Moral and non-moral values

What is a moral value, as opposed to a non-moral value? On the account given in "The Language of Values", I think that it is simply impossible to answer this question without begging the question in favour of some moral content. All the attempts at answering this question do beg the question in favour of some moral content. Furthermore, Alan Gewirth rightly points out that to use the word "ethics" descriptively would entail us describing many so-called moral codes that seem immoral. For example, Nazis claimed to have an ethics, as did the Dobuans. How on earth are we to define 'moral' in a way that excludes certain kinds of codes of conduct without thereby begging the question in favour of our own values? To use the word 'moral' in other words, is usually to use the word in some way prescriptively. As such, it can only be used to describe codes of conduct that are in some ways commensurate with our own values. But we can distinguish between different degrees of commensuration, as far as that is concerned. They would relate to the levels of commensurability, mentioned in the link at the right to the theory of commensurability.

An analogous difficulty with delimiting moral from non-moral values can be seen in defining good science, as Kuhn notes. It is what makes different scientific paradigms incommensurable. Proponents of different paradigms will try to convince each other by appeals to what are the legitimate problems of science, or what constitutes a valid observation. But they cannot make such claims without begging the question in favour of some scientific content, i.e. a view of the universe. The Newtonian view presupposes that x is valid science and the Einsteinian paradigm presupposes that y is good science. Similarly, different moral content presupposes different conceptions of moral values.

But of course, here a basic difference between ethics and science becomes apparent. Disputes between scientific paradigms are always eventually resolved in agreement. Disputes between ethical paradigms, on the other hand, are never resolved. Kantianism, utilitarianism and Aristotelianism continue to exist hundreds of years after they were first proposed. Kuhn also rightly points out, however, that ethics can still make progress within the same moral paradigm--hence, there is progress within Aristotelianism, rather than progress towards a unified moral perspective.

Here is where I could link in earlier discussion about the incapability of abstract theorising in ethics to progress. I could also discuss how social mores progress, and how abstract theorising assists in this area.

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