The use of trivial examples - update 1

I have found a legitimate criticism of the use of trivial examples in Anne Maclean's The Elimination of Morality. She criticises R.M. Hare's use of trivial examples in Moral Thinking. She says that the kinds of things that one allows to happen in trivial examples are much more varied than what we would allow to happen in examples where more important interests were at stake. She claims that Hare's use of trivial examples allows him to sneak in premises that we would not accept if he had used more important examples.

I can see how her criticism serves her purposes in the book. What I cannot see, however, is that it serves my purposes for an empirical theory of ethics where moral intuitions are experience-dependent. It shows at most that one cannot generalise from trivial examples to important examples because the more important the things are at stake, the greater restrictions we would place upon our choices. But it may simply be inappropriate to impose those same restrictions on the trivial versions of the scenarios that we are likely to face day to day. So the use of trivial examples is still appropriate to delineate our actions for 90% of the time as opposed to 10% of the time.