An Aporia from Hypocrisy
This morning, I found another good relevant concept: aporia. Aristotle suggests that inquiry should take its starting point in a survey of aporias. During the early stages of developing my MPhil thesis, I identified a dilemma that I was facing, of which I had already experienced both horns. I could write an impractical theory that people would preach and not practise (the original version of my theory of ethics, essentially a version of utilitarianism). Alternatively, I could write an immoral theory that people would practise and not preach (something that I had called 'the theory of permissibility'). Essentially, one theory was principle-oriented and the other was practice-oriented. The reason for the dilemma was the presence in the university of a culture of hypocrisy about altruism, and specifically utilitarianism. I cannot speak about specific staff members, simply because I was not one of them, and so did not socialise with them. However, I can certainly say that the students were fiercely defensive of a utilitarianism that they did not intend to practise once inconvenient. (I discuss this more fully in "Where I'm coming from".) The result was that what we could agree upon as moral, we would not really practise, but that the students would refuse to support a theory that sanctioned what they were actually doing.
This situation produced an aporia, where the way forward was not clear. In the meantime, my attempts to solve the problem often came across as "disturbing" and "practice-oriented". (I discuss this more fully in "A difficulty with Chapter 4".) The only way of avoiding an allegation of "practice-orientation" was to appeal to the tradition of empiricism versus rationalism. However, reading the dictionary to find new concepts to apply to the book is weakening my reliance on this concept. For example, I did not have to choose the term "aporia" on which to elaborate for the book; I could have chosen "a posteriori" instead. But I felt that at this early stage of development, it was begging the question in favour of an empirical approach. The point of the theory of ethics is not really that it be empirical or rationalistic, but that it attempt to resolve the aporia from hypocrisy. This has the additional advantage that it relieves me from having to create an ethics that is robustly empirical. The task would be virtually endless if carried out thoroughly, and that is not really the point of the project. Perhaps I would have been better in the Masters thesis to present my aporia from hypocrisy first, and this would have generated more sympathy for the work that followed.
Consequently, I now think that the appropriate title is not really "An Empirical Theory of Ethics". A better title would surely be "An Aporia from Hypocrisy", same as the first section. This automatically means that I do not have to resolve the aporia successfully in the book, although I will surely try. It also means that even if I fail, the aporia will still be there, and recognised as a serious subject for other philosophers to study as well. It will also be appropriate to consider other cultures, for whom this aporia does not present a problem. For example, the Ancient Greeks did not distinguish between principle and practice, so this dilemma would not have arisen for them. Nor would it have arisen for the Eastern philosophies. They not only do not make a distinction between principle and practice, but also they do not distinguish between philosophy and religion. Hence, for them, the spiritual path is the philosophical path that a normal human being can actually be expected to take seriously as worth living up to. I do not necessarily want to follow either the Ancient Greek or the Eastern philosophical paths, but they should be duly considered as well. Actually, an in-depth exploration of non-Western philosophies will probably fall outside the scope of this book. But I can at least provide a nod at how other cultures have avoided this particular aporia. I expect much of my earlier work on social mores to be included in the final version of the book as well.
My concept for tonight is "argumentum ad hominem." The appropriate place for a section dealing with this subject is immediately after the section on the aporia from hypocrisy. If I am going to concentrate on hypocrisy, one thing I am going to have to make clear from the outset is that I do not think that I can reject an ethical view simpliciter just because its proponent is a hypocrite, for that would be ad hominem.
This situation produced an aporia, where the way forward was not clear. In the meantime, my attempts to solve the problem often came across as "disturbing" and "practice-oriented". (I discuss this more fully in "A difficulty with Chapter 4".) The only way of avoiding an allegation of "practice-orientation" was to appeal to the tradition of empiricism versus rationalism. However, reading the dictionary to find new concepts to apply to the book is weakening my reliance on this concept. For example, I did not have to choose the term "aporia" on which to elaborate for the book; I could have chosen "a posteriori" instead. But I felt that at this early stage of development, it was begging the question in favour of an empirical approach. The point of the theory of ethics is not really that it be empirical or rationalistic, but that it attempt to resolve the aporia from hypocrisy. This has the additional advantage that it relieves me from having to create an ethics that is robustly empirical. The task would be virtually endless if carried out thoroughly, and that is not really the point of the project. Perhaps I would have been better in the Masters thesis to present my aporia from hypocrisy first, and this would have generated more sympathy for the work that followed.
Consequently, I now think that the appropriate title is not really "An Empirical Theory of Ethics". A better title would surely be "An Aporia from Hypocrisy", same as the first section. This automatically means that I do not have to resolve the aporia successfully in the book, although I will surely try. It also means that even if I fail, the aporia will still be there, and recognised as a serious subject for other philosophers to study as well. It will also be appropriate to consider other cultures, for whom this aporia does not present a problem. For example, the Ancient Greeks did not distinguish between principle and practice, so this dilemma would not have arisen for them. Nor would it have arisen for the Eastern philosophies. They not only do not make a distinction between principle and practice, but also they do not distinguish between philosophy and religion. Hence, for them, the spiritual path is the philosophical path that a normal human being can actually be expected to take seriously as worth living up to. I do not necessarily want to follow either the Ancient Greek or the Eastern philosophical paths, but they should be duly considered as well. Actually, an in-depth exploration of non-Western philosophies will probably fall outside the scope of this book. But I can at least provide a nod at how other cultures have avoided this particular aporia. I expect much of my earlier work on social mores to be included in the final version of the book as well.
My concept for tonight is "argumentum ad hominem." The appropriate place for a section dealing with this subject is immediately after the section on the aporia from hypocrisy. If I am going to concentrate on hypocrisy, one thing I am going to have to make clear from the outset is that I do not think that I can reject an ethical view simpliciter just because its proponent is a hypocrite, for that would be ad hominem.
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