How do social mores progress?
The previous section, of course, brings us to the most important question of all: how do social mores progress? Over the last several sections, I have been entertaining the hypothesis that social mores progress by a process of falsification. In this respect, I have been influenced by the various articles on the Friesian website that I have been reading. However, it is worth noting that Kuhn himself is very skeptical about Popperian falsification, doubting that any such falsifying experiences even exist (p.146). The falsifying experience is analagous to his anomaly, where a theory does not solve a particular puzzle that it is meant to. But no theory ever solves all the puzzles that it is meant to at any given time, so if any falsifying instance were grounds for theory rejection, then we should reject all theories at all times. We might assume that only a strong falsifying instance should be grounds for theory rejection, but then we would need an account of "improbability" or "degree of falsification". There are many difficulties with constructing such an account, especially because procedures for falsification only exist within one or other paradigm.
Kuhn puts his case very well, and I find it difficult to disagree with him. Science does not indeed seem to progress by falsification, but by being a less fit competitor for an already existing alternate paradigm in time of crisis. Ross argues that there was a situation documented in Martin J.S. Ruckwick's The Great Devonian Controversy that constituted a counterexample to Kuhn's claims. Apparently, all the geologists in the book found that their theories were refuted by the evidence they were encountering. Kuhn did not think that, once a paradigm had been established, it would ever be directly falsified if another paradigm were not present to take its place. The fact that this could happen is proof positive that falsifying instances of theories do in fact exist, just as Popper recognised.
I must admit, though, that this still seems rather dubious. It is only one example against a myriad of examples that Kuhn himself employs that seem to support his own view, not Popper's. Bear in mind that we are also talking here about a very small group of geologists who were debating about the correct way of mapping and interpreting the geological strata in Devonshire in the 1830s. Hence, the field of interpretation was so isolated that everyone in the group might have decided simply to abandon their respective theories and come up with something completely new. Where there is a greater pool of observations on which to draw, it is easier to defend general theories and falsification becomes harder. I do not think, therefore, that this constitutes a strong refutation of Kuhn's claims.
Having said that, however, it does seem that Popper is right that a claim must at least be in principle falsifiable. If it were not, then there would never be any grounds for science to generate anomalies, which is the case. Clearly, any theory must admit of predictions which turn out not to match observed data. What the Great Devonian Controversy also shows, I would argue, is that if the field of observation is sufficiently narrow, and one practical question of a pressing nature requires an answer, then no available theory might be adequate to the task. But to claim that this constitutes a falsification of all said theories is begging the question. The dominant theory would still prevail if no alternative had been introduced, and the geological strata of Devonshire would simply have provoked a crisis. That is assuming, of course, that geology was a normal science by the 1830s. If all the competing theories were indeed pre-paradigm schools, then this behaviour would simply constitute business as usual, and the successful mapping and interpretation of the geological strata of Devonshire would have constitued the triumph of one pre-paradigm school. Given the intensity of the controversy in question, this triumph might well have been enough to make the winning theory a paradigm for geology.
What does this entail for the previous sections where I am arguing for the falsifiability of moral theories? I do not think that all that work can get completely thrown away. Talking of falsifiability is a little crude, but it is intuitive enough what it means when one considers a simple enough proposition and imagines a simple enough experience to confirm or disconfirm it. If one were to substitute 'anomalisability' for 'falsifiability' in the previous sections, then one would still arrive at theories that were capable of making moral progress. Metaphysical presuppositions of ethical theories that are anomalisable can admit of moral progress.
Kuhn puts his case very well, and I find it difficult to disagree with him. Science does not indeed seem to progress by falsification, but by being a less fit competitor for an already existing alternate paradigm in time of crisis. Ross argues that there was a situation documented in Martin J.S. Ruckwick's The Great Devonian Controversy that constituted a counterexample to Kuhn's claims. Apparently, all the geologists in the book found that their theories were refuted by the evidence they were encountering. Kuhn did not think that, once a paradigm had been established, it would ever be directly falsified if another paradigm were not present to take its place. The fact that this could happen is proof positive that falsifying instances of theories do in fact exist, just as Popper recognised.
I must admit, though, that this still seems rather dubious. It is only one example against a myriad of examples that Kuhn himself employs that seem to support his own view, not Popper's. Bear in mind that we are also talking here about a very small group of geologists who were debating about the correct way of mapping and interpreting the geological strata in Devonshire in the 1830s. Hence, the field of interpretation was so isolated that everyone in the group might have decided simply to abandon their respective theories and come up with something completely new. Where there is a greater pool of observations on which to draw, it is easier to defend general theories and falsification becomes harder. I do not think, therefore, that this constitutes a strong refutation of Kuhn's claims.
Having said that, however, it does seem that Popper is right that a claim must at least be in principle falsifiable. If it were not, then there would never be any grounds for science to generate anomalies, which is the case. Clearly, any theory must admit of predictions which turn out not to match observed data. What the Great Devonian Controversy also shows, I would argue, is that if the field of observation is sufficiently narrow, and one practical question of a pressing nature requires an answer, then no available theory might be adequate to the task. But to claim that this constitutes a falsification of all said theories is begging the question. The dominant theory would still prevail if no alternative had been introduced, and the geological strata of Devonshire would simply have provoked a crisis. That is assuming, of course, that geology was a normal science by the 1830s. If all the competing theories were indeed pre-paradigm schools, then this behaviour would simply constitute business as usual, and the successful mapping and interpretation of the geological strata of Devonshire would have constitued the triumph of one pre-paradigm school. Given the intensity of the controversy in question, this triumph might well have been enough to make the winning theory a paradigm for geology.
What does this entail for the previous sections where I am arguing for the falsifiability of moral theories? I do not think that all that work can get completely thrown away. Talking of falsifiability is a little crude, but it is intuitive enough what it means when one considers a simple enough proposition and imagines a simple enough experience to confirm or disconfirm it. If one were to substitute 'anomalisability' for 'falsifiability' in the previous sections, then one would still arrive at theories that were capable of making moral progress. Metaphysical presuppositions of ethical theories that are anomalisable can admit of moral progress.
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