Moral falsifiability as metaphysical presupposition
We have already seen how the hierarchical ethic presupposed a metaphysics that admitted of falsifiable claims. We have also already seen how utilitarianism does not. Are we, therefore, now in a position to determine in general what is the structure of falsifiability as it is meant to apply to legitimate moral claims?
We are, of course, all familiar with Hume's famous fact/value distinction, whereby one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Thus, it does seem strange prima facie that any factual observation about the world could serve to refute a moral observation about what the world ought to be like. I have discussed in an earlier section how it is possible to make moral observations. Yet even here, the moral sentiment that is a part of the observation in question does indeed seem separate from the factual parts of the observation. Hence, the observation of a bunch of hoodlums setting fire to a cat seems a separate thing from the disapprobation that we feel towards this act. Hence, we might say that a moral claim that such an act is wrong is verified if we in fact can disapprove of the action when we observe it. However, the question of how such a claim can be falsified remains tricky. For we have already observed how once we allow moral observations to be legitimate, it seems as though almost any moral theory might legitimately form the basis for a moral observation. It may not necessarily be a matter of choice what theory will fit our actual moral intuitions and values. But it seems that, like Robert Nozick, if we really want our values to conform to a particular theory, then we can allow this to happen, even though in principle, it seems like we could thus recondition our intuitions to agree with a theory forever.
Hence, any account of moral falsifiability that rests solely on the basis of a moral value coupled with a factual observation seems doomed to fail. Moral values are, in one way or another, simply too elastic to allow for the kind of conclusive refutation that falsifiability demands. However, not all moral judgements are mere values coupled with factual observations. Some moral judgements actually presuppose certain kinds of factual observations. This is significant, because factual observations are the kinds of observations that are not so malleable to the persuasion by a specific metaphysical theory as moral observations are malleable to persuasion or even brainwashing by a particular moral theory. At least, there seem to be far fewer contending metaphysical theories to shape factual observations than moral theories to shape moral observations. Metaphysical theories seem to have have a far greater degree of commonality of basic assumptions about life than moral theories.
This is important, for in order to be conclusively falsifiable, a theory must also be (level 2) commensurable to all the observers in question. Commensurability requires a commonality of basic assumptions, or it does not occur. Because our basic metaphysical theses about our factual observations have this commonality, unfortunately lacking in our moral theses, the metaphysical theses become invaluable to falsification. For if these metaphysical theses are conclusively refuted, then they are refuted for the vast majority of observers. Merely moral theses seem almost never to get refuted in such a way, but moral theses that presuppose metaphysical theses do. Hence, in order that a moral claim be falsifiable, it must be grounded in a falsifiable metaphysics.
The Great Chain of Being was falsifiable by observations drawn from the history of capitalism. People did not display the behaviour that would have been expected of people who fell into a hierarchy of intrinsic perfection or imperfection relative to each other. Capitalism refuted the belief that one's level of perfection was determined by circumstances associated with one's birth. Specifically, the capitalist phenomenon of lower-class people attaining higher-class ranks constituted a refutation of this claim. This is because part of the thesis of the Great Chain of Being was that higher-order beings could beget lower-order beings--else how could God have created such an imperfect world? Yet lower-order beings could not beget higher-order beings--because our imperfect reality was dependant on the perfect higher reality of God. If we could have begotten something greater than ourselves, then we would have no need of God's higher reality, and the Chain would have been refuted. This enabled the Chain in fact to be refuted--by the straightforward observation of a man coming from a poor family but becoming a rich capitalist entrepreneur.
The hierarchical ethic presupposed the Great Chain of Being. The claim that one group of people had any right to enslave another group of people, or have any kind of conditional power over other people, depended on their inherent superiority, which the Great Chain supposed. Hence, the hiearchical ethic defined ways in which a beings rights might be circumscribed by the rights of beings higher in the hierarchy. Once this hiearchy was refuted, there was no longer any way to circumscribe those rights according to a social hierarchy. A paradigm shift towards democracy was an inevitable result. For the countries at the forefront of this shift, the US and France, the change was akin to that of a scientific revolution, a gestalt all-or-none switch from one political system to another. The social result, in the form of the American and French revolutions, was tumultuous, but an entirely new kind of government--democracy--was the result. The American and French systems of government then became models for other countries to follow in time.
