Enlightenment movement than merely philosophical ones--particularly economic factors, which resulted in social and political changes as well. Many things happened in the time of the Enlightenment to change our common sense about morality. In many ways, we still have yet to fully think through the ramifications of that change, which is exactly why Singer's arguments have achieved the popularity that they have. They were suggested by the social changes that took place in the Enlightenment, but they are not necessarily entailed by them, nor do I think that they are attractive conclusions to reach. It is not clear what the final resolution of our ethos will be in the new post-Enlightenment ethics, however. But it will not be a decision made by any one person, but by all of us in our society. Individuals, I take it, always have the right to agree or disagree with their society, because moral belief will always ultimately be determined by individual conscience. Yet society must still have its ethos, and this ethos is by definition a group effort--leading us right into Part 3, concerning society and the individual.