Natural rights theory and falsifiability
Must every legitimate moral judgement ultimately presuppose a falsifiable metaphysics? Might we test this notion with a paradigmatic moral judgement that people commonly make, such as 'murder is wrong'? Most philosophers are here quick to point out that the expression 'murder is wrong' is a tautology, because 'murder' means 'immoral killing'. However, a clear paradigmatic class of external referent is implied by the word, which is the intentional and premeditated killing of a human being.
Why do we consider this act to be immoral? It seems to me to be because we violate a person's natural right to life, which she has in virtue of having a rational faculty. An animal, on the other hand, has no rational faculty, so it does not have this same right to life--although, having an emotional faculty, it does have a certain right not to suffer gratuitously.
This moral judgement therefore already presupposes a specific metaphysics, namely one in which human beings have a rational faculty. This metaphysics, furthermore, is falsifiable--for example, if Freudianism were correct, then we would have no rational control over our environment. If we had no rational faculty, then it would undermine a great deal of the natural rights that we do claim for ourselves. However, we certainly seem to have a rational faculty, so such natural rights are in fact quite secure.
Furthermore, this moral judgement has some strong things in common with the hierarchical ethic--though not, of course, its inherent plausibility. First, both ethics were grounded, at least partially in the equivalent of some form of natural rights. After all, the hiearchy ethic presupposed that people higher in the hierarchy had more rights than people lower in the hierarchy. It also presupposed that the rights of the people higher in the hierarchy overrode the rights of the people lower in the hierarchy, at least potentially. Second, the rights of both ethics were clearly ground in metaphysical properties of the beings that had those rights. That is how the hierarchical ethic could come to be falsified by observations--the metaphysical assumptions in which its system of rights had been grounded proved to be false. The right to life, as I have stated it here, is grounded in the possession of a rational faculty, so it belongs to all beings that have such a faculty. This metaphysics is falsifiable by observations that we do not have a rational faculty, so it is quite valid according to a doctrine of falsifiability.
Therefore, we can conclude that a certain kind of ethics is valid in virtue of the fact that it is falsifiable: Natural rights theory, where those natural rights are grounded in metaphysical properties that themselves admit of falsifiable claims.
Why do we consider this act to be immoral? It seems to me to be because we violate a person's natural right to life, which she has in virtue of having a rational faculty. An animal, on the other hand, has no rational faculty, so it does not have this same right to life--although, having an emotional faculty, it does have a certain right not to suffer gratuitously.
This moral judgement therefore already presupposes a specific metaphysics, namely one in which human beings have a rational faculty. This metaphysics, furthermore, is falsifiable--for example, if Freudianism were correct, then we would have no rational control over our environment. If we had no rational faculty, then it would undermine a great deal of the natural rights that we do claim for ourselves. However, we certainly seem to have a rational faculty, so such natural rights are in fact quite secure.
Furthermore, this moral judgement has some strong things in common with the hierarchical ethic--though not, of course, its inherent plausibility. First, both ethics were grounded, at least partially in the equivalent of some form of natural rights. After all, the hiearchy ethic presupposed that people higher in the hierarchy had more rights than people lower in the hierarchy. It also presupposed that the rights of the people higher in the hierarchy overrode the rights of the people lower in the hierarchy, at least potentially. Second, the rights of both ethics were clearly ground in metaphysical properties of the beings that had those rights. That is how the hierarchical ethic could come to be falsified by observations--the metaphysical assumptions in which its system of rights had been grounded proved to be false. The right to life, as I have stated it here, is grounded in the possession of a rational faculty, so it belongs to all beings that have such a faculty. This metaphysics is falsifiable by observations that we do not have a rational faculty, so it is quite valid according to a doctrine of falsifiability.
Therefore, we can conclude that a certain kind of ethics is valid in virtue of the fact that it is falsifiable: Natural rights theory, where those natural rights are grounded in metaphysical properties that themselves admit of falsifiable claims.
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