We are, of course, all familiar with Hume's famous fact/value distinction, whereby one cannot derive an 'ought' from an 'is'. Thus, it does seem strange prima facie that any factual observation about the world could serve to refute a moral observation about what the world ought to be like. I have discussed in an earlier section how it is possible to make moral observations. Yet even here, the moral sentiment that is a part of the observation in question does indeed seem separate from the factual parts of the observation. Hence, the observation of a bunch of hoodlums setting fire to a cat seems a separate thing from the disapprobation that we feel towards this act. Hence, we might say that a moral claim that such an act is wrong is verified if we in fact can disapprove of the action when we observe it. However, the question of how such a claim can be falsified remains tricky. For we have already observed how once we allow moral observations to be legitimate, it seems as though almost any moral theory might legitimately form the basis for a moral observation. It may not necessarily be a matter of choice what theory will fit our actual moral intuitions and values. But it seems that, like Robert Nozick, if we really want our values to conform to a particular theory, then we can allow this to happen, even though in principle, it seems like we could thus recondition our intuitions to agree with a theory forever.
Hence, any account of moral falsifiability that rests solely on the basis of a moral value coupled with a factual observation seems doomed to fail. Moral values are, in one way or another, simply too elastic to allow for the kind of conclusive refutation that falsifiability demands. However, not all moral judgements are mere values coupled with factual observations. Some moral judgements actually presuppose certain kinds of factual observations. This is significant, because factual observations are the kinds of observations that are not so malleable to the persuasion by a specific metaphysical theory as moral observations are malleable to persuasion or even brainwashing by a particular moral theory. At least, there seem to be far fewer contending metaphysical theories to shape factual observations than moral theories to shape moral observations. Metaphysical theories seem to have have a far greater degree of commonality of basic assumptions about life than moral theories.
This is important, for in order to be conclusively falsifiable, a theory must also be (level 2) commensurable to all the observers in question. Commensurability requires a commonality of basic assumptions, or it does not occur. Because our basic metaphysical theses about our factual observations have this commonality, unfortunately lacking in our moral theses, the metaphysical theses become invaluable to falsification. For if these metaphysical theses are conclusively refuted, then they are refuted for the vast majority of observers. Merely moral theses seem almost never to get refuted in such a way, but moral theses that presuppose metaphysical theses do. Hence, in order that a moral claim be falsifiable, it must be grounded in a falsifiable metaphysics.
The Great Chain of Being was falsifiable by observations drawn from the history of capitalism. People did not display the behaviour that would have been expected of people who fell into a hierarchy of intrinsic perfection or imperfection relative to each other. Capitalism refuted the belief that one's level of perfection was determined by circumstances associated with one's birth. Specifically, the capitalist phenomenon of lower-class people attaining higher-class ranks constituted a refutation of this claim. This is because part of the thesis of the Great Chain of Being was that higher-order beings could beget lower-order beings--else how could God have created such an imperfect world? Yet lower-order beings could not beget higher-order beings--because our imperfect reality was dependant on the perfect higher reality of God. If we could have begotten something greater than ourselves, then we would have no need of God's higher reality, and the Chain would have been refuted. This enabled the Chain in fact to be refuted--by the straightforward observation of a man coming from a poor family but becoming a rich capitalist entrepreneur.
The hierarchical ethic presupposed the Great Chain of Being. The claim that one group of people had any right to enslave another group of people, or have any kind of conditional power over other people, depended on their inherent superiority, which the Great Chain supposed. Hence, the hiearchical ethic defined ways in which a beings rights might be circumscribed by the rights of beings higher in the hierarchy. Once this hiearchy was refuted, there was no longer any way to circumscribe those rights according to a social hierarchy. A paradigm shift towards democracy was an inevitable result. For the countries at the forefront of this shift, the US and France, the change was akin to that of a scientific revolution, a gestalt all-or-none switch from one political system to another. The social result, in the form of the American and French revolutions, was tumultuous, but an entirely new kind of government--democracy--was the result. The American and French systems of government then became models for other countries to follow in time.
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