Read the first 50 pages of Popper.
Well, I am not finding Popper nearly so fruitful for analogy as I did Kuhn. Basically, my reading of Popper is simply to see how I might synthesise him successfully with Kuhn. How well I can do this will depend largely on the degree to which he is able to show convincingly that his method can be used to adjudicate between two conflicting paradigms--something I seriously doubt.
On the other hand, something like falsifiability must still hold for ethics and science. It is simply that in the case of science, falsifiability can really only result in the generation of anomalies, which provoke a crisis in science leading to different competing paradigms for a revolution. It does not mean that the original theory gets rejected immediately.
Nevertheless, I find of philosphic value one thing that Popper has said already on p. 51, where he discusses the benefits of axiomatising a theory. He notes that investigations of whether a certain part of the theory is derivable from some part of the axioms have a bearing on falsifiability. They make it clear why the falsification of a logically deduced statement may sometimes not affect the whole system but only some part of it. That part may then be regarded as falsified. Axiomatisation of a whole theory might then be of value in (1) protecting the parts of the theory that have not been falsified by the observation and (2) helping the physicist generate replacements for the part of the theory that has been falsified.
One could regard this as a kind of axiomatic physics. I regard this as enormously attractive, although nothing like the equivalent system seems necessary for morals, because (1) morals lack the esoteric nature of physics and (2) morals are more qualitative where physics is quantitative. It seems difficult to believe that an axiomatised account of social mores would enable any society to make better decisions. I would have serious doubts about the fruitfulness of such an approach, and would probably desire more inherent flexibility in the system. Most of the rest of what Popper is saying about science does not seem to relate directly to ethics either, because it is too formalised to admit of analogy.
This raises the question, how important is philosophy of science to my theory of ethics anyway? I do not want to get off topic by becoming too concerned about a reconciliation between Popper and Kuhn if it does not contribute to my aim of producing an empirical theory of ethics.
Well, you have seen how enormously fruitful I have been finding analogies with Kuhn. Admittedly, analogies with Popper at the level at which he is writing in his book do not seem to be nearly as helpful, but in general, philosophy of science has been of benefit to me.
On the other hand, something like falsifiability must still hold for ethics and science. It is simply that in the case of science, falsifiability can really only result in the generation of anomalies, which provoke a crisis in science leading to different competing paradigms for a revolution. It does not mean that the original theory gets rejected immediately.
Nevertheless, I find of philosphic value one thing that Popper has said already on p. 51, where he discusses the benefits of axiomatising a theory. He notes that investigations of whether a certain part of the theory is derivable from some part of the axioms have a bearing on falsifiability. They make it clear why the falsification of a logically deduced statement may sometimes not affect the whole system but only some part of it. That part may then be regarded as falsified. Axiomatisation of a whole theory might then be of value in (1) protecting the parts of the theory that have not been falsified by the observation and (2) helping the physicist generate replacements for the part of the theory that has been falsified.
One could regard this as a kind of axiomatic physics. I regard this as enormously attractive, although nothing like the equivalent system seems necessary for morals, because (1) morals lack the esoteric nature of physics and (2) morals are more qualitative where physics is quantitative. It seems difficult to believe that an axiomatised account of social mores would enable any society to make better decisions. I would have serious doubts about the fruitfulness of such an approach, and would probably desire more inherent flexibility in the system. Most of the rest of what Popper is saying about science does not seem to relate directly to ethics either, because it is too formalised to admit of analogy.
This raises the question, how important is philosophy of science to my theory of ethics anyway? I do not want to get off topic by becoming too concerned about a reconciliation between Popper and Kuhn if it does not contribute to my aim of producing an empirical theory of ethics.
Well, you have seen how enormously fruitful I have been finding analogies with Kuhn. Admittedly, analogies with Popper at the level at which he is writing in his book do not seem to be nearly as helpful, but in general, philosophy of science has been of benefit to me.
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