Deciding between two moral paradigms
Note from the section "Kant and falsifiability" that metaphysical presuppositions underdetermine different falsifiable theories of ethics. Both Kantian deontology and natural rights theory carry the same metaphysical presupposition that human beings have a rational faculty. But this does not make those two theories the same theory with the same content or rationale, at least prima facie.
Nevertheless, might not the commonality of the metaphysical presupposition be a source of commensurability between the two theories? That is, might it not provide a way to reconcile the two approaches, mutatis mutandis? After all, where would natural rights theory and Kantian deontology contradict each other?
You know what? I think that that question is meaningless without a real dialectic going on between two different ethical theories that are to some degree viable as social mores--otherwise, I am simply shadow boxing. If I am to devise a real empirical theory of ethics, then I am going to have to conduct it from the standpoint of two empirically 'real' views.
This is one of the fascinating tendencies of a culture, the fact that it has an inevitable tendency to 'decide' between two views. According to Kuhn, as I read him, the scientific culture can actually 'decide' between two views that he claims are quite incommensurable with each other. Of course, in order to reach this decision, some form of commensuration must have occurred. But Kuhn allows the possibility that part of this commensuration includes standards that are aesthetic or otherwise merely cultural in nature, rather than strictly 'rational'. The point is that commensuration of the two different views is a very difficult process, and it typically takes about a generation.
Certainly, the schools of philosophy seem quite incommensurable with each other. That is why there are still Aristotelians, Kantians and utilitarians around today in the field of ethics. Looking at each of these schools in turn, they all seem to be roughly as self-consistent as each other, and they all seem to have their own roughly equal share of difficulties and virtues. Yet there is an inevitable human tendency, on the individual level, to decide between the views. Given the incommensurability of the different perspectives, I cannot believe that this decision is an entirely rational process, and it almost certainly reflects at least in part, the personality of the person who has made the decision. Given the relative close-knittedness and homogeneity of the scientific culture, therefore, might not paradigm choice reflect that culture as well?
Nevertheless, a culture need not be as close-knitted and homogenous as the scientific culture to decide between incommensurable views. As Lord Patrick Devlin recognised, an established system of social mores is an essential of social functioning. In fact, it seems simply to be part of what we mean by a society at all that it has a set of social mores. After all, an established set of standards of right and wrong would seem to be a necessary condition for the kinds of reliable and cooperative interactions between people that could be described as 'social'. Furthermore, this set of standards would not be 'established' if it were not viable. That is, it would not be established if the mores were not obeyed, at least for the majority of the time, and/or by a majority of the people. In other words, the fact that we can observe societies in the world already constitutes evidence that whole groups of people have been able to collectively decide on a set of viable standards of right and wrong, i.e. social mores.
Nor does this imply that ethics is simply to be reduced to social functioning. Mores exist because people believe they are right quite independently of whether they happen to conduce to social interaction. Of course, because we are social beings, our mores will only ever be likely to value human interaction in one way or another. But social functioning alone would seem to underdetermine a great many different kinds of social mores, not all of which we might rightly think were 'moral' at all. Nazi Germany would be a perfect example of a set of immoral social mores, and this society was not at all obviously unviable, especially if Hitler had been a smarter tactician during World War II. Whole cultures must always have the right to judge other whole cultures as immoral by their own standards. Whether this constitutes grounds for direct interference with those cultures is another matter, but that the right to judge by one's own standards is important seems hard to deny.
Nevertheless, might not the commonality of the metaphysical presupposition be a source of commensurability between the two theories? That is, might it not provide a way to reconcile the two approaches, mutatis mutandis? After all, where would natural rights theory and Kantian deontology contradict each other?
You know what? I think that that question is meaningless without a real dialectic going on between two different ethical theories that are to some degree viable as social mores--otherwise, I am simply shadow boxing. If I am to devise a real empirical theory of ethics, then I am going to have to conduct it from the standpoint of two empirically 'real' views.
This is one of the fascinating tendencies of a culture, the fact that it has an inevitable tendency to 'decide' between two views. According to Kuhn, as I read him, the scientific culture can actually 'decide' between two views that he claims are quite incommensurable with each other. Of course, in order to reach this decision, some form of commensuration must have occurred. But Kuhn allows the possibility that part of this commensuration includes standards that are aesthetic or otherwise merely cultural in nature, rather than strictly 'rational'. The point is that commensuration of the two different views is a very difficult process, and it typically takes about a generation.
Certainly, the schools of philosophy seem quite incommensurable with each other. That is why there are still Aristotelians, Kantians and utilitarians around today in the field of ethics. Looking at each of these schools in turn, they all seem to be roughly as self-consistent as each other, and they all seem to have their own roughly equal share of difficulties and virtues. Yet there is an inevitable human tendency, on the individual level, to decide between the views. Given the incommensurability of the different perspectives, I cannot believe that this decision is an entirely rational process, and it almost certainly reflects at least in part, the personality of the person who has made the decision. Given the relative close-knittedness and homogeneity of the scientific culture, therefore, might not paradigm choice reflect that culture as well?
Nevertheless, a culture need not be as close-knitted and homogenous as the scientific culture to decide between incommensurable views. As Lord Patrick Devlin recognised, an established system of social mores is an essential of social functioning. In fact, it seems simply to be part of what we mean by a society at all that it has a set of social mores. After all, an established set of standards of right and wrong would seem to be a necessary condition for the kinds of reliable and cooperative interactions between people that could be described as 'social'. Furthermore, this set of standards would not be 'established' if it were not viable. That is, it would not be established if the mores were not obeyed, at least for the majority of the time, and/or by a majority of the people. In other words, the fact that we can observe societies in the world already constitutes evidence that whole groups of people have been able to collectively decide on a set of viable standards of right and wrong, i.e. social mores.
Nor does this imply that ethics is simply to be reduced to social functioning. Mores exist because people believe they are right quite independently of whether they happen to conduce to social interaction. Of course, because we are social beings, our mores will only ever be likely to value human interaction in one way or another. But social functioning alone would seem to underdetermine a great many different kinds of social mores, not all of which we might rightly think were 'moral' at all. Nazi Germany would be a perfect example of a set of immoral social mores, and this society was not at all obviously unviable, especially if Hitler had been a smarter tactician during World War II. Whole cultures must always have the right to judge other whole cultures as immoral by their own standards. Whether this constitutes grounds for direct interference with those cultures is another matter, but that the right to judge by one's own standards is important seems hard to deny.
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